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SECRET

1827 vol. 3 (71 — 140)

1967

vol. 3
(71 — 140)

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76

UNITED KINGDOM
MISSION
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

File No. 1827

Name of File—

United Nations Relief and Works Agency (U.N.R.W.A.)

NO MINUTES TO BE WRITTEN HERE

RECORD OF WEEDING		
	INITIALS	DATE
2 YEARS		
5 YEARS (CONSULAR POSTS ONLY)		
10 YEARS		

FO 961/26

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LAST Year's File No. 1827

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SECRET

(1883) D. 156230 177M 10/65 P.I. Gp. 610

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1852/140/67

FM CLAIR

20 SEP 1967

ROUTINE TEL AVIV TO FO

TELNO 1043 21 SEPT 1967

/ROUTINE/ R. 1045 A.M. 21 SEPTEMBER 1967

ADDSD F O TELNO 1042 OF 21 SEPT R F I TO UKMIS NEW YORK, NO. 220

UKDEL GENEVA, AMMAN, JERUSALEM, TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI, KUWAIT,

BAHRAIN (RESIDENCY), KHARTOUM, JEDDA, RABAT, TUNIS, CAIRO,

ALGIERS, WASHINGTON AND BEIRUT.

-1133

MY TELEGRAM NO 1033 : REFUGEES.

ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS WHEN THE ISRAEL DELEGATION APPEARED YESTERDAY FOR THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAD BEEN ARRANGED AT THE JORDANIAN'S REQUEST, THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE INFORMED THEM THAT THE JORDANIAN DELEGATE HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN AUTHORISED BY HIS GOVERNMENT TO ATTEND. THE MEETING THEREFORE DID NOT TAKE PLACE AND THE RESUMED CROSSING OF REFUGEES WILL NOT BEGIN TODAY.

2. A MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR SPOKESMAN TOLD THE +JERUSALEM POST+ LAST NIGHT THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT TAKE ANY INITIATIVE TO HOLD FURTHER MEETINGS.

ASKED IF THIS MEANT THAT ISRAEL WOULD REJECT ANY FURTHER REQUEST FOR A MEETING, THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT AFTER THE JORDANIANS HAD EXPLAINED THEIR FAILURE TO ATTEND YESTERDAY, ISRAEL WOULD ALWAYS BE READY TO CONSIDER THE HUMAN ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM

HADOW

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(827)/139/67

BRIEF NO. I(A) (i)

Mainly factual

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO
THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY
- 20 - 27 SPETEMBER, 1967

MIDDLE EAST (GENERAL): REFUGEES

Col. Sussney
Mr Hope

OBJECTIVE

To solve the Palestine and Arab refugee problems; and in particular and as a first step to arrange for the return to their lands of Arab communities displaced during the recent hostilities.

TALKING POINTS

2. It remains imperative that the Arab communities whose lands were overrun during the recent hostilities should be allowed, if displaced, to return, and if not displaced, to remain where they are.

3. We welcome the fact that the Israel authorities have agreed in stages to the return of a number of these refugees but are deeply disappointed that many more will remain excluded. We have made urgent representations to the

/Israel

INDEXED

Israel Government, which we would now reiterate, that they should let these refugees return.

4. It is particularly with the needs of the newly displaced population in mind that HMG have made an additional contribution to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency of $500,000 and a contribution of £500,000 to Jordan for rehabilitation and reconstruction in addition to providing emergency medical and other aid.

5. HMG consider that there is need for a great international effort to try and solve the refugee problems.

/BACKGROUND

BACKGROUND

6. There are two refugee problems - the problem of the Palestine refugees displaced as a result of the Arab/Israel war in 1948, and the problem of the Arabs, including many of the 1948 refugees, displaced from territories occupied by Israel during the recent hostilities.

7. As regards the 1948 refugees, the Arab position has been that, as provided for in UN Resolutions, these people have the right to return to their homes or to compensation (It is improbable that many of them would exercise the right to return, even if they were given the chance). The Israel position has been that no compensation should be paid to them except as part of a peace settlement. The problem has thus been fundamentally a political one, and it is our impression that the possibility of making significant progress towards solving it in advance of a political settlement is slight.

8. UNRWA are continuing to do good work in housing and feeding both the 1948 refugees and the 1967 refugees. It may, however, be difficult for an already existing organisation to be the

/vehicle

vehicle for any imaginative new effort towards solving the problem.

9. Mr. Gussing, who is looking into the problem of alleviating the suffering of civil populations and prisoners-of-war in the area of conflict (who, of course, include both 1948 and 1967 refugees), is expected to report on or about 15 September. We hope his report will give some pointers as to how our wish and that of other well-disposed governments to deal with the refugee problems might best be translated into action.

10. As regards the 1967 refugees, the scheme for the return to the West Bank of those Arabs who fled across to Jordan at the time of the fighting in June has not gone well. Despite strong representations from us, the Americans, U Thant and the International Red Cross, the Israelis have refused, apart from minor exceptions, to extend the 31 August deadline for the completion of this operation. They insisted that provocative statements from the Jordanian side, e.g. that the refugees were returning to be "a thorn in the flesh of Israel" made it impossible for

/them

them to be more flexible. We pointed out to the Jordanian Government the undesirability of statements of this kind and they undertook to avoid anything which could be considered provocative. However, the Israelis paid little attention to these assurances and claimed that provocative broadcasts continued. It is noticeable that the only broadcast to which the Israelis have specifically referred is the notorious "thorn in the flesh" speech by the Jordan Finance Minister. Jordanian broadcasts have continued to be unfriendly to Israel, have affirmed that Jordan will never give up the West Bank, and have urged the inhabitants not to co-operate with the Israelis. They could hardly be expected to say less.

11. In the event, by 31 August the Israelis had approved applications for return to the West Bank for about 20,000 persons. Not all those have yet returned, partly owing to Jordanian inefficiency in bringing them forward, but the balance are to be allowed to go back as from 17 September on three days a week. This, however, leaves on the East Bank some 150,000 persons for whom applications to return have been submitted. The fact

/that

that they remain there and are therefore added to the already intractable refugee problem (before the recent war, UNRWA were looking after 300,000 refugees on the East Bank) cannot but make an Arab/Israel settlement harder to achieve.

12. Doubt is cast on the Israel Government's sincerity in all this by the readiness with which they used Jordanian statements, admittedly provocative but only to be expected in the circumstances, to limit the extent of the operation. It is also significant that the Israelis appear not to have approved the return of 1948 refugees to Jerusalem and Bethlehem or to the UNRWA camps in Jericho, Hebron and Bethlehem, from which approximately 80,000 were displaced in June. The implication is that the Israelis are thinking in terms of a long stay on the West Bank and to strengthen their hold there as far as possible. We have had distressing reports of the likely condition of the former inhabitants of the Jericho refugee camps when winter comes. This is particularly frustrating when good accommodation exists for them in the UNRWA camps which they left on the West Bank.

Eastern Department,
15 September, 1967

RESTRICTED

1827/138/67

CYPHER CAT/A

ROUTINE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO. 2335 19 SEPTEMBER 1967

RESTRICTED 20 SEP 1967 D. 8.59 p.m. 19 Sept.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 2335 OF 19 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION SAVING TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, UK MISSION GENEVA, JERUSALEM, TEL AVIV.

REFUGEES: GUSSING'S REPORT.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (A/6797) AND SECURITY COUNCIL (S/8158), BASED ON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY MR GUSSING, WAS CIRCULATED THIS MORNING (COPIES BY BAG).

2. THIS 97 PAGE DOCUMENT IS DIVIDED INTO FOUR CHAPTERS HEADED: (A) THE SAFETY, WELFARE AND SECURITY OF POPULATIONS UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL: (B) THE SITUATION OF PERSONS DISPLACED FROM AREAS UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL, AND THE QUESTION OF THEIR RETURN: (C) TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR: AND (D) THE QUESTION OF THE TREATMENT OF MINORITIES. IT ENDS UP WITH BRIEF CONCLUDING REMARKS BUT NO RECOMMENDATIONS.

3. THE FIRST TWO CHAPTERS ARE BY FAR THE LONGEST AND DEAL WITH SITUATIONS IN SYRIA, JORDAN, GAZA AND THE UAR WITH GREAT THOROUGHNESS. MR GUSSING SEEMS CONVINCED THAT ACTS OF INTIMIDATION OF THE ARAB CIVILIAN POPULATION, WIDESPREAD LOOTING AND IN SOME CASES EXPULSION OF CIVILIANS DID OCCUR IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR AND QUOTES INSTANCES. THE ARABS WILL FIND COPIOUS MATERIAL HERE TO BUTTRESS THEIR ALLEGATIONS OF ISRAELI BRUTALITY, ETC., IN THE FORTHCOMING ASSEMBLY DEBATES, AND THEREAFTER. ON THE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS, THE REPORT POINTS OUT THAT THE POSITION IN OCCUPIED SYRIA AND THE OCCUPIED UAR IS MUCH MORE COMPLICATED THAN FOR EX-WEST BANKERS.

INDEXED

4. AS REGARDS PRISNONERS OF WAR, MR. GUSSING SAYS HE VISITED CAMPS IN ISRAEL AND THE UAR AND GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT TREATMENT OF PRISONERS WAS ''CORRECT'' ON BOTH SIDES. CONTACT BETWEEN THEM AND THEIR FAMILIES HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED AND ONE EXCHANGE

/OF

RESTRICTED

OF PRISONERS HAD BEEN CONCLUDED. (THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF PRISONERS IS, OF COURSE, HELD IN ISRAEL).

5. THE BALANCE OF THE REPORT IS SOMEWHAT REDRESSED IN THE CHAPTER ON TREATMENT OF MINORITIES IN ISRAEL AND NEIGHBOURING ARAB COUNTRIES. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT GUSSING FOUND THAT JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN SYRIA AND THE UAR HAD NOT BEEN WELL TREATED SINCE THE 5 JUNE WAR, THOUGH THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO HIM WAS SECOND HAND.

6. IN HIS CONCLUDING REMARKS THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAYS THAT HE HOPES THAT THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED ''WILL FIND IT POSSIBLE TO DIVORCE THE PURELY HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION FROM THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS''. THIS IS AS NEAR AS HE COMES TO A RECOMMENDATION. HE ADDS THAT UNRWA'S EFFORTS ''HAVE NOW BECOME MORE INDESPENSABLE THAN EVER''.

F.O. PASS SAVING TO AMMAN 19, BEIRUT 91, CAIRO 157, JERUSALEM 38, TEL AVIV 41 AND UKMIS GENEVA 88.

LORD CARADON

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— 1827/137/67

19 SEP 1967

EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE AMMAN — TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1119 — 19 SEPTEMBER 1967
/IMMEDIATE/ — R. 10.27 A.M. 19 SEPTEMBER

MADDSD TO F O TELNO 1119 OF 19 SEPTEMBER RPTD FOR INFO TO
UKMIS NEW YORK/ NO. 150 TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM AND BEIRUT.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TEL. 1136

REFUGEES.

A JORDANIAN OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN DENIED THAT THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE ASKED FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE RETURN OF EVACUEES TO THE WEST BANK.

2. THE OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN SAID THE REAL REASON WHICH PREVENTED THE EVACUEES FROM RETURNING ON SUNDAY WAS THE NON-RECEIPT BY JORDAN OF APPROVED APPLICATIONS FOR RETURN FROM THE OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES THROUGH THE RED CROSS. THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES ARE STILL WAITING FOR THE ARRIVAL OF THESE APPLICATIONS.

3. THE JORDANIAN OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN WAS REPLYING TO ALLEGATIONS BY THE OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES THAT JORDAN HAS ASKED FOR THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE RESUMPTION OF THE RETURN OF EVACUEES TO THE WEST BANK.

FO PASS NEW YORK 150

/REPEATED BY FOREIGN OFFICE TO U.K.MISSION NEW YORK NO. 4906/

ADAMS/SOSFA

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W 1827/136/67

20 SEP 1967

ENCLAIR

ROUTINE AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1120 20 SEPTEMBER 1967

/ROUTINE/ R. 10.36 A.M. 20 SEPTEMBER

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1120 OF 20 SEPT. NO. 151

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV, UKMISS NEW YORK/BEIRUT AND JERUSALEM.

MY TELNO 1118. 136 REFUGEES.

IN PARA 3 FOR IMPROVEMENT PLEASE READ MOVEMENT.

F O PASS NEW YORK 151.

/REPEATED BY FOREIGN OFFICE TO U.K.MISSION NEW YORK NO. 4937/

ADAMS

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19 SEP 1967 — 1827/136/67

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TEL NO 1118

19 SEPTEMBER

/IMMEDIATE/

R. 1.01 P.M. 19 SEPTEMBER

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1118 OF 19 SEPTEMBER

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION UKMIS NEW YORK NO. 149 /TEL AVIV JERUSALEM BEIRUT.

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 2062: 1135 REFUGEES.

IT IS NOT TRUE THAT THE RETURN OF REFUGEES IS BEING QUOTE PREVENTED BY THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT UNQUOTE. THERE ARE 1361 FAMILIES COMPRISING 3722 PERSONS WHOSE APPLICATIONS TO RETURN TO THE WEST BANK HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY THE ISRAELIS AND RETURNED TO THE JORDANIANS, WHO HAVE NOT SO FAR GONE BACK. THE REASONS FOR THEIR NON-RETURN ARE

(A) SOME OF THEM ARE SPLIT FAMILIES,
E.G. WHERE PERMISSION HAS BEEN RECEIVED FOR THE RETURN OF TWO TEENAGE DAUGHTERS BUT NOT THE FATHER OR THE MOTHER THEN, NATURALLY, THE PARENTS WILL NOT ALLOW THE GIRLS TO GO BACK:
(B) NO MOTOR CARS ARE BEING ALLOWED BACK WITH REFUGEES, SO ANYONE DEPENDENT ON THE TRANSPORT WHICH THEY MANAGED TO BRING TO THE EAST BANK WHEN THEY FLED FROM THEIR HOMES IS UNWILLING TO ABANDON HIS CAR (AND PROBABLY THE MEANS OF HIS LIVELIHOOD) IN ORDER TO RETURN TO THE WEST BANK:

(C) NO FLOCKS ARE ALLOWED BACK,
SO THAT SHEPHERDS AND SMALLHOLDERS PREFER TO REMAIN HERE WITH THEIR STOCK IN TRADE, I.E. THEIR FLOCKS, IN THE HOPE THAT LATER THEY MAY RETURN WITH THEM TO THE WEST BANK.

INDEXED

2. THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES WHOM WE HAVE CONSULTED ARE SATISFIED THAT THE BULK OF THOSE WHO HAVE HAD PERMISSION TO RETURN AND WHO HAVE NOT DONE SO COME WITHIN THESE CATEGORIES. THEY SAY THERE /137

/ARE

ARE OTHERS WHO FEAR TO RETURN IN VIEW OF THE WELL-SUBSTANTIATED ACCOUNTS OF RECENT SHOOTING INCIDENTS WITH FATALITIES NEAR THE DAMYIA AND UMSHARAT BRIDGES.

3...I HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT THAT THESE ARE THE MAIN REASONS WHY THE INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED HAVE NOT YET RETURNED AND I DO NOT EXPECT TO SEE MUCH FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN THE QUOTE ALREADY APPROVED BUT NOT YET TRAVELLED UNQUOTE CATEGORY WHICH THE ISRAELIS ARE PRESENTING AS A CONCESSION.

4... WHILE IT IS OF COURSE TRUE THAT THE JORDANIANS, LIKE OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS, HAVE USED THE REFUGEES AS POLITICAL PAWNS IN THE PAST, THEIR POSITION SINCE 1 JULY HAS BEEN AND IS THAT THEY WANT ALL REFUGEES WHO CROSSED THE RIVER SINCE THE WAR TO RETURN AND IT IS NOT THEM BUT THE ISRAELIS WHO ARE FRUSTRATING THIS. THEY WANT APPROVAL OF THE 150,000 ODD WHOSE APPLICATIONS ARE STILL UNANSWERED.

5. MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM CONTAINS THE TEXT OF AN OFFICIAL JORDANIAN STATEMENT ISSUED ON 18 SEPTEMBER.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK 149

/REPEATED BY FOREIGN OFFICE TO U.K.MISSION NEW YORK NO. 4911/

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1827/135/67

CYPHER/CAT A CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMMAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2062 18 SEPTEMBER 1967

/PRIORITY/ R. 1.37 P.M. 18 SEPTEMBER

19 SEP 1967

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 2062 OF 18 SEPTEMBER REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV JERUSALEM UKMIS NEW YORK NO. 4892/BEIRUT.

(1127/133)

REFUGEES.

REPORTS DATELINED AMMAN IN THE WEEKEND AND IN TODAY'S PRESS STATE THAT THE RETURN (DUE TO START YESTERDAY) OF THE 6,000 REFUGEES WHOSE APPLICATIONS WERE APPROVED BY THE ISRAELIS BUT WHO WERE UNABLE TO RETURN BECAUSE OF THE 31 AUGUST DEADLINE IS BEING PREVENTED BY THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT. REPORTS GO ON TO STATE THAT ALTHOUGH NO OFFICIAL EXPLANATION HAS BEEN GIVEN KORDAN GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE IS UNDERSTOOD TO BE IN PROTEST AT ISRAEL'S WHOLE ATTITUDE OVER THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. IN ADDITION, REPORTS STATE THAT JORDAN GOVERNMENT'S SPOKESMAN HAS UTTERED OFFICIAL PROTEST AT QUOTE ISRAEL'S FLAGRANT TRANSGRESSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION UNQUOTE ON THE RETURN OF REFUGEES.

2. IF TRUE, THESE ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT SEEM UNLIKELY TO BENEFIT ANYONE AND WOULD LEND SUPPORT FOR ISRAELI CONTENTIONS THAT THEY ARE USING THE REFUGEES FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES.

3. GRATEFUL FOR COMMENTS.

/REPEATED BY FOREIGN OFFICE TO U.K.MISSION NEW YORK NO. 4892/

SOSFA

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1639/67

13 SEP 1967

With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY

Chancery,
NEW YORK.

14/9/67

Mr Hope

AMMAN

Dear

Mr Egerton

D.G. Crawford

O.C.

16/9

MP 14/9

11 September, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

1827/134/67

1[redacted]7

BRITISH EMBASSY,
AMMAN.

11 September, 1967

British Parliamentary Delegation

The following delegation visited Jordan as the guests of the Jordan Parliament on 9 and 10 September.

H. Walker, M.P.	-	Labour
D. Concannon, M.P.	-	"
A. Gardner, M.P.	-	"
R. Maxwell-Hyslop, M.P.	-	Conservative
A. Buck, M.P.	-	"
S. Mills, M.P.	-	Ulster Unionist.

2. The delegation crossed over from the West Bank via the King Hussein (Allenby) bridge on the afternoon of 9 September and returned by the same route to Israel the following day. Their leader, Mr. Walker, was careful to explain to the Jordan Prime Minister, to the Foreign Minister and to other members of the Jordan Government and Parliament who they met that the delegation was an unofficial one; that they had come to the area at the invitation and expense of the Israeli Government and that, at the suggestion of the British Foreign Office, they had sought to come to Jordan in order to hear the views of both sides on how the present Middle East situation might be improved.

3. The delegation heard from both the Jordan Prime Minister and Foreign Minister that, following the Summit Conference in Khartoum, the Arabs and notably Jordan and the U.A.R. did not seek hostilities with Israel. On the other hand they could not recognise her existence or enter into direct negotiations with her. Both ministers looked to the United Nations to reach a settlement which would entail the withdrawal of Israeli troops to the borders of 5 June. On Arab concessions they would go no further than the usual formula of "peace with justice". When questioned on how such a settlement could in practice be reached the ministers replied that it was for the great powers, including Britain, to oblige Israel to withdraw. The Foreign Minister hinted that an imposed settlement possibly on the lines of the 1947 partition plan might now be the most suitable outcome.

4. If the delegation were somewhat unimpressed about the realism of Jordanian thinking about a possible settlement they were deeply concerned at the plight of the refugees they saw at the Souf camp near Jerash. A tented camp of 10,000 persons with one UNRWA docter and two "Save the Children Fund" helpers, it more than anything else brought home to the delegation the extent of the human tragedy which had resulted from the events of last June. The delegation learned about the present plans to transfer the camps on the Jordanian hills to the more sheltered

/conditions

J.C. Moberly, Esq.,
Eastern Department.

CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED

See 1062/58

conditions in the Jordan valley in order to give the refugees better protection this winter. They saw for themselves the inadequate tents, the crowded conditions and the utter hopelessness of trying to care for the many women and children. The dangers of epidemics as a result of bad water, insanitary conditions and malnutrition during the coming winter were pointed out to them. The Prime Minister, when he dwelt on this subject during his interview, even referred to the possibility of "mass death" in the Jordan valley this winter if something were not soon done. Perhaps the senseless inhumanity of the whole refugee situation was best made clear to the delegation when on their return to the King Hussein bridge they could see in the distance across the Jordan the green area of Jericho. There were the well built permanent UNRWA camps (paid for by international contributions - 85% American and British) almost completely empty of people. They recognised that during the winter if nothing were done now thousands of refugees living in wretched conditions on the east side of the Jordan would be able to see the same sight.

5. The delegation left Jordan with the expressed intention of doing their best to relieve the plight of the refugees. They hoped to see the Israeli Foreign Minister to urge him to allow the return of the West Bankers to their permanent homes and camps before the winter. On the prospects of a political settlement they could only leave with an impression of total unrealism in Jordanian thinking; especially so after a somewhat prolonged and bitter discussion with members of the Jordan Parliament following a dinner given in their honour on the Saturday evening.

6. Incidentally Mrs McKay, M.P., currently on a private visit here, took part in this discussion expressing pronounced pro-Arabs views in a manner which members of the delegation described as not particularly helpful of diplomatic. She is for the moment something of a Jordanian heroine having just returned from a clandestine visit to the West Bank full of stories of Israeli acts of repression especially in the Gaza area. She did not appear to be a heroine of the delegation who were anxious for the most part to keep out of her way.

(D.G. Crawford)

c.c. Chanceries at
WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV,
and NEW YORK.

1821/165/67

Chancery,
UKmission UN,
New York.

1827/132/67

13 SEP 1967

18 SEP 1967

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF

THE CHANCERY

Mr Rhodes.

7th September, 1967

H/C 14/9

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BEIRUT.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

REPORT ON CONTRIBUTIONS

For the seven months ended 31 July 1967

GENERAL NOTES

1. This report covers only contributions to UNRWA and does not include any made direct to the refugees. A contribution to UNRWA is one that is under its direct control, and usable in its programme. All other contributions, even if handled by UNRWA, are considered as being made direct to the refugees.

2. The pledges reported in Statement I are those which relate wholly or partly to contributions for 1967 and subsequent years and, also, pledges wholly related to previous years that have not yet been received in full.

3. Contributions in currencies of countries where exchange restrictions are in force have been shown in U.S. dollars at official rates of exchange prevailing at the time of receipt. Other cash contributions are stated at approximate free market rates.

4. Contributions in kind are shown at the donors' valuations, if known and reasonable; otherwise at valuations set by the Agency, with consideration given to prevailing market valuations.

Accounts Division

14 August 1967

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM GOVERNMENTS

Status of Current Pledges
as at 31 July 1967
(in U.S. dollars)

Name of contributor	Description or purpose	Amount pledged	Applicable to operations in 1966 and before	1967	1968 and after	Unpaid balances
		$	$	$	$	$
Abu Dhabi	Bahrein dinars	20,927	-	20,927	-	-
Australia	Australian dollars (1966/67 pledge)	201,600	100,800	100,800	-	-
Austria	U.S. dollars	10,000	-	10,000	-	-
Austria	Austrian shillings	19,231 5/	-	19,231	-	19,231
Belgium	Belgian francs	35,000	-	35,000	-	-
Canada	Canadian dollars	462,963	-	462,963	-	-
Canada	Flour (FOB Canada)	925,926 5/	-	925,926	-	925,926
Canada	Flour and skim milk (C&F Beirut)	1,059,901 5/	-	1,059,901	-	1,059,901
Canada	Rental of aircraft for one year	21,600 5/	-	10,800	10,800	19,800
Ceylon	Supplies	1,000	-	1,000	-	1,000
China	U.S. dollars	20,000 5/	-	20,000	-	-
Congo	U.S. dollars	20,000 5/	-	20,000	-	20,000
Cyprus	Pounds sterling	560	-	560	-	-
Denmark	Danish crowns (regular pledge 1966/67)	79,629	39,814	39,815	-	-
Denmark	U.S. dollars (for vocational education 1966/67)	200,000	66,667	133,333	-	-
Denmark	U.S. dollars (for vocational education 1967/68)	200,000 5/	-	66,667	133,333	-
Denmark	Danish crowns	217,171 5/	-	217,171	-	-
Federal Republic of Germany	U.S. dollars (regular pledge)	750,000 5/	-	750,000	-	375,000
Federal Republic of Germany	Jordan dinars	2,800 5/	-	2,800	-	-
Finland	U.S. dollars	50,000 5/	-	50,000	-	-
Finland	U.S. dollars	15,000	-	15,000	-	-
France	French francs (regular pledge)	122,449	-	122,449	-	-
France	Rents (regular pledge)	60,717	-	60,717	-	25,796
France	Lebanese pounds (for university scholarships)	1,412 5/	-	1,412	-	-
France	French francs	1,020,408 5/	-	1,020,408	-	1,020,408

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM GOVERNMENTS
(Continued)

Name of contributor	Description or purpose	Amount pledged	Applicable to operations in 1966 and before	1967	1968 and after	Unpaid balances
		$	$	$	$	$
France	Services of staff (for teaching French)	11,987	3,996	7,991	-	1,132
France	French francs (for teaching French and vocational education):					
	1964/65 school year	57,653	45,417	-	12,236	-
	1965/66 school year	57,653	26,902	-	30,751	-
	1966/67 school year	57,653	15,350	25,575	16,728	-
	1967/68 school year	57,653	-	19,053	38,600	-
Gaza Authorities	Rents and vaccines	154,629	-	154,629	-	63,467
Gaza Authorities	Egyptian pounds (for university scholarships)	2,000	1,000	1,000	-	-
Ghana	U.S. dollars	3,000	-	3,000	-	-
Greece	U.S. dollars	15,000	-	15,000	-	-
Holy See	U.S. dollars	2,500	-	2,500	-	-
Holy See	U.S. dollars	10,000 5/	-	10,000	-	-
Iceland	U.S. dollars	12,000 5/	-	12,000	-	12,000
India	Supplies	26,666	13,333	13,333	-	18,704
Iran	Iranian rials	6,000	-	6,000	-	6,000
Ireland	U.S. dollars	25,000	-	25,000	-	-
Israel	Port, and transport services	150,000 7/	-	150,000 2/4/	-	150,000
Italy	U.S. dollars	320,000	160,000 1/	160,000	-	320,000
Jamaica	Pounds sterling	560	-	560	-	560
Japan	U.S. dollars	40,000	-	40,000	-	-
Japan	U.S. dollars	300,000 5/	-	300,000	-	300,000
Jordan	Rents, water, port and transport services, vaccines	170,766	-	170,766	-	69,680
Kuwait	U.S. dollars	220,000	-	220,000	-	220,000
Lebanon	Rents, laboratory services, water and vaccines	45,531	-	45,531	-	18,196
Libya	U.S. dollars	100,000	-	100,000	-	-
Luxembourg	U.S. dollars	3,000 4/	-	3,000	-	3,000

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM GOVERNMENTS
(Continued)

Name of contributor	Description or purpose	Amount pledged	Applicable to operations in 1966 and before	1967	1968 and after	Unpaid balances
		$	$	$	$	$
Malaysia	U.S. dollars (regular pledge)	1,500	-	1,500	-	1,500
Malaysia	U.S. dollars	10,000 5/	-	10,000	-	-
Malta	U.S. dollars	5,000 5/	-	5,000	-	5,000
Monaco	French francs	204	-	204	-	-
Morocco	U.S. dollars	25,000	-	25,000	-	25,000
Netherlands	Netherlands guilders (regular pledge)	110,193	-	110,193	-	-
Netherlands	U.S. dollars (for vocational education)	7,681	-	7,681	-	2,357
New Zealand	Pounds sterling and New Zealand pounds	84,000	-	84,000	-	-
Niger	Niger francs	510	-	510	-	510
Norway	Norwegian crowns (regular pledge)	84,000	-	84,000	-	-
Norway	Norwegian crowns	209,996 4/ 5/	-	209,996	-	209,996
Pakistan	Pounds sterling	20,964	-	20,964	-	-
Philippines	U.S. dollars	1,250	-	1,250	-	-
Qatar	U.S. dollars	10,000	-	10,000	-	-
Saudi Arabia	U.S. dollars	297,778	-	297,778	-	-
Singapore	U.S. dollars	1,000 5/	-	1,000	-	-
Spain	Flour	78,000 5/	-	78,000	-	-
Spain	Potatoes	44,500 5/	-	44,500	-	-
Sudan	Sudanese pounds	5,740	5,740	-	-	5,740
Sweden	Swedish crowns (regular pledge)	145,773	-	145,773	-	-
Sweden	U.S. dollars (special contribution)	1,890,000	-	1,890,000	-	-
Sweden	Vocational training services in Sweden					
	1966/67 school year	110,000	55,000	55,000	-	-
	1967/68 school year	110,000	-	55,000	55,000	-
Sweden	U.S. dollars (for well for Siblin VTC and T&TTI)	11,662	11,662	-	-	11,662

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM GOVERNMENTS
(Continued)

Name of contributor	Description or purpose	Amount pledged	Applicable to operations in 1966 and before	1967	1968 and after	Unpaid balances
		$	$	$	$	$
Switzerland	Swiss francs (regular pledge)	104,167 1/	-	104,167	-	-
Switzerland	Swiss francs (for family kits)	34,722 2/	-	34,722	-	-
Switzerland	Swiss francs (for blankets)	23,148 2/	-	23,148	-	23,148
Syrian Arab Republic	Transport, rents and vaccines	91,560	-	91,560	-	58,443
Trinidad and Tobago	U.S. dollars	1.000	-	1,000	-	-
Tunisia	U.S. dollars	4,000	-	4,000	-	-
Turkey	U.S. dollars	10,000	-	10,000	-	-
United Arab Republic	Port and transport services	117,883 6/	-	117,883	-	[illegible]
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Pounds sterling	4,500,000	-	4,500,000	-	2,250,000
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Pounds sterling	500,000 5/	-	500,000	-	-
United States of America	Foodstuffs of earlier pledges under delivery	-	-	-	-	67,860
United States of America	U.S. dollars and local currencies (1966/67)	13,300,000 3/	6,650,000	6,650,000	-	3,150,000
United States of America	Foodstuffs (1966/67)	8,900,000 3/	4,450,000	4,450,000	-	84,365
United States of America	U.S. dollars	2,000,000 5/	-	2,000,000	-	2,000,000
Yugoslavia	Supplies	20,000	-	20,000	-	20,000
				28,295,647	297,448	12,565,382

1/ Pledge made in 1966 in respect of period 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1966

2/ Pledge made in 1967 in respect of period 1 July 1966 to 30 June 1967

3/ Payable on a matching basis not to exceed 70% of contributions paid by all governments applicable to the fiscal period of the United States to which this pledge applies.

4/ Subject to parliamentary approval.

5/ Special pledge for emergency needs.

6/ For the period 1/1/67 - 31/5/67 only.

7/ Nominal estimate pending further information.

CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED FROM NON-GOVERNMENT SOURCES
during the seven months ended 31 July 1967
(in U.S. dollars)

Name of contributor	Description	Vocational education scholarships $	Other education contributions $	Other contributions $	Special contributions for emergency needs 1/ $
Australia					
U.N. Association of Australia - Victorian Division	Cash	502	-	-	-
U.N. Association of Australia	Cash	-	-	-	13,498
U.N. Junior Set - Sydney	Cash	-	-	-	448
Austria					
Caritas	Cash	3,873	-	-	-
Canada					
Ambassador Maybee	Cash	-	-	-	92
Canadian Embassy	Supplies	-	-	75	-
Canadian Red Cross Youth	Cash	460	-	-	-
Henderson, Mrs. Dorothy	Cash	460	-	-	-
Peel County Secondary School	Cash	926	-	-	-
Sundry donors	Cash	-	-	9	96
Denmark					
Danish Refugee Council	Cash	-	-	-	36,042
Danish Refugee Council	Supplies	-	-	4,105	-
Federal Republic of Germany					
Berliner Bank	Cash	500	-	-	-
Bosch, Robert, GmbH	Cash	500	-	-	-
Frankfurter Bank	Cash	500	-	-	-
MISEREOR	Cash	-	-	-	12,500
The Near East Representatives of German Banks - Beirut	Cash	1,000	-	-	-
Sundry donors	Cash	37	-	-	-
Sundry donors	Supplies	-	-	5	-

1/ Reports and documentation on special donations in kind are not yet complete. This column, therefore, should not be regarded as a complete report on special contributions for emergency needs.

CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED FROM NON-GOVERNMENT SOURCES
(Continued)

Name of contributor	Description	Vocational education scholarships	Other education contributions	Other contributions	Special contributions for emergency needs
		$	$	$	$
Finland					
Finnish Association of Folk High Schools and Folk Academies	Cash	1,500	-	-	-
Finnish Refugee Council	Cash	-	-	8,900	-
Hufoudstadsbladet, Helsinki	Cash	1,000	-	-	-
Paraisten Kalkkivuor, OY	Cash	500	-	-	-
Stockmann Department Store, Helsinki	Cash	1,000	-	-	-
Svenska Osterbottons Folkshogskola Folkakademi, Yttermark	Cash	500	-	-	-
Tehtaanpuiston Yhteiskoulon Teinikunta	Cash	500	-	-	-
Union of Finnish Girl Guides	Cash	500	-	-	-
France					
Alamichel, Claude	Cash	-	-	-	210
Cimade	Cash	-	-	-	1,020
Communaute de L'arche	Cash	-	-	-	612
Lycee Jeanne d'Arc - Nancy	Cash	163	-	-	-
Meyer, George	Cash	-	-	-	102
Secours Catholique de France	Cash	-	-	898	-
Sundry donors	Cash	-	-	-	20
Gaza					
Abu Abdallah Family	Services	-	-	60	-
Abu Khusa Family	Services	-	-	20	-
Abu Middain Family	Services	-	-	1,125	-
Abu Omar Family and Khalil Khalil	Services	-	-	22	-
Abu Salim Family	Services	-	-	285	-
Abu Salah Naser	Services	-	-	17	-
Abu Sha'b Family	Services	-	-	257	-
Abu Ayyad Family	Services	-	-	22	-
Abu Ayyad and Awada Families	Services	-	-	42	-
Abu Uriban Family	Services	-	-	55	-

CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED FROM NON-GOVERNMENT SOURCES
(Continued)

Name of contributor	Description	Vocational education scholarships	Other education contributions	Other contributions	Special contributions for emergency needs
		$	$	$	$
Gaza (Continued)					
Abu Uriban and Abu Middain Families	Services	-	-	28	-
Awada Family	Services	-	-	912	-
Awada and Abu Middain Families	Services	-	-	189	-
Daghma Family	Services	-	-	64	-
El Massaddar Family	Services	-	-	163	-
Gaza Municipality	Services	-	-	22	-
Massaddar and Qur'an Families	Services	-	-	218	-
Saleh Ali Barbakh	Services	-	-	27	-
Tarazi Family	Services	-	-	67	-
Waqf Department	Services	-	-	3,843	-
Ireland					
Irish National Committee for UNICEF	Cash	-	-	-	560
Japan					
Sundry donors	Cash	-	-	52	-
Jordan					
Municipal Council - Qalqilia	Services	-	-	358	-
Save the Children Fund	Supplies	-	-	266	-
Anonymous	Services	-	-	1,165	-
Lebanon					
Greek Orthodox Community	Services	-	-	367	-
Mneimneh and Bohsaly	Services	-	-	827	-
Heirs of Saaddine Shatila	Services	-	-	738	-
Syrian Lebanese Mission	Services	-	-	1,106	-
Sundry donors	Supplies	-	-	11	-
Anonymous	Services	-	-	1,658	-

CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED FROM NON-GOVERNMENT SOURCES
(Continued)

Name of contributor	Description	Vocational education scholarships	Other education contributions	Other contributions	Special contributions for emergency needs
		$	$	$	$
Netherlands					
UNESCO Centrum Netherland	Cash	-	-	-	10,000
New Zealand					
New Zealand Council Organizations for Relief Services Overseas (CORSO)	Cash	14,000	-	8,834	5,600
Norway					
Kroksnes, Arthur	Cash	-	-	141	-
Norwegian Refugee Council	Cash	8,000	-	29,771	-
Save the Children Fund (Redd Berna)	Cash	490	-	-	-
Portugal					
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation	Cash	5,000	-	-	-
Sweden					
Ericsson Messrs. L.M.	Supplies	-	583	-	-
Hult, A.	Cash	-	-	-	290
Swedish Save the Children Federation	Cash	8,000	-	15,301	-
Switzerland					
Anderson, Malte	Cash	500	-	-	-
Feller, E.	Cash	-	-	-	231
Krbec, Miss Eva Marie	Cash	-	-	-	231
Moracchi, V.	Cash	-	-	-	1,359
Waser, pfr. Heinz	Cash	-	-	-	116
Mrs. Weeks and Miss Krbec	Cash	139	-	-	-
Sundry donors	Cash	-	-	8	198
Syrian Arab Republic					
Syrian Local Authorities	Services	-	-	1,178	

CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED FROM NON-GOVERNMENT SOURCES
(Continued)

Name of contributor	Description	Vocational education scholarships $	Other education contributions $	Other contributions $	Special contributions for emergency needs $
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland					
British Organization	Supplies	-	-	-	71,500
British Organization (The Near East Council Churches)	Supplies	-	-	-	10,000
British Bank of the Middle East	Cash	-	-	-	70,000
Cambridge University - UNA Refugee Department	Cash	-	-	280	378
Christian Aid	Cash	-	-	-	14,000
Council for Education in World Citizenship	Cash	-	-	-	2,825
European Campaign for World Refugees	Cash	28,000	-	-	-
Freedom from Hunger (Tenby) Committee	Cash	504	-	-	-
Luthwaite, Miss Hilda	Cash	-	-	-	140
May, E.G.	Cash	-	-	63	-
Mulford, Mr. and Mrs. W.	Cash	196	-	-	-
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM)	Cash	10,500	-	5,040	42,000
Petts Wood Methodist Church	Cash	504	-	-	-
Rogers, Miss M.	Cash	504	-	-	-
Schuller, Mrs. Thomas	Cash	-	-	-	62
St. Helen's School	Cash	504	-	-	-
Standing Conference of British Organization for Aid to Refugees	Cash	-	-	-	22,400
Tomlinson, Miss	Cash	-	-	-	140
United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Cash	-	-	-	4,200
United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Freedom from Hunger Campaign Fund)	Cash	1,484	-	-	-
Veitch G.	Supplies	-	-	300	-
Wings of Friendship	Supplies	-	-	101	-
Sundry donors	Cash	-	-	28	25
Anonymous	Cash	-	-	278	-

CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED FROM NON-GOVERNMENT SOURCES
(Continued)

Name of contributor	Description	Vocational education scholraships $	Other education contributions $	Other contributions $	Special contributions for emergency needs $
United States of America					
American Council for Judaism Philanthropic Fund	Cash	-	-	-	5,000
American Middle East Rehabilitation Inc. (AMER)	Cash	5,981	-	-	6,500
American Middle East Rehabilitation Inc. (AMER)	Supplies	10,872	-	-	-
American Mission - Beirut	Services	-	-	587	-
American Women's Club of Lebanon	Cash	475	-	-	-
Arab American Community of Ann Arbor	Cash	-	-	-	1,050
Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO)	Cash	15,000	40,000	5,000	-
Baird Foundation	Cash	-	-	114	-
Buehrig, Dr. Edward E.	Cash	100	-	-	-
Dahran Women's Group (ARAMCO)	Cash	-	-	380	-
Fallers, A. Lloyd	Cash	-	-	-	100
Fellowship Club	Cash	-	-	-	50
First Congregational Church	Cash	-	-	-	50
Ford Motor Co.	Cash	25,000	-	-	-
Ford Motor Co.	Supplies	-	1,826	-	-
Garth, William Le Roy Estate	Cash	-	-	2,958	-
Goldburg, Rabbi Robert E.	Cash	-	-	-	100
Hansen, Ernest	Cash	-	-	-	100
Hibner, Mrs. Don T. Jr.	Cash	-	-	50	-
Holbrook, Dwight	Cash	-	-	-	100
Holy Land Centre Inc.	Cash	-	-	-	2,400
Hoppe, Denis and Family	Cash	-	-	-	100
Howe Miss Letitia T.	Cash	-	-	-	500
Hurlburt, G.W.	Cash	-	-	-	50
Islamic Centre of N.Y.	Cash	-	-	-	433
International Rescue Committee	Cash	-	-	-	2,500
Kellner, Mrs. Mary	Cash	-	-	-	50
Kirkpatrick, Mr. and Mrs. W.C.	Cash	-	-	-	50
Lawyer, Capt. John E. Jr.	Cash	-	-	-	131
Lombardi, Miss Helen Brown	Cash	-	-	100	-
Matthews, Mrs. M.	Cash	-	-	-	50
McEachein, Miss Janet	Cash	-	-	-	100

CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED FROM NON-GOVERNMENT SOURCES
(Continued)

Name of contributor	Description	Vocational education scholarships	Other education contributions	Other contributions	Special contributions for emergency needs
		$	$	$	$
United States of America (Continued)					
Mclanghlin, Mr. and Mrs. Ronald C.	Cash	-	-	-	50
Mukwonago Union High School	Cash	108	-	-	-
NAJDA - American Women for the Middle East	Cash	500	-	-	-
Near East Christian Committee	Cash	-	-	154	-
Nicely Mrs. Katharine T.	Cash	-	-	-	100
N.O.T.S. Hebrew Congregation	Cash	-	-	-	68
Pal - Aid International Inc.	Cash	-	-	-	1,000
Rollform Corporation	Cash	-	-	-	50
Sady, Emil J.	Cash	-	-	50	-
Selby, Peter Spengler	Cash	102	-	-	-
Scheller, Julius L.	Cash	-	-	-	50
Shanzer Dr. Hilda	Cash	-	-	-	60
Smith, Richard T. Jr.	Cash	-	-	-	74
Stewart, Mrs. Dunlop	Cash	-	-	-	92
United States Committee for Refugees	Cash	60	-	-	450
U.S. Omen	Cash	500	-	-	-
Yusuf, Dr. S.	Cash	-	-	-	75
Sundry donors	Cash	35	-	182	1,439
International Organizations					
International Federation of Business and Professional Women					
Australia	Cash	1,020	-	-	-
Switzerland	Cash	500	-	-	-
United Kingdom	Cash	2,016	-	-	-
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	Services of Staff	-	198,556	-	-
United Nations Emergency Force (Canadian Army Contingent)	Cash	-	-	2,916	-
United Nations Emergency Force (Danor Battalion)	Cash	-	-	239	-
United Nations Emergency Force (XXV Swedish Battalion)	Cash	-	-	1,163	-

CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED FROM NON-GOVERNMENT SOURCES
(Continued)

Name of contributor	Description	Vocational education scholarships	Other education contributions	Other contributions	Special contributions for emergency needs
		$	$	$	$
International Organizations (Continued)					
Women's Auxiliary of UNRWA	Cash	-	-	3,364	-
World Health Organization (WHO)	Services of staff or reimbursement of UNRWA staff costs in lieu	-	-	34,867	-
World Health Organization (WHO)	Supplies	-	-	696	-
Zonta Helsinki	Cash	-	-	-	1,535
Zonta International	Cash	15,342	-	-	-
Sundry donors	Gift coupons	275	-	-	-
		170,632	240,965	142,121	345,352

Summary:

Vocational education scholarships contributions	$170,632
Other education contributions	240,965
Other contributions	142,121
Special contributions for emergency needs	345,352
	899,070

1827/133/67

18 SEP 1967

EN CLAIR

ROUTINE TEL AVIV

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1033

18 SEPTEMBER 1967

/ROUTINE/

R. 10.57 A.M. 18 SEPTEMBER

ADDSD FO TELNO 1033 OF 18 SEPT R F I TO UKMIS NEW YORK, NO. 218.
UKDEL GENEVA, AMMAN, JERUSALEM, TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI, KUWAIT,
BAHRAIN (RESIDENCY), KHARTOUM, JEDDA, RABAT, TUNIS, CAIRO,
ALGIERS, WASHINGTON AND BEIRUT.
MY TELNO 1021. /127

R E F U G E E S.

FIRST RESUMED CROSSING OF REFUGEES DID NOT TAKE PLACE ON SUNDAY, 17 SEPTEMBER, AS PLANNED.

2. ACCORDING TO ISRAEL PRESS REPORTS, THE REPATRIATION WAS TO HAVE BEEN RESUMED UNDER AN AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN ON 16 SEPTEMBER, BUT ON 17 SEPTEMBER, JORDAN REQUESTED A POSTPONEMENT OF THE OPERATION UNTIL THURSDAY, 21 SEPT. AND ASKED FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON 20 SEPTEMBER.

3. ISRAEL PRESS SUGGESTS VARIOUS REASONS WHY JORDAN REQUESTED POSTPONEMENT, INCLUDING '' PATENT LACK OF ENTHUSIASM ON PART OF EMIGRES TO RETURN '' AND JORDAN'S WISH TO EXPLOIT THE REFUGEES FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES =

H A D O W

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13 SEP 1967

18 SEP 1967

With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY

Chancery,

NEW YORK.

Mr Egerton
8/9
O.r.

AMMAN

JCW

Hp 13/9

D.G. Crawford

6 September, 1967

1827/131/67

1822/67

THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

28 August 1967

~~The Ministerial Committee for Refugee Affairs~~

Statement by the ~~Executive Secretary~~ Prime Minister

The Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons
To the West Bank of Jordan

The Government of Jordan has always emphasized that the grave human problem caused by the influx of about one quarter of a million refugees and displaced persons, as a result of the recent hostilities on the West Bank of Jordan, has been and continues to be a matter of great concern to World public opinion, on which has been focused the watchful eye of all nations, international organizations and human institutions.

Mindful of the Security Council Resolution (237) of June 14th, 1967, which clearly required the Occupying Forces on the West Bank to "insure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the area where military operations have taken place" and "to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the area since the out-break of hostilities", and the General Assebly's Resolution on Humanitarian Assistance of July 4th, 1967, which endorsed any measures taken by the Commissioner General of UNRWA to provide humanitarian assistance to persons coming within the mandate of UNRWA as well as other persons in the area who are displaced and are in serious need of immediate assistance as a result of the recent hostilities, the Government of Jordan

INDEXED

.../2

has done all that could humanly be done to care for all refugees and displaced persons and records with satisfaction the outstanding work done by the International Committee for the Red Cross, UNRWA, as well as many other national and international organizations in alleviating the tremendous difficulties and great sufferings of this mass of human beings. The Government also wishes again to express the deep gratitude of the people of Jordan to the Governments and peoples of sister and friendly countries for their generous contributions, which in no minor measure helped best serve the refugees.

It was not only in the interest of Jordan that the repatriation of these refugees and displaced persons was agreed upon on August 6th, 1967, and has been since commenced. It was in the best interests of the cause of humanity and a fulfilment of an inherent natural right of the individuals concerned as recognized by the whole world and clearly required by the Resolutions referred to above as well as by the Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949. It is with regret that the Jordan Government declares that inspite of all Jordanian efforts at giving the repatriation operation maximum effectiveness, especially being faced with the challenge of the proximity of an approaching bitter winter, the procedures insisted upon by the Occupying Forces have proven to limit the time for the operation and the number of displaced persons who could possibly and physically be repatriated to but a

.../3

small percentage of the total. For, out of 40,000 application forms involving 170,000 persons submitted to the International Committee of the Red Cross and in turn transmitted to the Occupying Forces, during the period 13th through 28th August, 1967, only 4,763 forms have been returned by the latter forces covering 16,266 persons. Further the very short notice of approval given to the Jordan Authorities on a day to day basis which never exceeds 12 hours has proven cumbersome and highly impractical. The Occupying Forces by approving the return of some members of one family while refusing other members of the same family, by spreading the approved persons in any one list over several localities and camps, by excluding UNRWA registered refugees and refugees presently stationed in emergency camps on the East Bank of Jordan, by clearly excluding refugees originating from the areas of Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Jericho, and by refusing to allow repatriates to take back their cars and personal effects, have created marked retarding elements on this operation, apart from inflicting tremendous psychological negative effects on the refugees towards returning to their lands and camps. Inspite of all the above paralysing obstacles, 3,140 families consisting of 11,707 persons have been returned at great pains on the part of the ICRC and the Jordanian Authorities concerned.

The Government of Jordan sincerely believes that should these serious obstacles be removed, it will be possible to raise the number of persons to be repatriated daily to 10,000 instead of the present daily average (excluding Saturday) which has fallen below 2,000.

.../4

The Government of Jordan avails itself of the opportunity to draw the attention of UNRWA and all the parties concerned to paragraph 8 of the General Assembly's Resolution on Humanitrarian Assistance of July 4th which called upon "all members to facilitate the transport of supplies to all areas in which assistance is being rendered". Any hindrances in this respect are no doubt a breach of this Resolution.

In pursuance of their firm conviction, the Government and the agencies concerned, therefore, while being highly appreciative of the Secretary General's statement of August 25th, whereby he requested the Occupying Forces to extend the date set for the 31st August as the last date for repatriation until such time as would permit all those desirous of returning to their homes, will continue to seek at all levels and through all means a completion of the repatriation of all displaced persons and re-union of families in a workable, effective and speedy manner that meets the minimum requirements of which this humanitarian operation is worthy. The Government calls upon the conscience of all nations to support these efforts in this human endeavour to save more suffering and avoid a greater tragedy.

1827/130/67

16 SEP 1967

CYPHER: CAT 'A' CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2291 15 SEPTEMBER
D. 6.16 P.M. 15 SEPTEMBER 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2291 OF 15 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, AMMAN AND BEIRUT AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO, UKMIS GENEVA AND CAIRO.

MIDDLE EAST REFUGEES.

YOU WILL REMEMBER THAT I HAVE REFERRED IN RECENT TELEGRAMS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF SETTING UP A UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION TO REVIEW THE WHOLE QUESTION OF REFUGEES (OLD AND NEW) AND TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (OR PREFERABLY TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL).

2. I GATHER THAT GUSSING'S REPORT WHICH IS EXPECTED VERY SOON WILL BE MAINLY FACTUAL AND WILL NOT PUT FORWARD COMPREHENSIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE SITUATION.

3. IT DOES SEEM TO ME QUITE CLEAR THAT THE REFUGEE SITUATION CALLS FOR A FULL REVIEW AND A MAJOR NEW INITIATIVE COSTLY THOUGH THAT MUST BE (AND THAT UNRWA WILL NOT ALONE BE CAPABLE OF DEALING ADEQUATELY WITH THE SITUATION NOW CREATED).

4. ALTHOUGH THE ISRAELIS NO DOUBT WILL STRONGLY DISLIKE A PROPOSAL FOR A REFUGEE COMMISSION I DO NOT SEE THAT WE NEED TO BE INHIBITED FROM TAKING A LEAD IN THIS MOST URGENT ASPECT OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. I WONDER THEREFORE WHETHER THE PROPOSAL FOR A U.N. COMMISSION MIGHT BE INCLUDED WITH SOME PROMINENCE IN YOUR SPEECH TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

FO PASS PARIS NO. 373, MOSCOW NO. 388, TEL AVIV NO. 405, AMMAN NO. 273, AND BEIRUT NO. 164 AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO NO. 93, UKMIS GENEVA NO. 84 AND CAIRO NO. 152.

LORD CARADON

SENT 152215Z MTH

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1827/129/67

Times 11 Sep.

16 SEP 1967

Letters to the Editor

REFUGEES ACROSS THE JORDAN: BASIS FOR A SOLUTION

From the Israel Ambassador

Sir,—I doubt if sarcasm and assumed innocence of the facts can be helpful in producing an atmosphere conducive to making real progress in the solution of a complex and difficult problem. May I remind Sir John Richmond and Mr. Dabbagh (September 7) that it is not a matter what one thinks and what others may think but rather a matter of irrevocable facts:

(a) It was not Israel aggression in 1948 which resulted in the fleeing of residents, now referred to as refugees, but rather the outright Arab aggression, unprovoked and in defiance of United Nations decisions, that produced it;

(b) It was not Israel who refused for 20 years to negotiate a peace settlement which would have also solved the problem of the refugees, but rather Arab policy that preferred artificially to perpetuate the existence of the refugees in their miserable conditions in order to use them as a political ball for the policy of destruction and annihilation of the State of Israel;

(c) During the said period, at least half a million Jewish refugees were driven out by persecution (many are still being), intimidation, confiscation and physical torture from Arab countries and were taken into Israel.

(d) There can hardly be a doubt in the mind of anyone who followed events concerning the fact that Jordan attacked Israel without any provocation or reason on June 5, 1967, except a wish to join in "the total war" aimed at the total destruction of Israel.

(e) No amount of false allegations and propaganda will change the fact that nothing (beside unavoidable havoc created by the war itself) was done by Israel Forces to drive any civilians on the Western Bank from their homes. Those who fled across the Jordan did so largely, if not wholly, for the following reasons:—

1. The fear that Israel would treat them as they were told the conquering Arab armies would treat the Jewish population of Israel if and when Israel would fall into their hands.

2. Many were joining their families on the Eastern Bank because residence on the Western Bank was only temporary.

3. Many residents on the Western Bank, including thousands of refugees, receive regular remittances from their relatives abroad. They were afraid that these would not be allowed to reach them unless they left the Western Bank. Unfortunately their fears were immediately justified by the stubborn and inhuman behaviour of the Jordanian Government in this matter.

(f) Israel declared its willingness, for purely humanitarian reasons, to allow the return of residents to the Western Bank between certain dates. Jordanian authorities chose to "politicize" this issue and turn it into "a thorn in Israel's flesh", neglecting completely the urgency of the humanitarian problem behind it. Israel has twice extended the deadline declared for the return under its undertaking, but received in return only increased instigation for non-cooperation, civil unrest and subversive action throughout the refugee camps and the whole Western Bank.

Mr. Robert MacLennan, M.P., in today's issue, has raised an interesting, though irrelevant point of international law. He refers to regulations applying only to the military rule in occupied territories.

To the best of my knowledge, there is nothing in established international law (or for that matter is there any historical precedent whatsoever) which compels the Government of an attacked yet victorious country to allow residents of occupied territory who moved away to the unoccupied "enemy" territory, to return before the state of war between the two countries has been ended by a peace treaty.

Israel acted in this respect completely voluntarily and on humanitarian considerations only.

(g) Nothing can be more ludicrous than the allegation that Israel's action was designed to "clear the areas for Jewish settlement". The Western Bank is now occupied by nearly a million Arabs, and the return of another 100,000 or so would hardly make a difference in this respect. Just as ludicrous is the interpretation suggested by Sir John to the effect that only a few applications for the return to Jerusalem and Jericho were approved. This is a natural result of the fact that relatively very few left these areas for the Eastern Bank, and therefore very few applications for return have been amongst those received by Israel.

(h) Under the circumstances, not the individual guilt of every refugee matters but the overall considerations of the populations of the whole region and their safety and security that is at stake.

If the solution of the whole refugee problem, including those who have recently moved from the Western to the Eastern Bank of the Jordan, is to be seriously tackled with a view to solving it, then the Arab countries must drop their policy for the destruction of Israel, recognize its sovereign existence and accept Israel's serious and sincere offer to negotiate a peace settlement in which all points of conflict, including the refugee problem, will find their solution so that security and social and economic progress can benefit all the countries of the region.

Yours faithfully,
AHARON REMEZ.

2 Palace Green, W.8, Sept. 8.

H of C 14/13/9
Mr Hope I agree
Mr Egerton O.R. 14/9

Useful in that it depicts a fairly intransigent attitude on the part of the Israelis.

HP. 13/9

P.W.
? on UNRWA
pp
16/9

INDEXED

1827/128/67

EN CLAIR

ROUTINE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2272 13 SEPTEMBER

UNCLASSIFIED D. 8.51 p.m. 13 September

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2272 OF 13 SEPTEMBER

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, AND WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO UKMIS GENEVA AND JERUSALEM.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 2064 AND TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO. 98:

REFUGEES.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS CIRCULATED AS S/8153 AND A/6795 OF 12 SEPTEMBER (COPIES BY BAG) THE TEXT OF THE REPLY WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS MADE TO HIS APPEAL FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE DEADLINE OF 31 AUGUST FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO THE WEST BANK.

2. THE ISRAELI REPLY WHILST PLACING THE BLAME FOR THE SLOW RETURN OF THE REFUGEES ON THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT NEVERTHELESS RESPONDS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S APPEAL BY STATING THAT ISRAEL

(A) WILL ALLOW FORMER WEST BANK RESIDENTS, HOLDERS OF PREVIOUSLY ISSUED PERMITS, WHO WERE UNABLE TO MAKE USE OF THEM BEFORE 31 AUGUST 1967, TO RETURN TO THEIR FORMER HOMES WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME:

(B) WILL ACCEPT APPLICATIONS FROM RESIDENTS OF THE WEST BANK FOR THE REUNION OF THEIR FAMILIES AND STUDY THESE SYMPATHETICALLY:

(C) WILL STUDY APPLICATIONS IN CASES OF SPECIAL HARDSHIP:

(D) WILL DISCUSS WITH UNRWA WAYS OF ALLEVIATING THE PHYSICAL CONDITIONS IN THE CAMPS, PARTICULARLY IN THE JERICHO AREA, OCCUPIED BY THOSE WHO WERE PREVIOUSLY UNRWA REFUGEES.

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INDEXED

W 1827/128/67



UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
GENERAL

A/6795*
12 September 1967

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Fifth emergency special session
Agenda item 5

LETTER DATED 13 JUNE 1967 FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (A/6717)

Note by the Secretary-General

On 24 August 1967 the Secretary-General addressed a note to the Permanent Representative of Israel[1/] requesting the Government of Israel to extend the deadline for the return to the west bank of the Jordan of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities in June 1967 beyond the date of 31 August 1967 which had been set by the Government of Israel. The following note dated 11 September 1967 is the reply of the Government of Israel:

"The Permanent Representative of Israel presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with reference to the Secretary-General's note of 24 August 1967 has the honour to communicate the following.

"As it will be recalled, the Government of Israel announced on 2 July 1967 a plan concerning the return of west bank residents to their former homes. The announcement provided that west bank inhabitants who had left for the east bank since 7 June 1967, with the exception of those who might endanger public safety, would be permitted to return during a period of five weeks ending on 10 August 1967.

"This programme was motivated by humanitarian considerations in the spirit of the Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967. It was to be expected that the Government of Jordan would co-operate in the implementation of the plan in the same spirit.

"Unfortunately, from the outset the Government of Jordan created artificial obstacles by insisting on specious formalities. It was only after a series of direct conversations between Israel and Jordanian representatives in the

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* Also issued under the symbol S/8153.

1/ A/6789, S/8133.

presence of the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross that formal agreement on the modalities of the return was signed on 6 August 1967 by the two Governments and the representative of the ICRC.

"In the course of these conversations Israel responded to an appeal made by the Government of Jordan and agreed to postpone the deadline for the return until 31 August 1967. Both the Jordanian representative and the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross expressed their appreciation. The Government of Israel took immediately all the necessary administrative and technical steps for the execution of the agreement. Two bridges were opened across the Jordan River to receive returnees at the rate of 3,000 a day. The forms submitted for approval were rapidly processed and the approvals were transmitted without delay to the Government of Jordan.

"However, for reasons never satisfactorily explained by the Government of Jordan, the Jordanian authorities did not make full use of the permits issued, and only 60 per cent of the displaced persons who had been authorized to return did actually show up at the crossing points.

"While the return was under way, Jordan started a violent campaign of incitement of the Arab population in the west bank against the Israel authorities. Members of the Jordanian Government as well as the State-controlled Jordanian radio were actively engaged in this campaign. Special emissaries were secretly sent to the west bank in order to provoke disorder, and funds were lavishly distributed to this end. The attention of the Secretary-General to this campaign of incitement was directed in the letter of the Permanent Representative of Israel of 16 August 1967, 2/ as stated:

> 'While the Government of Israel is directing its efforts to alleviating the consequences of the hostilities, to bring back normalcy and to restore peaceful conditions, including the return of refugees to their former homes, the Government of Jordan is conducting a campaign of increasing violence, vituperation, and direct incitement both of the prospective returnees and of the Arabs in Israel-controlled territory.'

"At the same time the Jordanian authorities applied pressure on those former residents of the west bank who had decided to stay, in order to compel them to return to the west bank against their own will.

"The attitude of the Government of Jordan has caused serious concern to the Government of Israel which takes a grave view of this attempt by Jordan to use human plight in the pursuance of its hostile political objectives. Nevertheless, responding to the appeal of the Secretary-General, and having in mind the humanitarian considerations involved, the Government of Israel has decided:

(a) To allow former west bank residents, holders of previously issued permits, who were unable to make use of them before 31 August 1967, to return to their former homes within a fixed period of time. Arrangements to this effect are being made.

2/ A/6786, S/8123.

(b) To authorize the Israel authorities to accept applications from residents of the west bank for the reunion of their families. Such applications will be reviewed in each case by the Israel authorities with sympathetic consideration.

(c) To study individual applications based on conditions of special hardship.

(d) To discuss with UNRWA representatives in Israel ways by which Israel might contribute to a solution of the urgent problem arising from the adverse physical conditions in the camps now occupied by those who were previously UNRWA refugees, particularly in the Jericho camps.

"The Permanent Representative of Israel avails himself of this opportunity to reiterate to the Secretary-General the assurances of his highest consideration.

"New York
11 September 1967."

1827/127/67

12 SEP 1967

EN CLAIR

ROUTINE TEL AVIV

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1021

12 SEPTEMBER 1967
R. 2.18 P.M. 12 SEPTEMBER
NO. 217

ADDSD FO TELNO 1021 OF 12 SEPT RFI TO UKMIS NY, UKDEL GENEVA AMMAN JERUSALEM TRIPOLI BENGHAZI KUWAIT BAHRAIN (RESIDENCY) KHARTOUM JEDDA RABAT TUNIS CAIRO ALGIERS W'TON AND BEIRUT.

HYTELNO 987. REFUGEES.

THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR ANNOUNCED ON 11 SEPT THAT THE RETURN OF THE REMAINING REFUGEES WHOSE APPLICATION FOR MS HAVE BEEN APPROVED WILL BEGIN ON SUNDAY , 17 SEPT. THE CROSSING S WILL TAKE PLACE ON SUNDAY S TUESDAYS AND FRIDAYS VIA THE ALLENBY BRIDGE.

2. NO DEADLINE HAS BEEN SET FOR THE PRESENT COMPLETION OF THIS OPERATION AND NO DAILY MAXIMUM HAS BEEN FIXED , ALTHOUGH IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO HANDLE SOME 1500 REFUGEES EACH DAY . A TOTAL OF 7000 ARE EXPECTED TO RETURN .

HADOW

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MISSION

-/135-

19/9

INDEXED

1827/126/67

12 SEP 1967

/103.

I have noted elsewhere that I think that there should be a Commission appointed by the Security Council to review the whole problem of the Middle East refugees and to make urgent recommendations to the Security Council.

2. We can consider this as we work on the preparation of a general resolution about the Middle East for submission to the Security Council. I have already mentioned my idea of a Commission on Refugees to several other delegates.

3. A very large additional amount of money is going to be required. I do not think that the need can be met by merely appealing for additional contributions to UNRWA. It will be necessary, I think, for a new appeal to be based on a new and much more ambitious scheme for dealing with the refugee problem.

HC

(Caradon)
8 September, 1967

H. of C. Mr Hope C.H.C. 8/9
Mr. Rhodes
Mr. Egerton O.R.
Noted
JL 19/9

I assume that we shall tell London before we become committed to this more ambitious scheme which, I agree, is likely to prove very costly?

/130.

INDEXED

H. of C.

11/9 8/9

/160.

Yes. We shall have to make policy recommendations when the Sussing report appears and we can cover the point then.

E Grade
11/9.

Mr Rhodes.
11/9

Now see Lord Cecil's
TEL to F.O. No 2291 of 15/9.

X
19/9

Minutes

12 SEP 1967

Refugees

The present position regarding refugees is as follows -

a) We are expecting Mr. Gussing's report on refugees to be published on 17 September. Gussing is at present in New York writing this report and it is just conceivable that it may come out a little earlier. However, the latest view from the Secretariat was that it would hardly be out in time to be discussed in any detail at the Special Session on 18 September.

b) Movement of Refugees

The Secretary-General issued a report on 19 August in which he stated that the refugee problem was as follows -

Old Refugees

113,000 - 93,000 from the West Bank,
17,000 from Syria and
3,000 from Gaza

New Refugees - 85,000 from the West Bank,
210,000 90,000 from Syria and
35,000 from Sinai.

c) Since then, the Israeli Government have permitted the return from the East Bank to the West Bank of approximately 14,000 refugees and they have recently stated that they will extend the deadline and this will allow a further 6,000 to return. This means that of approximately 170,000 refugees on the East Bank (of which only 50,000 are in camps) only 20,000 will return. This will leave 150,000 refugees still on the East Bank; it is particularly noticeable that the Israelis have not given permission for any of the old refugees from the UNRWA camps at Jericho, Hebron and Bethlehem nor of the inhabitants of Jerusalem or Bethlehem to return.

/ d)

INDEXED

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Wt. 43560/43 4/63
Ed. (53)

Minutes

d) In the Syrian area, the Syrian Permanent Representative has alleged that there are 110,000 refugees and, of course, none of these have been allowed to return. The Israeli Representative put out a letter to-day stating that the Syrian allegations were exaggerated. That there were only 90,000 people in the area before the War started of which 6,000 remain. The Israeli Representative offers to negotiate with the Syrians over the return of the evacuees as it has done with the Jordanian Government.

2. In the meantime we have received the UNRWA brief for the Twenty-second Session of the General Assembly (Flag A) in which it states that the United Kingdom's contribution to UNRWA will be approximately $4.5m. Flag A

3. Finally we have had a precis of Michelmore's report (Flag B) which Mr. Egerton has summarised. Flag B

(Colonel H.J. Sweeney)
11 September, 1967

H of C

Many thanks

11/9.

Sir L. Gaitskell may care to see.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

 W 1827/12#/67

12 SEP 1967

Mr. Rhodes

Mr. Hope

Minister of State

Draft of Commissioner General of UNRWA's

Annual Report

The Chargé d'Affaires in Beirut has been given an advance copy of Mr. Michelmore's report, which will come out in final form just before the General Assembly. Mr. Cable attaches a useful summary of the main points made in the body of the report, and of its conclusions.

2. UNRWA's deepening financial crisis is stressed, as it was in the Secretary General's report of 19 August submitted in accordance with the "humanitarian" Resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly (UKMis telegram No.2000 to the Foreign Office). Mr. Michelmore states that even if there had been no Arab/Israel war, UNRWA's budgetary short-fall in 1967 would have been of the order of $4 million. As regards the 1968 estimates, these involved much guess-work. At a guess, $41.6 million would be needed in contributions from Governments. This was a sum "considerably in excess" of the 1967 budget.

3. As Mr. Cable says in his covering letter, Michelmore is seeking guidance from the XXIInd Assembly on three points:

(a) Should UNRWA maintain its existing services during 1968 on the same basis as before the recent hostilities?

(b) Should it continue to give help on a temporary, emergency basis to new groups of refugees in urgent need of it?

(c) Should it try to expand and improve its existing education and training services, particularly to the areas severely affected by the economic impact of recent events?

4. He clearly expects the answers to these questions to be in the affirmative, but he is very gloomy about the prospects of getting the additional money he will need. He reminds Members of the three suggestions put forward during the XXIst General Assembly for improving the budgetary position, but he is not hopeful that any of them will be adopted. At one point in his report he hints at the need of "some basically different approach" towards rehabilitation, "which would not depend for its success on educational and employment opportunities elsewhere in the Arab world". This indeed is the nub of the question. If other than Arab countries could be persuaded to open their doors to a greater extent than before to Arab refugees; and if Arab Governments could be persuaded to let the refugees disperse abroad on a far more generous scale than hitherto, the way might be open to some long-term progress. But Michelmore feels he cannot express an opinion on political matters like these.

Finally/

INDEXED

5. Finally, if the extra money UNRWA will need in 1968 is not forthcoming, Michelmore wants guidance from the Assembly on the "harsh and highly political decisions" as to which services to the refugees should be reduced or eliminated.

S L Egerton

(S. L. Egerton)
5 September, 1967

There is a strong case here for an extra grant this year — but I doubt if H.M.G. would be willing to increase their contribution in our present economic circumstances. The Arabs will, no doubt, exploit this issue to their utmost.

P. Hope 6/9.

CONFIDENTIAL

E. Youde, Esq., C.M.G.,
NEW YORK

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF

~~HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR~~

The Chargé d'Affaires

31 August, 1967

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BEIRUT.

Minute
JR 5/9

T 1827/124/67

12 SEP 1967

(1821/159/67)

BRITISH EMBASSY,

BEIRUT

CONFIDENTIAL

31 August, 1967

7/118
1/118

UNRWA Annual Report

As foreshadowed in my letter No. 1821/155/67 of 12 August, the Commissioner General of UNRWA has produced the draft of his annual report (covering the period 1 July 1966 - 30 June 1967), a copy of which is enclosed. As it is such a lengthy document, I also attach a summary we have made of the main points.

2. Mr. Michelmore has circulated this draft to members of the Advisory Commission. (A copy has also gone to the Israelis - a new departure.) This week he is calling on the members of the Commission individually to discuss the draft - a device intended to avoid the embarrassment of a full-stage Advisory Commission Meeting at this stage. He is coming to see me tomorrow, after which I may be in a position to offer further comments.

3. The draft report seems to me frank and direct exposé of the difficulties facing UNRWA at present. In essence, Mr. Michelmore is demanding guidance from the General Assembly on three points:

(a) Should UNRWA maintain its existing services during 1968 on the same basis as before the recent hostilities?

(b) Should it continue to give help on a temporary, emergency basis to new groups of refugees in urgent need of it?

(c) Should it try to expand and improve its existing education and training services, particularly to the areas severely affected by the economic impact of recent events?

4. Clearly, the Commissioner expects the answer to these questions to be in the affirmative. He then goes on to ask: in that case, how can UNRWA be provided with secure and adequate sources of funds to carry out these tasks? Three possibilities are mentioned:

(a) Compensation: Some way might be found by which the refugees could benefit from the property they left behind in 1948.

(b) The whole of the UNRWA budget might be transferred to the assessed budget of the United Nations, so that all member states would contribute in accordance with the current scale of assessment.

(c) The part of the Agency's budget representing administrative expenses might be transferred to the assessed budget of the United Nations, leaving operational services to be financed by voluntary contributions (which might give $3.2 - 4.0 million a year).

5. There are, of course, serious difficulties in the path of any of these possibilities - though the Draft Report does not spell them out. The first course of action is probably impossible except in the context of a general Arab/Israeli settlement - which seems as far away as ever. The second would seem from here to stand

/virtually

INDEXED

K.R.C. Pridham, Esq.,
United Nations (Econ. & Soc.) Department,
Foreign Office

CONFIDENTIAL

virtually no chance of acceptance in the United Nations, where the U.S.S.R., France and no doubt others would be bound to object. As to the third possibility, the U.S. Government have already made it plain to UNRWA that, if the administrative expenses were transferred to the United Nations assessed budget, then the U.S. would feel bound to reduce their voluntary contribution by the amount of their assessed share of the Administration budget, which would largely nullify any advantages.

6. In short, though the United Nations General Assembly is likely to demand renewed efforts on behalf of the refugees, it seems from Beirut that the chances of any positive steps to improve UNRWA's financial position look gloomy. This appreciation is implicit in Mr. Michelmore's final sombre request: that, if adequate funds cannot be secured, the General Assembly should give him guidance as to the action he should take to bring the Agency's expenditure and income into balance. If not, he warns, "the harsh and highly political decisions as to which services must be reduced or eliminated will fall upon the Commissioner-General and expose him to inevitable criticism."

7. This plea underlines one of the major weaknesses of UNRWA: that the Commissioner-General is always seriously hampered by lack of adequate guidance. The General Assembly is clearly too large and diffuse a body effectively to carry out this function; and the Advisory Commission has become almost moribund. When the Commission meets, the discussion seldom assumes a practical form, for the Arab representatives treat the meeting as an opportunity for political propaganda while the representatives of the donor countries, anxious to avoid prolonging a sterile debate, try to avoid opening their mouths at all. Consequently, the Commissioner-General is left to rely on himself for the most part, a fact which can leave him in an uncomfortably exposed position in circumstances like the present, in which unpopular decisions may need to be taken.

8. When I see the Commissioner-General tomorrow, I shall simply tell him that I have forwarded the report to you and that I have no comments to make at present. I presume you would not wish, in any case, to comment at this stage, but that you would reserve any remarks you may have for the discussions in New York or Geneva.

9. I am sending copies of this letter and of the Summary of the draft report to Tony Moore in Eastern Department, to Teddy Youde in New York, to Peter Marshall in Geneva, to Philip Adams at Amman and to Michael Hadow at Tel Aviv.

(J. E. Cable)

W 1827/124/67

SUMMARY OF UNRWA COMMISSIONER-GENERAL'S DRAFT.
REPORT, 1 July, 1966 - 30 June, 1967

Mr. Michelmore points out that even before the recent Arab-Israeli war, there was no solution in sight to UNRWA's basic dilemma, the ever- widening gap between resources and the needs of a growing number of registered refugees. Income continued to lag far behind the cost of essential services for the refugees and, after four successive years of deficit it seemed likely by the end of May that even if some hoped-for additional contributions were received, the 1967 budget would still be unbalanced by as much as $4 million. This continuing financial crisis, which confronted the Agency with the harsh alternatives of progressively curtailing various services to the refugees or of risking an abrupt collapse when in a year or so's time its last remaining reserves ran out, had been discussed at two sessions of the Agency's Advisory Commission earlier in the year, and it had been intended to have another meeting about mid-year to consider the problem further. (paras 1-5)

2. In order to secure greater flexibility in the use of the Agency's dwindling assets, the Commissioner-General, with the approval of the Advisory Commission, presented to the Secretary-General and to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions a proposed amendment of UNRWA's Financial Regulations which would give him wider latitude in treating governmental pledges announced, but not yet paid, as funds to meet future, long-term commitments and thus release cash which up to the present had been earmarked to meet such commitments. This has been agreed - but it is clearly no more than a palliative, which does not affect UNRWA's basic financial predicament. (para 6)

3. Mr. Michelmore feels bound to renew his appeal to put UNRWA on a sound financial basis. He does not consider it within his competence to make specific recommendations for changes in the method and basis of financing the Agency; but recalls the three suggestions put forward during the 21st session of the General Assembly:

a) that some method should be found by which the refugees would be enabled to benefit from the property which they left behind in 1948. It has been suggested that this would yield an annual sum considerably in excess of the income at UNRWA's disposal and that this sum could be applied to providing better services for the refugees and to rendering many of them independent of international assistance;

b) that the whole of the UNRWA budget should be transferred to the assessed budget of the United Nations and that all Member States would then contribute in accordance with the current scale of assessment;

/c)...

c) that part of the Agency's budget, representing administrative expenses, should be transferred to the assessed budget, while operational services should continue to be financed by voluntary contributions. Depending on the definition of "administrative expenses" expenditure included in the Agency's administrative budget might vary from $3.2 to $4 million a year. If UNRWA were to receive additional revenue of this order, the effect would be to restore solvency to the Agency's present scale of "normal" operations at least for some years to come. If, however, the Governments already contributing to UNRWA were to reduce their voluntary contributions by the amount of their assessed share of the administrative budget, the relief to the Agency afforded by this proposal would be largely nullified. (paras. 7-9)

4. UNRWA's efforts to meet the host governments demands for an increased educational programme are described (paras 10-12)

5. Relations with the host governments have been satisfactory except with Syria, which has imposed a virtually total ban on any investigations over ration rolls (paras 13-23).

6. The aftermath of the recent war described (paras 24-26); areas in which major hostilities took place (paras 27-31); and in which no major hostilities took place (paras 32-40). The emergency assistance given (paras. 41-45). Special contributions (paras. 46-47).

7. In the longer term, the long-dead locked questions of repatriation and compensation are crucial. In 1948, the General Assembly resolved that refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be allowed to do so, and that compensation should be paid to those choosing not to return. After 19 years, these original refugees have still had neither the opportunity to return, nor compensation for their property. Under the surface of this deadlock, much solid and constructive progress has been made in dealing with the economic and social aspects of the problem - not by ambitious and costly works projects nor by schemes of mass resettlement, but by the operation of normal economic and human factors. (paras. 48-52).

8. This gradual but hopeful process of economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees has now, for the time being at least, been halted and indeed reversed as a result of recent events. At the present time too many uncertainties overhang the future of the refugees in Gaza and on the West Bank to permit any prediction of how long this adverse effect will last in those areas. It is understood that some remedial action is already being taken by the Government of Israel to restimulate economic activity in both areas. But clearly if the refugees living in Gaza and on the West Bank remain cut off from opportunities of education, training and employment in the rest of the Arab World, this cannot but increase the

/difficulty...

difficulty of promoting their rehabilitation. Whether it may be feasible to offset this disadvantage by some basically different approach which would not depend for its success on educational and employment opportunities elsewhere in the Arab World is not a matter on which the Commissioner-General feels able to express an opinion. In East Jordan it is possible to say with more certainty that, so long as the separation of the West Bank from the remainder of Jordan lasts, the whole process of rehabilitating the refugees on the East Bank, both those already living there before the hostilities and any of those displaced from the West Bank who may not be permitted or may not wish to return, will be gravely, perhaps irremediably, set back. In Syria too, for so long as the Palestinian refugees displaced from the south are not able to return to their former places of residence, they will be faced by many new difficulties in their struggle to recover economic independence, and their rehabilitation may be seriously retarded. If in fact the present state of affairs is prolonged, the international community may wish to consider what action it can take to promote economic recovery in the areas affected. This would involve participation on several different planes by governments international organisations and private and philanthropic enterprise. As far as UNRWA is concerned, the Agency's most effective contribution would appear to be the maintenance of its existing services, possibly with some extension to new groups of displaced persons, coupled with an expansion of its programme of education and training for the children and young refugees. But not even the existing UNRWA services can be maintained, let alone extended or expanded, unless the chronic problem of financing the Agency is tackled with determination and realism. (paras 53 and 54).

9. The 1968 budget has, in the present circumstances, to involve much guess work. It is based on the following assumptions :

(1) continuation of normal UNRWA services, as before the hostilities, without reduction;

(2) continuation of issue of rations on a temporary and emergency basis for up to 75,000 recipients over and above the pre-hostility number (861,000);

(3) reversion of the supplementary feeding programme to its normal pre-hostility pattern and scope by April 1968, except for increasing by 3,000 the number of hot meals provided in Gaza.

(4) cessation of issue of emergency supplements to certain categories of recipients and reversion to the normal scale of basic rations by April 1968;

(5) contingent provision for possible replacement of tented camps by normal shelters (and ancillary buildings) to accommodate 30,000 displaced persons;

/ (6) ....

(6) provision of a special contingency item of $1 million to meet the needs of individual cases of hardship attributable to the emergency and its aftermath;

(7) continuation of UNRWA medical services on a temporary and emergency basis for up to 30,000 additional beneficiaries;

(8) provision of environmental sanitation for the increase in the camp population;

(9) provision of general education for a net addition of 6,000 children attending UNRWA/Unesco schools in East Jordan;

(10) provision for two training centres in East Jordan; for re-opening the training centre at Homs in Syria (now occupied by displaced persons) in the autumn of 1968; for expanding the Gaza vocational training centre to accommodate 200 more trainees; and for continuing to operate all the other UNRWA centres on a normal basis;

(11) contingency provision of a block sum of $1.5 million against possible increases in unit costs in Gaza and West Bank arising from currency changes and other factors.

No provision is included for the expanded educational programme mentioned in Para. 4 above. To meet this budget, UNRWA needs $41.6 million in contributions from Governments. The Commissioner General appeals to the U.N. General Assembly to place the Agency on a sound financial basis. (paras. 55-62).

10. Summary and conclusions

In summary, the questions affecting UNRWA which seem to the Commissioner-General to require consideration and decision by the General Assembly are the following :

(1) Is it desired that UNRWA should maintain its existing services during 1968 on the same basis as before the recent hostilities?

(2) is it desired that UNRWA should continue in 1968 giving help on a temporary and emergency basis to new groups of beneficiaries in urgent need?

(3) is it desired that UNRWA should seek to expand and improve its existing education and training services, particularly in those areas severely affected by the economic impact of recent events?

(4) how is UNRWA to be provided with secure and adequate sources of funds to carry out whatever tasks may be assigned to it by the General Assembly?

/ (5)....

(5) if in fact adequate funds cannot be secured, will the General Assembly give the Commissioner-General guidance as to the action he should take to bring the Agency's expenditure and income into balance? Failing this, the harsh and highly political decisions as to which services must be reduced or eliminated fall upon the Commissioner-General and expose him to inevitable criticism.

It will be appreciated that affirmative answers to any or all of the first three questions will in practice be meaningful only to the extent to which a correspondingly positive answer can be given to the fourth question. If that is not forthcoming, then the fifth question assumes crucial importance.

11. The remaining sixty pages of the Draft Report cover:

Annex I: a report on UNRWA's Operations 1 July 1966-31 May 1967.

Annex II: a report on legal aspects of the Work of the Agency.

A.S.M. MacRae

29 August 1967.

1827/123/67

12 SEP 1967

EN CLAIR

PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 2245 11 SEPTEMBER 1967

D. 8.36 P.M. 11 SEPTEMBER

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 2245 OF 11 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO AMMAN BEIRUT AND JERUSALEM.

MYTEL NO 2160: /OF 5 SEPTEMBER/

REFUGEES.

THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL HAS WRITTEN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (S/8147 AND A/6794 OF 8 SEPTEMBER, COPIES BY BAG) REPLYING TO THE SYRIAN LETTER IN MYTEL UNDER REFERENCE.

2...THE LETTER SAYS THAT THE SYRIAN ALLEGATIONS OF 110,000 CIVILIANS EXPELLED BY THE ISRAELIS ARE COMPLETELY MISLEADING, AS MANY OF THESE PEOPLE WERE IN THE DIRECT EMPLOY OF THE SYRIAN ARMY AND EVACUATED BY THE SYRIANS THEMSELVES. AUTHENTIC ESTIMATES OF THE PRE-WAR POPULATIONS IN THE AREA UNDER DISCUSSION WERE 90,000, AND WHEN THE CEASE-FIRE BECAME EFFECTIVE 6,404 REMAINED.

3...THE LETTER CONCLUDES THAT WHEN THE SYRIANS ARE READY TO TALK THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY OUTSTANDING ISSUE, INCLUDING THAT OF THE REFUGEES.

F O PASS TEL AVIV 398 AND SAVING AMMAN 114, BEIRUT 88 AND JERUSALEM 34.

LORD CARADON.

DISTRIBUTION

MISSION

INDEXED

— W 1827/123/67

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL

Distr.
GENERAL

S/8147*
8 September 1967

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 SEPTEMBER 1967 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 1 September 1967 from the Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Syria (A/6791, S/8138) communicating an attempt on the part of the Government of Syria to engage the International Red Cross in obtaining the consent of the Government of Israel for the return of Syrian residents to the area of Syria now under Israel control.

The claim that these civilians were "expelled by force by the Israel invaders" is completely misleading. The fact is that the majority of the inhabitants of that area was evacuated by the Syrian authorities in the course of the fighting in the area, apparently for military considerations. Many of these people had been in the direct employ of the Syrian army, whose camps, bases and extensive fortifications and installations had been the predominant administrative and economic factor in the area. The figure quoted in the Syrian letter, of 110,000 persons who left the area, should be viewed in the light of the liberties which Syrian representatives allow themselves with regard to facts and figures. Authentic estimates put the pre-war population of that area at 90,000. When the cease-fire became effective and cease-fire lines were drawn, the population which remained in the area numbered 6,404. This figure was established by a census which was carried out after the fighting stopped.

With all its deep respect for the International Red Cross and its readiness for co-operation with it, the Government of Israel believes that matters such as the return of the evacuees is in the first place a matter for direct arrangements between the Governments concerned. This was the procedure in the case of the return of residents of the west bank, which was arranged between the Government of Israel and of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

---

* Also issued under the symbol A/6794.

When Syria is ready to enter into talks with Israel, the Israel Government will be prepared to discuss with them any outstanding issues, including the return of evacuees.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council and of the General Assembly.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Gideon RAFAEL
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

1822/67

CONFIDENTIAL

Chancery, New York.

23 AUG 1967

11 SEP 1967

With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY

(D. G. Crawford)

Mr Bgatt 28/8

Mr Hope 29/8

AMMAN

21 August 1967

Col Sweeney

Miss Hanson

Mr Hoen

CONFIDENTIAL

JC 23/8

1827/122/67

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

(1822/67)

21 August 1967

Return of Refugees to the West Bank

Since the Agreement, concerning the modalities for the return of refugees, was announced by the International Red Cross in Amman on 7 August, the Jordanian authorities, in co-operation with UNRWA, have been engaged in registering refugees, using the application forms on which the International Red Cross, after much discussion and delay, managed to secure the acceptance of both Israel and Jordan.

2. Registration began on 9 August and ended on 17 August when it was announced that 167,500 refugees had registered for return to the West Bank out of an estimated quarter of a million who had left there since 5 June. Repatriation began on 19 August when 350 persons returned to the West Bank under the supervision of the International Red Cross and about a further 2,000 returned yesterday. It is hoped that from today onwards approximately 3,000 persons will return daily over the King Hussein (Allenby) bridge and over a second bridge (Um Shart) some miles to the north which is accessible to motor traffic.

3. Derek Cooper, the secretary of the British Relief Fund here, saw yesterday's repatriation. He considered that it took place with remarkable efficiency. The refugees had been called forward on the previous day from camps and houses in the Amman area to a transit camp at Ghor Nimrein, which is just short of the King Hussein bridge. Counterfoils of their application forms had been returned by the Israelis via the International Red Cross to the Jordanian authorities, who had then arranged for the transport of the refugees to the transit camp. The refugees were returning in family groups to specific areas on the West Bank and yesterday people were destine for Tulkarm, Jenin and Nablus.

4. From the transit camp the refugees and their luggage were driven in buses directly to the bridge where they were given refreshments, rations and J.D.5 per person. The counterfoils of their applicatin forms were checked by Israeli officials, although Cooper considered that this check was not particularly thorough and that there was a desire on both sides to allow the refugees to cross with as much speed and comfort as possible. The King Hussein bridge had been improved to facilitate crossing and baggage was carried for refugees by Jordanian police to the middle of the bridge and thereafter by Israeli soldiers to the buses waiting for them at the other end.

5. This is encouraging but inevitably doubts remain on the Jordanian side concerning Israel's sincerity over the return of refugees: are the 30,000 or so, who can be got across before 31 August, to be the only ones? Or will the period of return be extended to permit all those who have registered to go back? The forecast rate of 3,000 per day would, of course, mean that the operation would have to continue for two or three months to move all applicants and thus the present final date for repatriation of 31 August is unrealistic.

/The

J. C. Moberly Esq.,
Eastern Department.

INDEXED

CONFIDENTIAL

The Jordanians hope that the Israelis will soon announce a deferment of this date or preferably make it clear that there is no official final date for the return of refugees. The Jordanians would also like to see more bridges put into use for the return of the refugees so as to increase the daily rate and for longer notice to be given by the Israelis so that the calling forward of refugees could be done at a more leisurely rate. With the present short notice (twenty-four hours) some of the refugees for various reasons, e.g. sickness, are not available for return at the allocated time and the Jordanians hope that arrangements will be made for them to be called forward at a later stage. Furthermore, the Jordanians are concerned that families are not returning as complete units and it is clear that men between the ages of 18 and 50 are for some reason having their applications deferred. It may be that the Israeli authorities, for security reasons, require more time to check such applications, but clearly further distress will be caused to families returning if men between these ages are not allowed to join them without undue delay.

(D. G. Crawford)

Copied to Chanceries at Washington, New York, Beirut and Tel Aviv;
Consulate-General at Jerusalem.

1827/120/67.
(entered 10712)

ENCLAIR

PRIORITY AMMAN

TELNO 1084

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

5 SEPTEMBER 1967

R. 6.40 P.M. 5 SEPTEMBER

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 1084 OF 5 SEPTEMBER RPTED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV BEIRUT WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK. NO. 142.

JORDAN WEST BANK.

IN THE COURSE OF AN INTERVIEW YESTERDAY WITH THE JORDAN NEWS AGENCY (A GOVERNMENT AGENCY) KING HUSSEIN SAID, IN REPLY TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE SENDING OF QUOTE FEDAYEEN UNQUOTE TO ISRAELI HELD TERRITORY.'' I HAVE EXPLAINED MY VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT FRANKLY TO THE ARAB LEADERS. IN JORDAN WE ASSUME THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY WITH REGARD TO THE WEST BANK. AS FOR THE PREVIOUS FEDAYEEN OPEWTION, IT HAS BECOME CLEAR THAT ITS POSITIVE RESULTS HAVE BEEN OF A LIMITED NATURE. THIS OPERATION WAS AMONG THE CHIEF EXCUSES WHICH THE ENEMY USED FOR IMPOSING THE BATTLE ON US AND DETERMINING ITS TIME. FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY WAS TAKING PLACE BEFORE THE AGGGRESSION CONTRARY TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE UNIFIED ARAB COMMAND ''. THE KING ADDED THAT WHILE HE WAS PROUD OF THE ATTITUDE OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK TOWARDS THE ENEMY AND IN THEIR REFUSAL TO COOPERATE WITH THEM, HE CONSIDERED IT A CRIME ON THE PART OF ANY QUARTER TO RESORT TO SENDING THE SO-CALLED ''FEDAYEEN'' IN ORDER TO COMMIT ACTS THAT WOULD GIVE THE ENEMY AN EXCUSE FOR COMMITTING FURTHER ACTS OF INTIMIDATION AGAINST ''OUR'' WEST BAK BRETHERN AND CITIZENS.

ADAMS/SOSFA

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1827/119./67.

-5 SEP 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT/A

ROUTINE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO. 2160 5 SEPTEMBER 1967

CONFIDENTIAL D. 12.58 p.m. 5 September

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 2160 OF 5 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, UKMIS GENEVA.

MY TELNO. 2064: REFUGEES.

THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF SYRIA HAS WRITTEN TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL (S/8138 AND A/6791 OF 1 SEPTEMBER) ASSERTING THAT ''QUIET HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS'' BY THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AIMED AT ENABLING THE 110,000-ODD SYRIAN REFUGEES TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES IN OCCUPIED SYRIA HAVE BEEN NULLIFIED BY THE ISRAELI CABINET WHICH HAS TURNED DOWN VARIOUS REQUESTS BY THE IRC. THIS VIOLATES THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND THE VARIOUS RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON A CEASE-FIRE (SIC) AND ON THE TREATMENT OF CIVIL POPULATIONS UPROOTED BY THE 5 JUNE WAR.

2. THE LETTER SAYS THAT THE EFFORTS OF THE IRC SHOULD RECEIVE THE SUPPORT OF THE UN, ''ESPECIALLY THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL''. IT ASKS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO INVESTIGATE THE MATTER AND TO REPORT ON IT.

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UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL

Distr.
GENERAL

S/8138*
1 September 1967

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 SEPTEMBER 1967 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF SYRIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the fact that the quiet humanitarian efforts lately deployed by the International Red Cross in order to tackle the question of the return of Syrian refugees to their homes in Syrian-occupied territory have been thus far defeated by Israel rejection. The Israel cabinet refused to heed the request made by the International Red Cross, thus blocking the return to their homes of these innocent civilians, expelled by force by the Israel invaders.

The gravity of this state of affairs could better be assessed in the light of the great number of these refugees (a number that has now attained 110,000) and the deliberate intent of the Israel authorities to exploit their sufferings - especially since the winter is approaching - and use their rightful return as a means of blackmail and pressure against the Syrian Government for expansionist aggressive ends.

Obviously this refusal by the Israeli authorities violates the Geneva agreements and runs counter to the provisions of the various resolutions of the Security Council on cease-fire and on the treatment of civilians, a violation which is even more condemnable from the humanitarian point of view, considering the deep and unnecessary suffering it inflicts on innocent people. The International Red Cross, which partially succeeded in facilitating the return of some Jordanian refugees to their homes in the west bank, should receive the utmost support on the part of the United Nations, and especially the members of the Security Council, so that its efforts in this instance lead to fruitful results.

---

* Also issued under the symbol A/6791.

I would be grateful, Sir, if you would investigate this matter, report on it, and kindly order the distribution of this letter as a document of both the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Accept, etc.

(Signed) Rafic JOUEJATI
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

CONFIDENTIAL
(1821/155/67)

17 AUG 1967

-5 SEP 1967

E. Youde Esq., M.B.E.,
U.K. Mission to U.N.,
New York.

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF

Chargé d'Affaires

12 August, 1967.

Mr. Egerton

Col Sweeney

Miss Harden 14/8/8

Mr Rhodes o/r

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BEIRUT.

1827/118/67.

(1821/155/67)

BRITISH EMBASSY,

BEIRUT.

12 August, 1967.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency

I called on Michelmore, the Director General of the United Nations Relief & Works Agency (UNRWA) today. He told me that the financial situation of UNRWA was less serious than it had been before the Arab/Israel war because, so far, the special contributions, whether in cash or kind, received from various governments and other international agencies had exceeded the additional expenditure that UNRWA had been required to meet. He could not say how long this happy state of affairs would last and he expected the financial situation for the year 1968 to be as critical as ever. But, for the moment, UNRWA were managing to cope with their tasks.

2. Much to my relief, Michelmore said there seemed to be widespread agreement, among the representatives in Beirut of the Governments represented on the UNRWA Advisory Commission, that it was unnecessary to hold a meeting of the Advisory Commission to consider the Annual Report. Instead, Michelmore would send copies of the draft, which should be ready in about ten days time, to all the members of the Commission so that they could comment individually, whether in writing or orally. This is a very sensible arrangement as meetings of the Advisory Commission are always unproductive and, in the present highly charged emotional atmosphere, a meeting would simply place myself and my American colleague in the unhappy dilemma of deciding at what stage during the Syrian delegate's speech we would have to walk out.

3. I shall let you know as soon as I receive my copy of the draft report.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to Tony Moore in Eastern Department, to Teddy Youde in New York and to Peter Marshall in Geneva.

READ

(J. E. Cable)

K. R. C. Pridham Esq.,
United Nations (Economic & Social) Department,
Foreign Office.

1827/117/67.

EN CLAIR

PRIORITY TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO 987 4 SEPT 1967

/PRIORITY/ -5 SEP 1967

R. 4.02 p.m. 4 September

No. 210

ADDSD TO FO TEL NO 987 OF 4 SEPT RFI UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL GENEVA, AMMAN, JERUSALEM, TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, KHARTOUM, JEDDA, RABAT, TUNIS, CAIRO, ALGIERS, WASHINGTON. BEIRUT.

REFUGEES.

MY TEL NO 978. ON SUNDAY , 3 SEPTEMBER, ISRAEL GOVT OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED THAT IS HAS AGREED TO THE RETURN OF WEST BANK REFUGEES WHO HAD RECEIVED BUT HAD NOT USED THEIR PERMITS TO RETURN BY 31 AUGUST.

IT IS ESTIMATED THAT SOME 14,000 REFUGEES HAVE ALREADY RETURNED AND THAT AN ADDITIONAL 6,000 WILL BE ELIGIBLE TO DO SO UNDER THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS.

2. THE PRACTICAL DETAILS OF THE EXTENSION OPERATION, INCLUDING STARTING AND CLOSING DATES OF RESUMED CROSSINGS, ARE TO BE WORKED OUT BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE AND THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR.

3. IT IS REPORTED IN THE PRESS THAT THIS DECISION WAS TAKEN AT THE CABINET MEETING HELD ON SUNDAY, 26 AUGUST.

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1827/116/67.

- 1 SEP 1967

EN CLAIR

PRIORITY AMMAN

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1070

/PRIORITY/

1 SEPTEMBER 1967

R. 12.45 P.M. 1 SEPTEMBER

ADDSD TO FO TELNO 1070 OF 1 SEPT RPTD FOR INFO TO TELAVIV, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK NO 140 UKMIS GENEVA AND BEIRUT.

JORDAN REFUGEES. THE RESULTS OF THE VERY LIMITED OPERATION FOR THE RETURN OF JORDANIAN REFUGEES TO THE WEST BANK AT THE END OF THE PERIOD ALLOWED BY ISRAEL ARE MOST DISAPPOINTING.

2. THE BEST ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION IS AS FOLLOWS

(I) NUMBER OF FORMS SUBMITTED TO ISRAEL 40,000 COVERING 170,000 REFUGEES.

(II) NUMBER OF FORMS RETURNED BY ISRAEL BY 31 AUGUST 5,102 COVERING 17,649 REFUGEES.

(III) NUMBER OF FAMILIES RETURNED 3,824 COMPRISING 14,027 REFUGEES.

3. THIS LEAVES ON THE EAST BANK SOME 152,251 REFUGEES (ONLY 50,000 OF WHOM ARE IN CAMPS) WHO HAVE APPLIED TO RETURN. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT NO APPROVAL HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM ISRAEL FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES FROM UNWRA CAMPS (AT JERICHO, HEBRON AND BETHLEHEM) WHO NUMBER APPROXIMATELY 80,000. NO PERMISSION HAS BEEN RECEIVED FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO JERUSALEM AND BETHLEHEM.

4. IT SEEMS CLEAR FROM THE ABOVE THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE SO FAR TACKLED THE PROBLEM OF THE RETURN OF REFUGEES IN A VERY HALF-HEARTED AND DILATORY MANNER.

/ 5.

INDEXED

5. THE OUTLOOK FOR THE REFUGEES IN THE COMING MONTHS AS THE WEATHER DETERIORATES AND DIESEASE SPREADS THROUGH THEIR TEMPORARY CAMPS AND IN THE TOWNS WHERE THEY ARE SQUATTING IS BLEAK INDEED.

FO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON 198, NEW YORK 140.

/REPEATED BY FOREIGN OFFICE TO U.K.MISSION NEW YORK NO. 4539/

ADAMS

SOSFA

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CONFIDENTIAL

1827/115/67.

(1827/115/67) 31 August, 1967.

Robin Byatt has asked me to let you have comments on the draft brief on UNRWA (No. 34) for the XXII Regular Session, which was enclosed with your letter UP.2/8/1 of 25 August. -/114

2. This is fine, as far as it goes. But what we will need policy decisions and guidance on in due course are the reports you mention, viz. U Thant's Report A/6787 and S/8124 of 19 August; Gussing's Report to the Secretary-General, due out in mid-September; the Commissioner-General's Annual Report. So may I ask that these are processed as soon as you receive them, and Section 4 sent out as soon as possible thereafter?

3. There is one other point. As mentioned in my letter 1072/2074/67 of 25 August to Anne Warburton, the present thinking of the Arabs (influenced strongly by Adnan al Pachachi) is to have a separate debate on Jerusalem either in a reconvened Emergency Special Session or in the Regular Session, or perhaps both. If it turns out so (and we should know within the next ten days), we feel that the short passage in the UNRWA brief on Jerusalem (para 4(c) of Section 5) will hardly suffice. Some of the questions which need answers from the Department (at least defensive ones, if we cannot say much publicly) are set out in the first section of the memorandum enclosed with Robin Byatt's letter to Anne Warburton 1072/2024/67 of 4 August.

4. I enclose a spare copy of this letter.

(S. L. Egerton)

Roger Bone, Esq.,
United Nations (Political) Department,
Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED

(1827/114/67)

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

Foreign Office, S.W.1.

UP 2/8/1

25 August, 1967.

Further to my letter of 18 August, I am now enclosing copies of the following draft briefs for the XXII Regular Session: Nos. 21, 34 and 92. References are to the provisional agenda in A/6680/Rev.1.

2. The UNRWA brief (34) does not take account of the Secretary-General's reports A/6787 and S/8124 on the implementation of General Assembly Resolution 2252 (ES-V) and Security Council Resolution 237 (1967). These will be covered, together with the Commissioner General's Annual Report, in a supplementary brief to be inserted as Section 4. As you mention in the annex to your letter to Anne Warburton of 11 August there will be a need for extra guidance through normal correspondence if the item becomes the vehicle for the main Middle East debate.

1/115.

INDEXED

(R. B. Bone)

R. A. C. Byatt, Esq.,
U.K. Mission,
New York.

Apt to FO
JE 31/8

Mr Eggeson.
Mr. Darwin. HGA 30.viii

Any comments on the draft brief?

We may need more on Jerusalem.

This guidance (parts specifically on UNRWA in section 5) will largely be overtaken by the much more important guidance we shall be receiving as section 4. The S/Gen's report of 19 August and perhaps Michelmore's report (yet to come) will raise many new points calling for policy decisions. AWarburton 30/8

29/8.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1827) 34

I.O.C.(67)

_____, 1967

Political and Financial Series

STEERING COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

United Nations General Assembly:
Twenty-Second Session

Item ___ : UNRWA: Report of the Commissioner General

Note by the Foreign Office

The attached brief for the British Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly has been prepared by the Foreign Office.

Foreign Office, S.W.1

_____, 1967

BRIEF FOR UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: TWENTY-FIRST SESSION

Item 35: Report of the Commissioner-General of U.N.R.W.A.

Section 1: Outline of Brief

Section 2 lists the United Nations documents referred to. Section 3 gives an account of Arab/Israel relations with reference to UNRWA. and the Conciliation Commission. Section 4 summarises the Commissioner-General's report. Section 5 covers policy and has been written on the assumption that the debate on UNRWA will also cover the Palestine question and the Arab/Israel dispute generally.

Section 2: Documents

The following United Nations documents are of interest.

1. The Annual Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for the period 1 July, 1966 to 30 June, 1967.

2. The following General Assembly Resolutions:

212 (III)	of 10 November, 1948	
194 (III)	of 11 December, 1948	Annex 1
302 (IV)	of 8 December, 1949	
393 (V)	of 2 December, 1950	
394 (V)	of 14 December, 1950	
512 (VI)	of 26 January, 1952	
513 (VI)	of 26 January, 1952	
614 (VII)	of 6 November, 1952	
720 (VIII)	of 27 November, 1953	
818 (IX)	of 4 December, 1954	
916 (X)	of 3 December, 1955	
1018(XI)	of 28 February, 1957	
1191(XII)	of 12 December, 1957	
1315(XIII)	of 12 December, 1958	
1456(XIV)	of 9 December, 1959	
1604(XV)	of 21 April, 1961	
1725(XVI)	of 3 January, 1962	
1856(XVII)	of 20 December, 1962	
1912(XVIII)	of 3 December, 1963	
2002(XIX)	of 10 February, 1965	
2002(XX)	of 15 December, 1965	
2154(XXI)	of 17 November, 1966	Annex 2

/Background

Background

Events which led to the establishment of UNRWA and the Palestine Conciliation Commission

On 14 May, 1948, the British Mandate in Palestine formally came to an end. The Jews proclaimed the setting-up of the State of Israel and the fighting between Jews and Arabs in Palestine thereupon developed into open warfare when the Arab armies invaded the frontiers of the former mandatory state on 15 May. A special session of the United Nations Assembly relieved the Palestine Commission (not to be confused with the later Conciliation Commission), which had been set up in 1947 to implement the United Nations Partition Plan, from further responsibilities, and a Mediator was appointed by the Security Council.

2. The efforts of both the Security Council and the United Nations Mediators finally brought about a series of Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Arab States.

3. Each side accused the other of aggression. The Israelis claimed that the Arabs attacked them in direct contravention of the United Nations Resolution 181 (II) of 29 November, 1947 which partitioned Palestine between Jews and Arabs, while the Arabs claimed not only that the setting up of Israel itself was an act of aggression, but that the Israelis overflowed their allocated boundaries and occupied by force territory which had been granted to the Arabs by the United Nations. But at that time the Arabs did not accept the Resolution partitioning Palestine. Some Arabs now regret this, and Arab leaders have called from time to time for the partition Resolution to be implemented (notably President Bourguiba in 1965).

4. During the fighting about half a million Arabs (many of them town dwellers from Haifa, Jaffa, Lydda and Ramle) fled to safety in the neighbouring Arab States of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan (where

/most

most went) and Egypt. It is argued by the refugees themselves and by Arab leaders that the refugees were terrorised out of Palestine by systematic Jewish campaigns of brutality designed to make room in Palestine for Jewish immigrants. The Israelis on the other hand maintain that the Arab leaders urged the refugees to leave their homes as a temporary measure. The Arab armies would then have had more room to manoeuvre and, having driven the Jews into the sea, the refugees would have been able to return to their homes. However, by the autumn of 1948 the existence of large numbers of destitute refugees called for immediate relief measures. The General Assembly accordingly passed Resolution No. 212 (III) of 19 November called for subscriptions from all members of the United Nations and appointing a Director of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees to administer a relief programme.

5. The General Assembly then turned its attention to the political situation. This resulted in Resolution No. 194 (III) of 11 December, 1948. Annex 1, Paragraph 2 set up a Conciliation Commission of three member states of the United Nations (France, Turkey and the United States were chosen) which took over the duties of the United Nations Mediator and was instructed to carry out the rest of the Resolution (which amounted, in fact, to achieving an Arab/Israel settlement). The other important paragraph (paragraph No. 11) dealt with refugees.

> "Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property for those choosing not to return and for loss or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

/Instructs

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, re-settlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations."

6. This has ever since been taken by the Arabs to justify the return of the refugees and to put Israel in the wrong by not permitting them to do so. The Israelis have argued that the Resolution must be seen as a whole and not simply be reduced to one paragraph dealing with refugees, and go on to argue that the whole of the Resolution cannot possibly be implemented until the Arabs change their attitude towards Israel so radically as to make a peace treaty possible. Meanwhile the Arab States do not even recognise the existence of Israel and maintain that they are still technically at war with the "so-called" state of Israel.

7. Resolution 212 of 19 November, 1948 (see end of paragraph 4 above) instructed the Director of Relief for Palestine Refugees to administer a relief programme to cover nine months till 31 August, 1949. It was still hoped at that time that the Conciliation Commission would be able to liquidate the refugee problem by implementing Resolution No. 194, in particular paragraph 11. But by the autumn of 1949 the General Assembly again had to consider provision for the refugees, and passed Resolution No. 302 (IV) of 8 December, 1949, which set up the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Paragraph 8 of the Resolution established "an Advisory Commission consisting of representatives of France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, with power to add not more than three additional members from contributing Governments to advise and

/assist

assist the Director of UNRWA in the execution of the programme; and the Director and the Advisory Commission shall consult with each Near Eastern Government concerned in the selection, planning and execution of projects". UNRWA took over its duties in the field on 1 May, 1950. It embarked on a direct relief and relief works programme. The programme of relief works was not a success and ceased in the middle of 1951.

Conciliation Commission

8. The Conciliation Commission, set up under Resolution No. 194 in December 1948, started work in January 1949. From April to June it held meetings separately in Lausanne with Arab and Israel delegations. On 12 May the Conciliation Commission signed separate protocols with Israel on the one hand and with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria on the other, agreeing that the territorial boundaries in the United Nations Partition Plan of November 1947, should be taken as the basis for a discussion about refugees ("respect for their rights and the preservation of their property") and territorial adjustments, where necessary. Israel then offered to accept 100,000 refugees and also to accept, in addition, the refugees in Gaza provided the Gaza Strip was ceded to Israel, and provided that these concessions would only come into effect as a part of a final peace settlement. Jordan and Syria agreed to accept "such refugees as might not return to their homes". Finally Israel agreed to start the "reunion of families scheme", undertaking to accept certain close relatives of those Arabs who did not leave Israel. The Arabs criticised this as too restrictive, maintaining that the term family should be more widely interpreted in its oriental sense. These minor offers appeared to represent the limit of agreement between the Arabs and Israelis. Progress was subsequently made only on the "families scheme", and the other offers lapsed mainly because the Arabs

/insisted

insisted that Israel should accept the principle that all refugees could be repatriated, which Israel refused to do.

9. In 1950 the Commission recommended the "return to Israel of as many refugees as would be consistent with their own best interests" and compensation and "reintegration" of those not returning. Two resolutions were then passed by the General Assembly in December. The UNRWA Resolution No. 393 (V) of 2 December, 1950, held that reintegration, either by repatriation or resettlement was essential; set up a reintegration fund of $30 million and appointed a Negotiating Committee to raise further funds. The second Resolution No. 394 (V) of 14 December instructed the Conciliation Commission to set up an office in Jerusalem to assess the value of the refugees properties, and to arrange for payment of compensation.

10. On 22 May, 1951, the Conciliation Commission set up its office in Jerusalem for the assessment of compensation. To deal with the wider political questions still unsolved the Commission held separate conversations with both sides in Paris, but had to report that neither side was ready to seek stability in the Middle East through full implementation of the General Assembly's resolutions. Israel refused to accept paragraph 11 of Resolution No. 194 (repatriation) and the Arabs refused to accept paragraph 5 (settlement of all disputes). The General Assembly in Resolution No. 512 (VI) of 26 January, 1952, simply noted with regret that no progress had been made by the Commission; urged the Governments to settle their outstanding differences, making use of United Nations facilities; and instructed the Commission to continue its work.

11. In 1952 the Commission restricted its activities to the two technical questions of assessing compensation and arranging for the payment of blocked accounts. In the Ad Hoc Committee the

/Arabs

Arabs attacked the Commission and said that action must be taken:

(i) to put Jerusalem under United Nations control;

(ii) to repatriate refugees;

(iii) to protect and guarantee free access to the Holy Places.

(All three points are specifically covered by Resolution No. 194.) The Arabs went on to accuse the Commission of partiality towards Israel and complained that its members, being under instructions from their own governments, could not deal honestly with the problems facing them, and recommended that membership of the commission should be enlarged. Various draft resolutions were put forward but none was successful, with the result that no resolution about the Conciliation Commission was passed by the General Assembly at its Seventh Session. From 1952 to April 1961 the activities of the Commission were governed by Resolution No. 512 (VI) of 26 January, 1952. Apart from routine work on assessment of compensation and the release of blocked accounts, the Conciliation Commission attempted virtually nothing during those years. In 1961 a draft Arab-inspired resolution recommended the establishment of "appropriate and effective machinery for safeguarding the property rights of the Arab refugees". This was strongly opposed by the Americans, because it would be illegal infringement of Israel sovereignty; Israel had appointed a custodian of refugee property shortly after the end of the fighting. In order to ride the Arabs off the recommendation about refugee property the Americans were prepared to accept some criticism of the Conciliation Commission. The General Assembly requests the Commission to report within six months on its efforts to implement Resolution No. 194 (III), paragraph 11: vide Resolution No. 1604 (XV).

12. The P.C.C. did not in the event report within 6 months but Western pressure was largely successful in keeping the Commission out of the limelight for the next five years. In April 1966 the

/P.C.C.

P.C.C. published a Working Paper (ASAC 25/W.84 of 28 April, 1966) reporting that the process of identifying and valuing Arab property in Israel had been completed and setting out the methods by which this was done. Close study of the Working Paper revealed that Arabs owned, or had an interest in, over 85% of Israel's land surface. The Working Paper did not give a figure for the total value of this property, but we have since learnt confidentially that at 1947 values it is worth about $500 million. Allowing for inflation present day values might be as much as $1000 million, or $1500 million if interest were added. The Arabs did not give this Working Paper the study it deserved and have since attacked it.

U.N.R.W.A.

13. In his 1951 report to the Sixth Session of the Assembly the Director of UNRWA recommended the setting up of a three year programme of relief and reintegration (i.e. repatriation and resettlement) with funds of $50 million and $200 million respectively. The three year programme would start retrospectively from 1 July, 1951. This was authorised in Resolution No. 513 (VI) of 26 January, 1952. The interesting point in this was the emphasis put on reintegration which, in view of the Conciliation Commission's failure to make progress on repatriation, could only mean resettlement. In the subsequent autumn Assembly meeting the Arabs pointed out that reintegration had come to mean "permanent exile" and complained that the amount set aside for direct relief to refugees was anyway too small. Arab feelings were taken into account by the Assembly in Resolution No. 614 (VII) of 26 November, 1952.

14. In 1953 Egypt, Syria and Jordan signed agreements with the Agency regarding rehabilitation programmes designed to make about 300,000 refugees self-supporting (without prejudice to the right of these refugees to repatriation). The Director-General of

/UNRWA

UNRWA whose report was generally endorsed by the Advisory Commission made two important suggestions: (i) that host governments (i.e. the Arab governments in whose countries the refugees now were) should take over administrative responsibility for relief work, the money continuing to be provided through UNRWA; and (ii) that Jordan, Syria and Egypt be added to the Advisory Commission. In the Ad Hoc Committee the United States representative indicated for the first time that Congress was most reluctant to continue voting large sums for refugees when Israel and the Arabs showed so little initiative in helping to solve the refugee problem. The United Kingdom supported the Director's suggestion that administrative responsibility for relief work should gradually be transferred to the host governments. The Arabs and Israel were opposed to this. The General Assembly then passed Resolution No. 720 (VIII) of 27 November, 1953.

15. In his 1954 report the Director made three main points:

(i) The belief that the cost of relief work could be reduced as refugees became self-supporting through rehabilitation programmes was proving almost completely unfounded. One reason for this was the unwillingness of both the refugees and host governments to assist with rehabilitation on the grounds that it would prejudice the refugees' right to return.

(ii) No solution along the lines of the Assembly's resolutions regarding repatriation and compensation was in sight.

(iii) The need for educational and practical training programmes, as almost half the refugee population was under 15 years of age.

The Director and the Advisory Commission recommended that the Agency's mandate should be extended for five years. They also recommended that the $200 million fund for rehabilitation (see paragraph 13 above) should be maintained, subject to expenditures

/already

already made. During the year Belgium and Lebanon took seats on the Advisory Commission, thus bringing it up to full strength.

16. In the ensuing debate in the Ad Hoc Committee the United States representative stressed the importance of finding new homes and work for refugees who chose to settle in Arab countries, without prejudice to their rights. The Arabs reacted strongly to this approach because, to the extent that rehabilitation succeeded, it prejudiced the refugees right to return. In the event, a resolution embodying the substance of the recommendations made by the Director and the Advisory Commission was passed by the General Assembly as Resolution No. 818 (IX) of 4 December, 1954.

17. Refugee affairs had now reached the stage when UNRWA's mandate had been extended for five years, until 1960. The Agency's work was settling into a fairly routine pattern of relief, education, health services and a small amount of rehabilitation (i.e. resettlement). The Conciliation Commission, sticking only to its limited tasks of assessing the value of refugee property and unblocking accounts, did not affect UNRWA's work. It does not seem necessary to give a detailed account of the debates in these years. Efforts at self-support and rehabilitation were hampered by lack of funds and the continued absence of a political solution of the Palestine problem, as well as by the persistent hostility of the refugees towards major development projects.

18. In 1958, the United States representative said that it was necessary to accelerate the rate at which refugees were made self-supporting. The Arabs opposed this strongly and said that the United Nations must in no circumstances free itself of its responsibility for the refugees until a final solution was reached. Until the refugees were repatriated the United Nations should receive from Israel the revenues derived from refugees property and make them available to the refugees. Israel opposed this but

/offered

offered to pay compensation in advance of a final peace settlement for any refugees who were resettled. The General Assembly passed Resolutions 916 (X) of 1955, 1018 (XI) of 1957, 1191 (XII) of 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 1958, 1456 (XIV) of 1959, and 1604 (XV) of 1961.

19. The Mandate was extended from 1961-1963. The Director's Report for 1961 stated that basic relief services were maintained at the 1960 level in order to concentrate funds on the expansion of education and vocational and teacher training. A Special Representative, an American named Dr. Joseph Johnson, had been appointed by the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to undertake confidential talks with the Israel and Arab Governments and to find means of progress towards a settlement of the refugee question. His realistic interim report, circulated during the Sixteenth Session, suggested that there was some hope of limited progress. We and the Americans therefore aimed principally at this Session at getting his mandate extended and the United States draft resolution, which was that finally passed as Resolution 1725 (XVI) of 1962 was directed to this end.

20. The main task before the 1962 Assembly was to provide for the extension of the mandate of UNRWA which was due to expire in 1963. Dr. Johnson's proposals, which consisted of offering limited numbers of refugees the choice between repatriation and compensation, were rejected by Israel and were not mentioned in public. He resigned soon after. A draft resolution calling for direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs was inspired by Israel. An Arab inspired draft resolution calling for the appointment of a United Nations custodian for Arab property, assets, and property rights within Israel was also put forward; neither in the end was put to a vote. The United States draft resolution, extending the mandate of UNRWA for two years and urging the Palestine Conciliation Commission to continue its efforts to make progress on the refugee

/question,

question, was carried, with the addition of a preambular paragraph recalling Resolution 194 (III) of 1948 as well as Resolution 1856 (XVII) of 1962. At the Pledging Conference Her Majesty's Government, in pursuit of their aim of economies in relief, announced that a specific proportion of their 1963 contribution to the Agency would be earmarked for education. This had the effect of limiting the amount to be spent on relief.

21. In 1963 the Director-General reported that expenditure on relief had been held at the previous year's level but that expenditure on education and training had been greatly increased. The United States Delegation refused to accept a comparatively mild draft suggested by the Arabs, but were at first equally unable to obtain acceptance of their own draft by the Arabs and the Israelis. A resolution based on the original Arab draft was tabled by Afghanistan, Pakistan and Indonesia, after the United States had lost a procedural wrangle over the precedence of their own draft; Israel then let it be known that the Netherlands, Denmark Iceland and Luxembourg had been persuaded to sponsor a resolution calling for direct Arab-Israel negotiations, and that support was expected from African and Latin American countries. In the event the Arab and Israeli inspired resolutions were withdrawn and the United States draft was passed as Resolution 1912 (XVIII). At the Pledging Conference the United Kingdom specified that a further five per cent of the United Kingdom contribution should be devoted to education and training and the amount devoted to relief should be reduced accordingly.

22. In the Special circumstances of the Nineteenth Session the General Assembly adopted Resolution No. 2002 (XIX) of 15 February 1965, which extended the UNRWA mandate to 30 June 1966, without reference to a Committee and without debate. At the Pledging Conference called by the Ad Hoc Committee on 17 February 1965 the

/United Kingdom

United Kingdom announced a contribution equivalent to $5.4 million of which not more than 45% was to be allocated to relief, but pointed out that Britain could not be expected to continue indefinitely to provide money for relief to those who were not genuinely in need. The Palestine Conciliation Commission was not the subject of debate and issued no report.

23. At the XXth General Assembly the Americans put forward a compromise draft Resolution to the Special Political Committee at an early stage. The Arabs and the Israelis then each proposed amendments to this draft. Just before these amendments were to be voted upon the Israelis withdrew theirs. The Arabs then withdrew the more obviously partisan of their amendments, but did not withdraw the others. This made it difficult to vote against the remaining Arab amendments without appearing to favour Israel unduly; and though the United Kingdom, the United States, the old Commonwealth and most of the Western European States voted against, the remaining Arab amendments were approved and incorporated in the Resolution accordingly adopted by the Special Political Committee. This Resolution had therefore a distinct pro-Arab flavour. An Arab-inspired Resolution about Arab refugee property in Israel was however rejected. The Arabs then came to consider the effect upon UNRWA of a Resolution against which all the major contributors had voted, and eventually accepted a compromise whereby the original American draft without the amendments tacked on in the Special Political Committee was adopted in Plenary.

24. For tactical reasons we agreed that Her Majesty's Government's contribution of $5 million for 1966 might be increased by $0.4 million payable with the second instalment of our contribution in August 1966 if substantial progress had been made in achieving rectification of the ration rolls. This was not paid since no such progress was made. No conditions were made about the allocation of this money.

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Section 3

25. At the XXIst General Assembly the Americans again put forward at an early stage a compromise draft which, with drafting amendments proposed by Somalia, was adopted as Resolution 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966 (Annex 2). A draft Resolution (proposed by Afghanistan, Malaysia, Pakistan and Somalia) calling for the appointment of a United Nations Custodian of Arab property in Israel was rejected. At the 1966 Pledging Conference the United Kingdom representative announced that, because of Britain's current economic difficulties, Her Majesty's Government's contribution for 1967 would have to be reduced by $0.5 million to $4.5 million. He made it clear that 55% of the United Kingdom contribution was specifically allocated to UNRWA's education, training and health services, and that the remaining 45% might be used for the provision of relief.

Section 4: The Commissioner-General's Report

Not available.

Section 5: Policy

Seating of Representatives of the Refugees

It has become traditional for the Special Political Committee to hear spokesmen for the Arab Refugees. The delegations of Arab States invariably ask that they should be heard as "the Palestine Delegation", or some similar phrase. They will probably come this year from the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) headed by Ahmad Shuqairy, to which the Arab States accord the status of an "entity" though not of a government. We regard this Organisation as likely to increase tension in the area and are anxious that it should not receive international recognition. The United States and Israel Governments share this view. (The Israel Foreign Minister emphasised in a meeting with the Minister of State in February the importance Israel attached to the PLO's receiving no recognition. He was assured that Her Majesty's Government would never accord it recognition in any way).

Line to Take

2. In consultation with the United States Delegation, the Delegation should seek, by lobbying the Chairman in advance, to make sure that the status of any spokesman for the refugees is not defined by the Committee and that nothing is said or done to accord them the status of governmental or quasi-governmental representatives, or to accord any recognition to the Palestine Liberation Organisation. The Committee should follow the precedent set by the Chairman's decision last year to allow PLO spokesmen to be heard, but specifically to deny recognition to the Organisation.

The Arab/Israel Dispute

3. As in previous years the debate is likely to cover a wide number of topics not directly concerned with the refugees. In earlier years the Israel Government has sought the support of the

/British

British, American and some other governments for a proposal that their delegations should press the Chairman, in advance of the debate, to control it so that it is confined to UNRWA affairs, or should appeal to the parties to avoid recrimination. The State Department and we considered this proposal unrealistic, though we would of course prefer a quiet debate. The topics most likely to be raised this year are a denunciation of Israel aggression in initiating the recent hostilities, withdrawal by Israel from territories occupied during the recent hostilities, the rescinding by Israel of recent acts and the avoidance of further acts purporting to change the status of Jerusalem, and a general limitation of the supply of arms to the Middle East.

Line to Take

4. The delegation should, if possible, avoid speaking on these subjects and should, if opportunity offers, endeavour to keep discussion to the point, and away from these controversial subjects. They should not however join in any formal démarches to this end unless the United States delegation are prepared to do so, and then only after seeking instructions. But if discussion of these topics cannot be avoided and it becomes necessary to give the British view, they should seek instructions or confine themselves to the following formulae:

(a) Denunciation of Israel Aggression in Initiating Recent Hostilities

Her Majesty's Government are opposed to the use or the threat of force in the Middle East, as elsewhere in the world, to resolve disputes. We regard the United Nations as primarily responsible for keeping the peace in the area, and impartially deplore the use of force from whichever side. Throughout the year of mounting tension which culminated in open hostilities on 5 June, we made clear our view that governments had a duty to prevent the mounting of attacks from their territory against Israel and that it was inexcusable to disown responsibility

/for

for those attacks; but we equally made clear to Israel our views that retaliation was not the right answer and that it was dangerous because one could never know where it would end. We do not think it appropriate to use this occasion to try to apportion blame for the recent outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East. We would rather see attention focussed on the elements of a settlement in the Middle East which would reduce the risk of a recurrence of hostilities. We think that any such settlement must

(i) establish the right of all states in the area to an independent national existence in peace and security;
(ii) find a just solution of the refugee problem;
(iii) safeguard the right of free and innocent passage through international waterways in the area;
(iv) establish general agreement on the control of the supply of arms to the area.

(b) Withdrawal by Israel from Occupied Territories

Britain is in favour of withdrawal by Israel from territories occupied during the recent hostilities, but Her Majesty's Government believe that this must be associated with an end to Arab claims to be in a state of belligerence with Israel, and with progress towards a settlement which covers the major issues of dispute between Israel and her Arab neighbours.

(c) Jerusalem

The United Kingdom voted for General Assembly Resolutions 2253 of 5 July and 2254 of 14 July, calling on Israel to rescind measures already taken and to avoid further action purporting to change the status of Jerusalem. Since 1947 Her Majesty's Government have maintained that the status of Jerusalem cannot be finally settled until an arrangement is found which is acceptable

/both

both to Israel and the Arab States, and which gives adequate safeguards of access to the Holy Places. We deplore the recent Israel legislation in relation to Jerusalem since it represents a unilateral attempt to fix the status of Jerusalem in advance of a general settlement, and without the agreement of the Arab States and the International Community. We hope that the Israel Government will cease to claim that the status of Jerusalem is "not negotiable" and that they will see that unilateral action on this question makes a general settlement more difficult, just as any settlement which did not establish a universally agreed status for Jerusalem would inevitably remain precarious. We would not wish, at this stage, to prejudge the future of Jerusalem. This is a question which can be decided only in the framework of a general settlement.

(d) Limitation of Arms Supply to the Middle East

Her Majesty's Government would welcome general agreement on a limitation of the supply of arms to the Middle East. Apart from avoiding the obvious dangers of an arms race, this would release vast resources which could be better spent in the development of the region.

The Palestine Conciliation Commission

5. Although the Commission has completed its project for the identification and evaluation of the property of the refugees, it has not undertaken any initiatives during the past year for a settlement of the Arab/Israel dispute and no early moves seem likely. It has not yet published a report. The Commission may not therefore feature much in the debate. The Arabs may revive proposals for enlarging the Commission to add Afro-Asian members. The Arabs may

/also

revive proposals for a United Nations Custodian of Arab property in Israel.

Line to Take

6. The Delegation should keep in touch with the United States Delegation. They should support and vote for any resolution providing for the continuation of the Conciliation Commission's activities in acceptable terms. This could be on the lines of paragraphs 3 and 4 of Resolution 192 (XVIII).

7. The Americans may wish to exclude a reference to paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) from the operative clauses of any resolution in view of the Israel opposition and consequent controversy which such a reference could arouse. The Delegation has discretion to assist them in lobbying on this question if they so request but in view of the numerous precedents for such a reference we do not ourselves regard it as particularly undesirable.

8. If proposals for an amendment of the composition of the Commission are canvassed the Delegation should keep in touch with the United States, French and Turkish Delegations and seek instructions. We shall have to be guided primarily by the views of our allies and by the need to avoid giving an opening to the Soviet bloc. We do not rule out all possibility of accepting the reconstitution of the Commission provided that the United States remains a member, but since the Israelis are opposed to any change, initiatives in this sense could only come from the Arabs with the aim of installing their partisans on the Commission. This would not help it in its task and any change is probably therefore undesirable. The State Department are opposed to it.

9. If the Arabs press for the appointment of a United Nations Custodian of former refugee property in Israel the Delegation should work against this. We share with the Americans the view:

/(a)

(a) that it is doubtful whether the refugees still have a valid legal claim to property in Israel;

(b) that the appointment of a United Nations Custodian would infringe Israel sovereignty, (an Israel Custodian has been in office since 1948); and

(c) that the Arabs, knowing Israel is bound to reject any reference to property rights or a Custodian, wish to press the point in order to place on the Israelis and on us the blame for non-compliance with a United Nations Resolution.

The Delegation should draw on (b) and (c) only if pressed; we are particularly anxious to avoid saying anything on point (a).

Direct Negotiations

10. The Israelis may promote a resolution calling for direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab States. Since the cease fire, they have repeatedly stated that they would welcome direct negotiations for a separate settlement. At the moment, no Arab Government is prepared to contemplate direct negotiations and we therefore think that any negotiations which take place in the near future will have to be through the agency of the United Nations. We are in favour of the United Nations Secretary-General's being authorised to appoint a Special representative to take up contact immediately with the Governments concerned. A resolution calling for direct negotiation would in the present situation be meaningless and would be likely to make the Arabs more intransigent.

Line to Take

11. The delegation should be guided by the following considerations:

(a) We must, as far as possible, keep in step with the Americans;

(b) we are not likely to vote for direct negotiations

(i) since such a resolution would not only be ignored, but would also make United Nations activity less acceptable to the Arab States - and this at a time when United Nations mediation

/seems

seems the only practical means of progress;

(ii) since it would go counter to our interest in securing a Security Council Resolution authorising the Secretary-General to appoint a special representative in the area;

(c) we are reluctant to be isolated in opposition to a resolution which seems on the face of it unobjectionable;

(d) we may have to take tactical considerations into account. We wish to avoid appearing to favour either side. If we have already decided to vote against an Arab inspired resolution, it will be better for us to vote against an Israel inspired resolution of this type. If the Arabs have proposed nothing, abstention on an Israel draft might be preferable.

The delegation should avoid taking part in a debate on a resolution of this kind; if it seems likely to come to a vote, they should seek instructions.

UNRWA

12. In the absence of any progress towards a general settlement in the Middle East, it is still not possible to foresee the shape or size of the refugee problem with which UNRWA will have to deal in the future. But until there is a general settlement, including a solution of the refugee problem, we are likely to continue to have political, as well as humanitarian reasons for supporting UNRWA. By relieving the distress of the refugees, UNRWA lessens the danger that they will contribute to a heightening of tension in the Arab/Israel dispute.

13. For as long as UNRWA has to continue with its humanitarian programme, Her Majesty's Government would expect to continue to make a substantial contribution to the Agency's budget. But the precise level of our contribution in 1968 may well be determined by political developments, by the degree to which new initiatives to solve the refugee problem become propitious and by the number of

/"new refugees"

"new refugees" who return to West Bank Jordan where they have their homes or where UNRWA has at present unused facilities to care for them. We await with great interest the Report of the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Nils-Goran Gussing.

14. Apart from maintaining and re-establishing its services (in conditions of post-war dislocation) to those refugees who come under terms of the UNRWA Mandate, the Agency has extended its services also to those who became refugees as a result of the recent hostilities. Throughout the period since the outbreak of hostilities, we have impressed upon the Israel Government the importance of avoiding acts which would encourage any exodus of the inhabitants of occupied territories and the importance of making humane arrangements for the return to their homes or camps of those who had fled. We are relieved that the Israel and Jordan Governments have been able to agree on a procedure to arrange the return of those who fled from the West Bank. We hope that sufficiently large numbers of refugees will feel encouraged to return to relieve UNRWA of the additional burden of caring for refugees not covered by its Mandate. In addition to our normal annual contribution to UNRWA's Budget of $4.5 million for 1966, we contributed $500,000 towards the cost of emergency relief provided by UNRWA for these "new refugees".

15. Since we must expect some considerable time to elapse before a general settlement is achieved we must consider some of UNRWA's perennial problems which may be expected to recur during this period.

16. During the last few years we have become increasingly concerned at the rising cost of UNRWA's work. We have had confidence in the Commissioner-General and his staff, and have supported the policy whereby the Agency attempts to assist the refugees to become self-supporting by spending a considerable proportion of its revenue on the provision of health services, and education and vocational

/training.

training. The relief work of the Agency is justified where there is genuine need, and we accept that it will have to continue; but too many refugees have been in receipt of rations when they did not need them. We believe that the administration of the relief programme could and should be reformed to ensure that relief goes in appropriate amounts only to those who need it. This could only be done with the active cooperation of the host Governments, and the Commissioner-General's past efforts to obtain this cooperation without financial pressure have been unsuccessful. In Britain's financial situation we cannot be expected indefinitely to provide money for rations for those who do not need them.

17. It was for this reason that we reduced our annual contribution for 1966 from $5.4 to $5 million. The United Kingdom's own financial situation made it necessary for us to reduce our contribution for 1967 by a further $.5 million to $4.5 million. Although we do not rule out for 1968 contributions towards emergency relief measures, or towards any new initiative towards a solution of the refugee problem, we have no reason at present for raising our annual contribution for 1968 to UNRWA's ordinary Budget from its 1967 level of $4.5 million. Our balance of payments situation has not sufficiently improved to justify restoration of the reduction of $.5 million made in 1967. There has been no progress towards rectification of the ration rolls sufficient to justify restoration of the $.4 million reduction which we made in 1966. However, the exact extent of UNRWA's commitments after the new Arab/Israel war is still uncertain, and we cannot altogether exclude that there might not be convincing reasons for increasing our annual contribution.

18. But if we assume a reversion to the conditions prevailing before 5 June we do not believe that the host Governments, whatever they may say in public, or in private, will ever willingly consent

/to cooperate

to cooperate in a thorough rectification of the ration rolls. It is in their interest to exaggerate the size of the refugee problem, which is a central part of their case against Israel, and to submit to pressure from refugees not in need that they should retain their rations. As matters stand at present, the needy refugees are adequately looked after by UNRWA. Those not in need were estimated at 10-20 per cent of those in receipt of basic rations by the Commissioner-General in paragraph 12 of his 1963/64 report. An American estimate puts this figure at 25 per cent and it may be higher. Basic rations cost $12 million in 1964 so there is obviously scope for economy. The fact that there are children waiting to get on the rolls emphasises the need to do something about this. We regard it as the Commissioner-General's job to try to bring this home to the host Governments. Any move to withdraw ration cards from this undeserving section of the refugee population would be unpopular, and as the host Governments see it, unnecessary unless there is a prospect that cuts will have to be imposed on all the UNRWA services, which would be unpopular with all the refugees. We cannot accept a continuing commitment to maintain our contribution at current levels, which would encourage the Arabs in their determination artificially to prolong the existence of the problem, although we cannot give this reason publicly.

19. We may well be accused of attempting to liquidate the refugee problem in advance of a just and agreed solution. Such accusations do not bear examination and there is no reason for us to be apologetic over our record over UNRWA. Over the years we will have contributed more than $100 million by the end of 1967. This represents 14 per cent of the Agency's total expenditure and is more than the total contributed by all other Governments excluding the United States. Even after the cut Her Majesty's Government will still be by far the second largest contributor. Our financial

/difficulties

difficulties make it essential for us to look very carefully at overseas expenditure, and the fact that we have made such a comparatively small cut demonstrates the importance we attach to UNRWA's work.

20. In discussing the need for the Commissioner-General to cut his services in accordance with the finance available the delegation should bear in mind that we should prefer to see reductions in UNRWA's relief services, rather than in the health services and in the educational and vocational services which fit the refugees to stand on their own feet. It will be difficult to do more than make this point without laying ourselves open to further charges that our real aim is to liquidate the refugee problem by denying them essential rations and that without food to keep the refugees alive, schools are futile. The answer to this must be that the ration rolls contain wage-earners who do not need rations. We should regard a straight percentage cut of all UNRWA services as less desirable. The least desirable outcome would be a concentration of expenditure cuts on education and training. It might be possible to give some effect to these preferences by tying a proportion of our contributions, but no decision on this has yet been made.

Line to Take

21. We have no strong views on how the debate in the Special Political Committee should be tackled. The delegation should keep in close touch with the Americans.

22. In speaking about the operations of the Agency the delegation should take the line that Her Majesty's Government have confidence in the Commissioner-General and his staff and admire the resource and humanity with which they have tackled the formidable problems posed. But the affairs of the Agency have not gone as well in the past as could have been hoped, because of a lack of cooperation between the host Governments and the Agency. This cooperation must

/be pressed

be pressed forward so that the Agency can operate as efficiently as possible in the interests of the refugees. The United Kingdom has repeatedly stressed its anxiety that the resources of the Agency should be confined to the assistance of those in need. It is generally accepted that, as the Commissioner-General recognises, greater equity in the administration of the funds available is required for this purpose and that a proportion of the refugees at present in receipt of rations do not need them. It is here that cuts can be made in expenditure. The Commissioner-General and the host Governments must have regard to what the international community can provide by way of funds for the continuance of the Agency's work.

23. Any resolution should aim at a clause directing that expenditure should match income and appealing to member Governments for increased contributions. In the present political atmosphere we should not be associated with any resolution explicitly calling for a reduction of UNRWA expenditure on relief

Third Generation Refugees

24. The Israelis may urge publicly that no rations be given to the grandchildren of refugees. The Americans hope to avoid any reference to this problem. We share the Israel view that the grant of rations to such children threatens to perpetuate the refugee problem, and are more keen than the Americans that this point should be brought home to the Commissioner-General. We see no likelihood however that any resolution would refer to this problem in acceptable terms and in the present state of Anglo-Arab relations would not wish openly to be associated with any such move.

The Pledging Conference

Line to Take

25. It is anticipated that the British contribution for the calendar year 1968 will, be not more than $4.5 million, its 1967 level. We have not yet decided whether any specific proportion

/should

should be allocated only to health services, education and training.

26. The delegation should explain that we will decide on the level of our 1968 contribution to UNRWA in the light of the situation and any new initiatives towards a general settlement including a solution of the refugee problem. In the absence of any developments our contribution to UNRWA's ordinary annual budget will ~~remain at~~ will exceed $4.5 million, its 1967 level.

27. The delegation should not speak at the Pledging Conference without further instructions, which will be sent when the level of our contribution has been determined. Subject to these instructions, they should speak on the following lines, modified as necessary by the terms of any resolution which has been passed. When announcing our contribution they should point out that Britain has borne a very creditable share of UNRWA costs. Britain's present financial position dictates a need for economy in all overseas Governmental expenditure. We attach such importance however to UNRWA that despite our difficulties we are continuing to make an annual contribution not significantly smaller than we made when we had less reason to economise on overseas expenditure. This will no doubt still leave Britain by far the second largest contributor. We hope that other countries which have the means to do so will increase their share in the financing of UNRWA.

3

ANNEX 1

Text of Resolution 194 (III)
The Palestine Question
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations
On 11 December 1948

The General Assembly,

Having considered further the situation in Palestine,

1. *Expresses* its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of the late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life; and

Extends its thanks to the Acting Mediator and his staff for their continued efforts and devotion to duty in Palestine;

2. *Establishes* a Conciliation Commission consisting of three States Members of the United Nations which shall have the following functions:

a) To assume, in so far as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by resolution 186 (S-2) of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948;

b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by the present resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council;

c) To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council ; upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions, the office of the Mediator shall be terminated;

3. *Decides* that a Committee of the Assembly, consisting of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, shall present, before the end of the first part of the present session of the General Assembly, for the approval of the Assembly, a proposal concerning the names of the three States which will constitute the Conciliation Commission;

4. *Requests* the Commission to begin its functions at once, with a view to the establishment of contact between the parties themselves and the Commission at the earliest possible date;

5. *Calls upon* the Government and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the Security Council's resolution of 16 November 1948 and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

6. *Instructs* the Conciliation Commission to take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

7. *Resolves* that the Holy Places — including Nazareth — religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and free access to them assured, in accordance with existing rights and historical practice ; that arrangements to this end should be under effective United Nations supervision ; that the United Nations Conciliation Commission, in presenting to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly its detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem, should include recommendations concerning the Holy Places in that territory; that with regard to the Holy Places in the rest of Palestine the Commission should call upon the political authorities of the areas concerned to give appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of the Holy Places and access to them ; and that these undertakings should be presented to the General Assembly for approval ;

8. *Resolves* that, in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area, including the present municipality of Jerusalem *plus* the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern, Shu'fat, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control;

Requests the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the demilitarization of Jerusalem at the earliest possible date;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which will provide for the maxi-

mum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area;

The Conciliation Commission is authorized to appoint a United Nations representative, who shall cooperate with the local authorities with respect to the interim administration of the Jerusalem area;

9. *Resolves* that, pending agreement on more detailed arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned, the freest possible access to Jerusalem by road, rail or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council, for appropriate action that organ, any attempt by any party to impede such access;

10. *Instructs* the Conciliation Commission to seek arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic development of the area, including arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the use of transportation and communication facilities;

11. *Resolves* that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;

12. *Authorizes* the Conciliation Commission to appoint such subsidiary bodies and to employ such technical experts, acting under its authority, as it may find necessary for the effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under the present resolution;

The Conciliation Commission will have its official headquarters at Jerusalem. The authorities responsible for maintaining order in Jerusalem will be responsible for taking all measures necessary to ensure the security of the Commission. The Secretary-General will provide a limited number of guards for the protection of the staff and premises of the Commission;

13. *Instructs* the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations;

14. *Calls upon* all Governments and authorities concerned to co-operate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the present resolution;

15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the terms of the present resolution.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
LIMITED

A/RES/2154 (XXI)
18 November 1966

Twenty-first session
Agenda item 32

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the Special Political Committee (A/6506)]

2154 (XXI). Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) and 394 (V) of 2 and 14 December 1950, 512 (VI) and 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958, 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959, 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961, 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1856 (XVII) of 20 December 1962, 1912 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963, 2002 (XIX) of 10 February 1965 and 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965,

Noting the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1966,[1]

1. Notes with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/6313).

2. Expresses its thanks to the Commissioner-General and the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;

3. Directs attention to the continuing critical financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report;

4. Notes with concern that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General in collecting additional contributions to help relieve the serious budget deficit of the past year, contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East continue to fall short of the funds needed to cover essential budget requirements;

5. Calls upon all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the Commissioner-General's report, and, therefore, urges non-contributing Governments to contribute and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions;

6. Directs the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue his efforts in taking such measures, including rectification of the relief rolls, as to assure, in co-operation with the Governments concerned, the most equitable distribution of relief based on need;

7. Notes with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine was unable, because of the unchanged situation in the area, to find a means to achieve progress on the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and calls upon the Governments concerned to co-operate so that the Commission may continue its efforts towards that end;

8. Calls upon the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to intensify its efforts for the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) and to report thereon as appropriate and not later than 1 October 1967.

1469th plenary meeting,
17 November 1966.

1827/113/67.

30 AUG 1967

EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM NUMBER 978

/ROUTINE/

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

29 AUGUST, 1967.

R. 10.55 A.M. 30 AUGUST

ADDRESSED TO F O TELNO 978 -/110

REF MY TELNO 977 OF 29/8. REFUGEES. TODAYS MA ARIV (EVENING NEWSPAPER) REPORTS THAT FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCES LET IT BE KNOWN THIS MORNING THAT REFUGEES WHO HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED PERMITS TO RETURN TO THE WEST BANK BUT WHO DO NOT MANAGE TO DO SO BY 31 AUGUST WILL BE ADMITTED AFTER THAT DATE.

2. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THERE WILL BE ABOUT 10,000 UNUSED PERMITS ON 31 AUGUST.

3. MA ARIV STATES THAT THIS DECISION WAS TAKEN IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AVERT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON ISRAEL WITHOUT GOING BACK ON HER DECISION NOT TO EXTEND THE DATE FOR RETURN OF THE REFUGEES BEYOND 31 AUGUST.

4. IT IS ALSO REPORTED THAT THE GOVT IS CONSIDERING A DECISION ABOUT THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO THE WEST BANK WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FAMILY REUNION SCHEME.

5. ARTICLE CONCLUDES BY SAYING THAT AN (OFFICIAL) ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE GOVTS STEP WILL APPARENTLY BE PUBLISHED TOMORROW (WED 30 AUG) IN JERUSALEM.

SOSFA/HADOW

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1827/112/67.

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Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Tel. No. 478 26 August, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

30 AUG 1967

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 478 of 26 August. Repeated for information to Tel Aviv and Saving to Washington and UKMIS New York.

Tel Aviv telegram No. 965.

Return of Refugees.

It might help moderate Arab leaders to defend their stand on relations with Britain and economic measures, if an announcement of Her Majesty's Government's attitude to the return of refugees were to be published as early as possible during Arab summit which is still expected to start here on 29 August.

Foreign Office pass Priority Tel Aviv 7 and Saving to Washington 9 and UKMIS New York 3.

Mr. Reddaway

Sent 1050Z/26 August
Recd. 1200Z/26 August

[Repeated as requested]

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Eastern Dept.

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1 SEP 1967

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PRIORITY TEL AVIV

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 980

31 AUGUST 1967

/ROUTINE/

R. 9.46 A.M. 1 SEPTEMBER

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDSD TO FO TEL 980 OF 31/8 RPT WTON UKMIS NYORK NO. 209.

UKMIS GENEVA

1110

MYTEL 977 : REFUGEES.

MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE INFORMED ME LAST NIGHT THAT HE HAD, IN THE MORNING, RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS GOVT TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO THE ISRAELI GOVT TO BE REASONABLE ABOUT THE RETURN OF REFUGEES.

HE DID NOT ENLARGE ON WHAT PRECISE POINT HE WAS TO MAKE, BUT SAID THAT HE HAD CONSIDERED IT SUFFICIENT FOR HIS COUNSELLOR TO SPEAK TO AN ISRAELI OFFICIAL +AT A FAIRLY LOW LEVEL+.

2. YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER, IN ANYTHING WE SAY TO ARAB GOVTS, WHETHER WE COULD NOT GAIN SOME CREDIT BY POINTING OUT THAT WHILE WE HAD BEEN ACTIVE ON BEHALF OF THE REFUGEES FOR SOME TEN DAYS NOW, THE FRENCH, + THE FRIENDS OF THE ARABS+, LEFT IT UNTIL THE LAST POSSIBLE MINUTE WHEN IN FACT ALL THE SPADE WORK HAD BEEN DONE.

F.O. PASS WTON 219 UKMIS NYORK 209

/REPEATED BY FOREIGN OFFICE TO U.K.MISSION NEW YORK NO. 4511/

MR HADOW

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FLASH TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM NO 977

/ROUTINE/

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

29 AUGUST 1967

R. 8.30 A.M. 30 AUGUST

1827/110/67.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 AUG 1967

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 977 OF 29 AUGUST
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION UKMIS NEW YORK NO 208 GENEVA WASHINGTON
TRIPOLI BENGHAZE BAHRAIN (AGENCY) KHARTOUM JEDDA RABAT TUNIS
JERUSALEM AMMAN CAIRO ALGIERS.

YOUR TELNO 1866: REFUGEES. 106

MR EBAN BEGAN BY SAYING A TELEGRAM HAD GONE TO MR REMES TO SPEAK TO YOU ORALY IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO GIVE YOU MR EBANS BACKGROUND THINKING ON THE GENERAL SITUATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER NEIGHBOURS (MYTEL 525 NOTAL).

2. WITH REGARD TO REFUGEES THE GOVT HAD DECIDED THAT:-

(A) ALL REFUGEES IN POSSESSION OF APPROVED APPLICATIONS ISSUED PRIOR TO 31 AUGUST WOULD BE PERMITTED TO RETURN. ISRAEL WOULD GO ON PROCESSING APPLICATIONS UP TO 31 AUGUST (BUT THESE WOULD ONLY AMOUNT TO ANOTHER 2-3000) MR EBAN WAS VAGUE ABOUT HOW LONG THE PERIOD FOR RETURN WOULD BE POSSIBLY TWO WEEKS OR SO BUT WHEN THE GOVT ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE HE DID NOT THINK ANY FURTHER DEADLINE WOULD BE SPECIFIED AND IT MIGHT WELL BE THAT RETURNEES IN THIS CATEGORY WOULD BE GIVEN QUITE A LONG TIME TO MAKE UP THEIR MINDS.

(B) THE FAMILY REUNION SCHEME WOULD BE CONTINUED INDEFINITELY.

3. I AGAIN RAN OVER THE GROUND COVERED IN YOUR TEL 1836, 194 MY TEL 965 AND AMMAN TELS 1025 NR 1030 188 AND 1016 104. I SAID IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE OUTSIDE WORLD COULD WELL CONSIDER THAT 190

INDEXED

CONFIDENTIAL

/ISRAEL

ISRAEL HAD BEEN UNNECESSARILY RESTRICTIVE: THEY WOULD NOT HAVE PROCESSED ALL THE APPLICATION FORMS NECESSARY FOR THE RETURN OF, SAY, A NATIONAL FIGURE OF 120,000 REFUGEES AND THE WORLD WOULD SEE THAT THEY HAD PREVENTED SOME HUNDRED-THOUSAND ODD FROM COMING BACK (WHETHER THESE PEOPLE REALLY WISHED TO DO SO OR NOT). I URGED THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BE THE LAST WORD. IT SEEMED ALL TOO OBVIOUS THAT IN ANOTHER TWO OR THREE WEEKS THE ISRAEL GOVT WOULD AGAIN COME UNDER STRONG WORLD CRITICISM AND MIGHT WELL HAVE TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF REFUGEES. MR EBAN INDICATED ASSENT AND SEEMED TO ACCEPT THAT POSSIBLE FURTHER CONCESSIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE AT A LATER DATE BUT THOUGHT THESE COULD BE BEST ACHIEVED BY A DIRECT DIALOGUE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN.

4. I SAID, IN PARTICULAR, I SIMPLY COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT DONE SOMETHING TO BRING BACK EN MASSE (UNDERLINED) THE FORTY ODD THOUSAND PROFESSIONAL REFUGEES FROM JERICHO, THEREBY GAINING CREDIT WITH UNRWA. MR EBAN SAID HE COULD NOT SEE WHY UNRWA DID NOT MAKE MORE PERMANENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THESE PEOPLE TO STAY ON THE EAST BANK. I SAID I THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS AN UNREASONABLE POINT OF VIEW. ALL THE FACILITIES EXISTED ALREADY ON THE WEST BANK AND WHY SHOULD UNRWA GO TO ALL THAT EXTRA TROUBLE AND EXPENSE, ON INTERNATIONAL MONEY, JUST BECAUSE THE ISRAELIS WANTED TO MAKE THINGS DIFFICULT.

5. WITH REGARD TO PUBLICITY I SAID HE WOULD HAVE NOTICED THAT WE HAD NOT (AS DISTINCT FROM THE AMERICANS AND U THANT) PUBLICISED OUR REPRESENTATIONS. I FELT THAT NOW YOU MIGHT WELL WISH TO LET THE ARAB STATES KNOW THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN BEHIND THE OTHERS IN REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THE REFUGEES. I THOUGHT IT QUITE POSSIBLE YOU WOULD WISH TO MAKE SOME STATEMENT TOMORROW. OR AGAIN YOU MIGHT WISH TO AWAIT UNTIL THE ISRAELIS

/HAD

HAD MADE THEIR ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT THEIR NEW ARRANGEMENTS ON 31 AUGUST, GIVE YOUR VIEWS ON HOW FAR THESE ARRANGEMENTS WERE SATISFACTORY OR NOT AND, AT THAT TIME, SAY THAT YOU HAD BEEN URGING THE ISRAEL GOVT TO EXTEND THE DATE FOR AT LEAST THE LAST TEN DAYS. MR EBAN MERELY ASKED THAT YOU WOULD NOT REVEAL WHAT THE ISRAELI ARRANGEMENTS WERE, BEFORE THE ISRAEL GOVT ITSELF MADE THESE PUBLIC.

6. FO PASS NEW YORK 208 WASHINGTON 218

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30 AUG 1967

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IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO.2787
/PRIORITY/
CONFIDENTIAL

29 AUGUST 1967
R. 1.01 P.M. 29 AUGUST

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.2787 OF 29 AUGUST
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK U.K./NO 429 MISSION
GENEVA AMMAN AND JERUSALEM AND SAVING TO TRIPOLI BENGHAZI KUWAIT
BAHRAIN (AGENCY) KHARTOUM JEDDA RABAT TUNIS CAIRO AND ALGIERS.

TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO.976 /105 TO FOREIGN OFFICE: REFUGEES.

MR. EBAN HAS TOLD THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE NOW WILLING TO ACCEPT ALL REFUGEES FOR WHOM APPLICATIONS ARE APPROVED REGARDLESS OF THE PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED TIME LIMIT.

2. HE DID NOT HOWEVER MAKE IT CLEAR WHETHER THIS APPLIED ONLY TO APPLICATIONS ALREADY APPROVED OR WHETHER THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE WILLING TO PROCESS ALL THE APPLICATIONS IN THEIR HANDS. MR. BARBOUR IS BEING ASKED TO SEEK CLARIFICATION ON THIS POINT.

F O PASS IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV 120 PRIORITY UK MISSION GENEVA 203 AMMAN 108 AND JERUSALEM 17 AND SAVING TO TRIPOLI 22 BENGHAZI 15 KUWAIT 50 BAHRAIN (AGENCY) 1 KHARTOUM 10 JEDDA 31 RABAT 8 TUNIS 9 CAIRO 22 AND ALGIERS 8.

SIR P. DEAN

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29 AUG 1967

Mr Eggleton

With the compliments of

THE BRITISH EMBASSY
A.B. Urwick

THE NEW YORK TIMES of 25 AUGUST 1967
Article by Hedrick Smith

Washington tel.2768 to F.O. of 25 August refers.

Copied to: Eastern Dept. F.O.
Chanceries, Amman, Tel Aviv, U.K.Mis. Geneva & C.G.Jerusalem.

WASHINGTON, D.C.
28 August 1967

The Chancery,
U.K.Mis. to the U.N.
New York, N.Y.

1827/109./67.

E. CLAIR

28 AUG 1967

IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 2064 28 AUGUST 1967

UNCLASSIFIED D. 1.15 P.M. 28 AUGUST

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2064 OF 28 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, U.K. MISSION GENEVA AND JERUSALEM.

MY. TELEGRAM NO. 2023: REFUGEES.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS CIRCULATED AS S/8133 AND A/6789 OF 25 AUGUST (COPIES BY BAG) THE TEXT OF A NOTE HANDED BY HIM TO THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL ON 24 AUGUST. THIS QUOTE URGENTLY APPEALS UNQUOTE FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE DEADLINE OF 31 AUGUST FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO THE WEST BANK, IN VIEW OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL OF UNRWA AND MR. GUSSING, AND OF THE REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF JORDAN.

2. THE NOTE REFERS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION NO. 237 OF 14 JUNE AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S RESOLUTION NO. 2252 (E-S/V) OF 4 JULY, WHICH CALLED ON ISRAEL QUOTE TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF THOSE INHABITANTS WHO HAVE FLED THE AREAS SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES UNQUOTE. WHILE RECOGNISING THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN ORGANISING THE RETURN, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAYS IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT IT WILL BE PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO ARRANGE FOR THE RETURN OF QUOTE MORE THAN A FRACTION OF THOSE WHO HAVE SIGNIFIED THEIR DESIRE UNQUOTE TO GO BACK. ACCORDINGLY, IN VIEW OF THE HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED, AND IN PURSUANCE OF THE TERMS OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF BOTH THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL URGENTLY APPEALS TO THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT TO EXTEND THE DEADLINE SO THAT THOSE WANTING TO RETURN MAY HAVE A QUOTE REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY UNQUOTE TO DO SO.

F.O. PASS PRIORITY AMMAN 252, TEL AVIV 382, AND ROUTINE BEIRUT 148, U.K. MISSION GENEVA 71 AND JERUSALEM 33.

LORD CARADON SENT 281715Z MC

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UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

Distr.
GENERAL

A/6789*
25 August 1967

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Fifth emergency special session
Agenda item 5

LETTER DATED 13 JUNE 1967 FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (A/6717)

Note by the Secretary-General

In view of the information received by the Secretary-General from Mr. Laurence Michelmore, Commissioner-General of UNRWA, and Mr. Nils-Göran Gussing, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, relating to the return to the west bank of the Jordan of those inhabitants who fled from the area during the hostilities in June 1967, and in view of the representations made to him on 24 August by the Permanent Representative of Jordan on behalf of his Government on the matter, the Secretary-General decided, in pursuance of Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, to request the Government of Israel to extend the deadline beyond the date of 31 August 1967 which had been set. To this end, the following note was handed by the Secretary-General to the Permanent Representative of Israel on the afternoon of 24 August:

> "The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the question of the dateline of 31 August for the return of displaced West Bank residents.
>
> "The Permanent Representative of Israel will recall that both the Security Council in its resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 and the General Assembly in its resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 called upon the Government of Israel 'to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities'. The Secretary-General recognizes that a number of difficulties have had to be overcome in arranging for the return of

* Also issued under the symbol S/8133.

displaced persons across the River Jordan. However, from all the information available to the Secretary-General, it is now clear to him that it will be physically impossible to arrange, before the present dateline of 31 August, for the return of more than a fraction of those who have signified their desire to return to the West Bank.

"In view of the humanitarian considerations involved and in pursuance of the terms of the resolutions of both the Security Council and the General Assembly, the Secretary-General requests the Permanent Representative of Israel to convey to his Government the Secretary-General's urgent appeal to the Government of Israel to extend the dateline for the return of the displaced West Bank residents in order to ensure that those who have signified their desire to return are, in fact, given a reasonable opportunity to do so.

"The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to express to the Permanent Representative of Israel the assurances of his highest consideration.

24 August 1967"

1827/106/67.

28 AUG 1967

CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE

TO TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1866

28 AUGUST

/PRIORITY/

R. 12.20 P.M. 28 AUGUST

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO. 1866 OF 28/8 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK NO 4441 UKMIS GENEVA WASHINGTON TRIPOLI BENGHAZI BAHRAIN (AGENCY) KHARTOUM JEDDA RABAT TUNIS JERUSALEM AMMAN CAIRO ALGIERS.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 976/105: REFUGEES.

NO (REPEAT NO) APPOINTMENT HAS BEEN MADE FOR MR. REMEZ TO SEE THE FOREIGN SECRETARY EITHER TODAY OR TOMORROW. PLEASE THEREFORE REPORT BY FLASH TELEGRAM THE RESULTS OF YOUR CONVERSATION WITH MR. EBAN.

2. IF ISRAEL GOVERNMENT'S DECISION IS NOT SATISFACTORY WE MAY WISH TO CONSIDER EARLIER PUBLICITY FOR OUR DEMARCHE.

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28 AUG 1967

OTHER CAT A

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IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 976

28 AUGUST

/ROUTINE/

R. 10.27 A.M. 28 AUGUST

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 976 OF 28 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK NO 207 /UKMIS GENEVA WASHINGTON TRIPOLI BENGHAZI KUWAIT BAHRAIN (AGENCY) KHARTOUM JEDDA RABAT TUNIS JERUSALEM AMMAN CAIRO ALGIERS.

MY TELNO 975: /107. REFUGEES.

RIVLIN TELEPHONED AGAIN LAST NIGHT TO SAY MR. EBAN WOULD BREAK HIS HOLIDAY TO SEE ME AT 10 AM ON 29 AUGUST IN HERTZLIYA.

2. HE SAID THAT CABINET HAD TAKEN A DECISION ABOUT RETURN OF REFUGEES WHICH WAS QUOTE A GREAT STEP FORWARD UNQUOTE, BUT WOULD NOT DISCLOSE DETAILS ON THE TELEPHONE. CABINET DECISION WILL NOT BE MADE PUBLIC FOR ANOTHER THREE DAYS, BUT MR. REMEZ HAS BEEN INFORMED BY TELEGRAM SO THAT HE CAN GIVE YOU FULL DETAILS IN CONFIDENCE AT THE MEETING WHICH ISRAEL M F A UNDERSTAND HAS BEEN BEEN ARRANGED WITH YOU TODAY.

3. IF ISRAEL CABINET DECISION DOES NOT, IN FACT, MEET YOUR REQUIREMENTS, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON WHAT TO SAY TO MR EBAN TO ARRIVE HERE BY 0900 HRS GMT ON AUGUST 29.

HADOW

FO PASS UKMIS NEW YORK 207 WTON 287.
/REPEATED BY FOREIGN OFFICE TO U.K.MISSION NEW YORK NO. 4432/

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/106. 107

INDEXED

1827/104./67.

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 1046

DATED 28 AUGUST 1967.

/IMMEDIATE/

R. 2.41 P.M. 28 AUGUST

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1046 OF 28 AUGUST.

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK NO 138, BEIRUT WASHINGTON, UKMIS GENEVA AND JERUSALEM.

YOUR TEL 975 /105 TO TEL AVIV.

REFUGEES.

WE UNDERSTAND FROM INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS THAT APPLICATIONS ON BEHALF OF APPROXIMATELY 130,000 REFUGEES HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO ISRAELIS WHO HAVE TO DATE APPROVED RETURN OF 18,000 ONLY.

2. WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT OF EACH BATCH APPROVED PERHAPS UP TO ONE THIRD HAVE FAILED FOR VARIOUS REASONS TO SHOW UP THIS IN NO WAY EXONERATES ISRAELIS FROM OBLIGATION TO PROCESS ALL APPLICATIONS RECEIVED AND TO GIVE JORDANIANS SUFFICIENT TIME TO ROUND UP THOSE WHO WISH TO TRAVEL.

3. ONE REASON FOR FAILURE OF APPROVED APPLICANTS TO SHOW IS THAT OLDER CHILDREN ARE REQUIRED TO APPLY SEPERATELY FROM THEIR PARENTS AND IN MANY CASES HAVE NOT SO FAR RECEIVED AUTHORITY. FAMILIES ARE THUS FACED WITH PROSPECT OF HAVING

/TO

CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED

TO SPLIT. MOREOVER, VIRTUALLY NO APPLICATIONS FROM FORMER RESIDENTS OF THE JERICO CAMPS HAVE BEEN APPROVED, AND NONE OF PEOPLE FROM THE JERUSALEM AREA. U.N.W.R.A. ARE CONCERNED AT PROSPECT OF HAVING TO DEAL WITH LARGE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES ON THE EAST BANK WHILE EXISTING WEST BANK FACILITIES ARE UNUSED.

4. PERHAPS IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO ENCOURAGE PUBLICITY OF THESE FACTS.

F.O. PASS NEW YORK 138 AND WTON 195.

/REPEATED BY FOREIGN OFFICE TO U.K.MISSION NEW YORK NO. 4444/

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1827/103./67.

CONFIDENTIAL 28 AUG 1967

Middle East Refugees.

I took these papers with me to London and we had some discussion there on the Palestine refugee problem.

2. Although we could not expect anything much to happen until Mr. Gussing's report is received, I said that I very much hoped that as soon as that report comes in we should urgently consider what we can do about it. I suggested that though we might be inhibited from taking a lead in other matters, there was no reason why we should not take a leading part on the refugees - and we had already said publicly that we were in favour of a new and imaginative initiative on humanitarian grounds. I suggested that possibly an official experienced in Arab affairs might be designated to deal with this matter in consultation with London and New York and also the countries concerned in the Middle East.

3. Even before we see Mr. Gussing's final report I think it may be useful to have some preliminary discussion amongst ourselves in the Mission on possible initiatives to be taken in the refugee question.

HC

(Caradon)

20 August, 1967.

INDEXED

Mr. Hope. P.H. 21/8

H. of C.

Mr. Egerton. We now have the Secretary-General's report of 18 August. Apart from stressing the need for more money for UNRWA, perhaps to the tune of £10m. per year, this states there is an obvious need for a restatement of the essential nature of the longer-term tasks of rehabilitation and an examination of how they should be undertaken.

2. Perhaps the first practical thing to establish is how many of the "new" refugees the Israelis accept

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accept back. Gussing will no doubt sum it all up and make recommendations just before the G.A. Meanwhile the S.G's interim report of 18 August has put everybody on notice of the size of the problem and the probable order of the extra cost to UNRWA.

3. Ready to discuss at any time.

N Egerton 21/8

W A Bryant 21/8.

Minister of State

Please try to find out when Mr Gussing will return and when his report will be ready

22/8

Mr Egerton

Sep. Min.

JL 26/8

When I saw the Secretary-General today I mentioned very briefly my idea that some new United Nations organisation might be required to deal with the whole question of relief and rehabilitation of refugees in the Middle East, perhaps to absorb UNRWA. I said that I thought that in the greater initiative now required in this field Prince Sadruddin might well be able to play an important part. But I realised that any such idea should not be pursued until Mr. Gussing makes his report (the Secretary-General said that Mr. Gussing's first report was not expected for several weeks).

(-/58)

2. No further action is required now, but I might take these papers with me to London and I may get an opportunity of mentioning this when I am in the Office next week.

HC

(Caradon)
19 July, 1967

Sir Leslie Glass 19/7

Head of Chancery (Acting)

19/7

Mr. Egerton 20/7
Private Office

For my London papers
HC
20/7

CONFIDENTIAL

I am attracted by the idea that Prince Sadruddin and the U.N. High Commission for Refugees should play an important role in the Near East, and I thought of reporting my view to London.

2. Instead I think that I shall take this telegram with me to remind me to mention the matter when I am in the Office on Friday.

(Caradon)
15 July, 1967

Sir Leslie Glass

Acting H of C

At this morning's office meeting the Minister of State said that he wished to raise with the Secretary-General (and perhaps subsequently London) the possibility of evolving some new approach to the Palestine refugee problem, probably not involvement of the U.N. High Commissioner himself, and to enquire whether Mr. Gussing had yet made a report.

(R.A.C. Byatt)
18 July, 1967

Minister of State

CONFIDENTIAL

1827/102/67.

CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 975

27 AUGUST 1967

/ROUTINE/

R. 8.33 A.M. 28 AUGUST

CONFIDENTIAL .

28 AUG 1967

U/N

ADDSD TO FO TEL 975 OF 27/8 RFI UKMIS NYORK/GENEVA WTON TRIPOLI BENGHAZI KUWAIT BAHRAIN(AGENCY) KHARTOUM JEDDA RABAT TUNIS JERUSALEM AMMAN CAIRO ALGIERS

YR TEL 1854. -/99 REFUGEES.

IN ADDITION TO ACTION REPORTED IN MYTEL 965 -/94.

I HAD OPPORTUNITY TO URGE EXTENSION OF DEADLINE ON ALLON ON AUG 24 AND (IN COMPANY WITH MR JEREMY THORPE) ON SHIMON PERES THAT NIGHT, . FORMER WAS, AS USUAL, HARD LINE, BUT UNCOMFORTABLE WHILE LATTER WAS RECEPTIVE (THOUGH I CANNOT ASSESS WHETHER HE CAN GET DAYAN TO INFLUENCE ANY GOVT DECISION).

JEREMY THORPE RAISED THE SUBJECT THE SUBJECT WITH ALL MINISTERS HE MET AND TODAYS PRESS CARRIES CALL BY HIM TO ISRAEL TO LIVE UP TO HER HUMANITARIAN REPUTATION.

2. I SAW MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE YESTERDAY AND LEARNED HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE AN OFFICIAL (-/91) APPROACH (HIS FIRST NON-PERSONAL ONE). HE WAS GOING UP TO JERUSALEM IN THE AFTERNOON TO CARRY THESE OUT, BUT DOUBTED IF HE COULD RAISE ANYONE BUT A JUNIOR OFFICIAL ON A SATURDAY. HE THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT MATTER MIGHT BE DISCUSSED IN CABINET TODAY. THIS MORNING HE TOLD ME HE HAD ONLY SEEN ASSISTANT AMERICAN DESK OFFICER

/ AND EVEN

CONFIDENTIAL

-/105.

INDEXED

AND EVEN AT THAT LEVEL
HAD DRAWN CONCLUSION THAT ISRAEL POSITION
WAS HARDENING (CF. HIS VIEWS IN MYTEL 965).
3. TODAYS PRESS BREAKS STORY OF AMERICAN APPROACH
IN WTON (WTON TEL 2768) -/101 AND OF UTHANTS MOVE.
RESULT HAS BEEN HARDENING IN PRESS LINE. I STILL BELIEVE
IT WILL NOT PAY FOR US TO GIVE PUBLICITY
GRATUITOUSLY BUT SINCE WE HAVE BEEN SCOOPED LIKE
THIS, I DO NOT THINK ANY HARM WOULD
BE DONE IF ALL ARAB POSTS WISH TO INFORM GOVTS PRIVATELY
THAT WE HAD STARTED OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIONS ON AUG 23RD
(IE BEFORE AMERICANS), WERE
CONTINUING WITH THEM DESPITE APPARENT REBUFF TO AMERICANS
AND WOULD CONTINUE TO THE END.
4.I HAVE TODAY COMPLAINED TO MFA AT LACK OF ANY OFFICIAL
RESPONSE TO MY REPRESENTATIONS OF AUG.23RD. I SAID
SAID I NOW HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO TALK TO THE P M IN MR EBANS
ABSENCE. I WAS TOLD IT WAS LIKELY THAT I WOULD
RECEIVE A REACTION BY TOMORROW. I SAID THAT IF THIS WAS
FAVOURABLE I WOULD NOT PRESS TO SEE MR ESKHOL,
BUT IF IT WERE UNFAVOURABLE I WOULD WISH TO SEE
HIM ON AUG 29THM I ALSO TOLD RIVLIN (ACTING
HEAD COMMONWEALTH DIVISION) THAT ISRAEL WAS REALLY PREPARING
ANOTHER SAMUA FOR HERSELF I.E. A SERIOUS LOSS
OF WORLD SYMPATHY OVER AN ACTION WHICH WAS TOTALLY IRRELEVANT
TO ISRAELS INTERESTS OR SECURITY.
5. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE INFORMED ME YESTERDAY OF RED CROSS
VIEWS REPORTED IN AMMAN TEL 1043. -/100

/REPEATED BY FOREIGN OFFICE TO U.K.MISSION NEW YORK NO. 4426/

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1827/101/67.

28 AUG 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2768 /Priority/ 25 AUGUST 1967

R. 9.15 a.m. 26 August

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO F O TEL NO 2768 OF 25 AUGUST REPTD FOR INFMN TO AMMAN TELAVIV UKMIS NEW YORK/UKMIS GENEVA No. 424, AND SAVING TO CONSULATE GENERAL JERUSALEM.

OUR TEL 2731 /191 AND YOUR TEL 1854: /199. RETURN OF REFUGEES.

THE NEW YORK TIMES REPORTED TODAY THAT AMBASSADOR BARBOUR HAD ALREADY EXPRESSED AMERICAN CONCERN TO THE ISRAELIS OVER THE DEADLINE FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND QUOTED STATE DEPT OFFICIALS AS EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT ALL THOSE WISHING TO RETURN WOULD BE ALLOWED TO DO SO.

2. THE STATE DEPT CONFIRM THAT INSTRUCTIONS TO SPEAK TO THE ISRAELIS HAVE NOW BEEN SENT TO BARBOUR, ALTHOUGH AS FAR AS THEY KNOW HE HAS NOT YET HAD TIME TO CARRY THEM OUT. MR EUGENE ROSTOW ALSO SAW THE ISRAELI CHARGE D'AFFAIRES THIS MORNING AND ASKED IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR ISRAEL TO EXTEND THE DEADLINE.

3. THE STATE DEPT ARE NOT AWARE THAT ANY OF THEIR OFFICIALS HAVE TALKED TO THE PRESS ABOUT THIS. WHILE THE PUBLICITY FOR THEIR APPROACH TO THE ISRAELIS WAS CERTAINLY NOT INTENTIONAL, THE AMERICANS ARE NOT PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT IT HAS NOW BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE.

F O PASS PRIORITY TO AMMAN 107, TEL AVIV 119, UKMIS GENEVA 424, AND SAVING C G JERUSALEM 1.

SIR P DEAN

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INDEXED

1821/100/67

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CYPHER/CAT +A+.

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO FOREIGN OFFICE 25 AUG 1967

TELEGRAM NO. 1043
/Priority/

25 AUGUST 1967.
R. 1.35 p.m. 25 August

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1043 OF 25 AUGUST
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK. /UKMIS No. 137,
GENEVA, WASHINGTON AND JERUSALEM.

TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO 965. TO YOU. -194

RETURN OF REFUGEES.

THE REGENT, PRINCE MOHAMMED, SENT FOR ME YESTERDAY ON HIS RETURN FROM WATCHING THE REFUGEES CROSSING THE KING HUSSEIN BRIDGE, TO EXPRESS HIS GRAVE CONCERN AT THE SLOW PACE OF THE WHOLE OPERATION BY (A) THE SHORT NOTICE GIVEN AND (B) THE DELAYS IN RETURNING THE REGISTRATION CARDS TO JORDAN. HE ASKED THAT H.M.G. SHOULD DO WHAT THEY COULD TO MAKE ISRAEL CO-OPERATE MORE EFFECTIVELY.

2. WHILE PRINCE MOHAMMEDS CONCERN WAS NO DOUBT GENUINE, I AM BOUND TO REPORT THAT MUCH OF THE DELAY SEEMS DUE TO THE INABILITY OF THE JORDANIANS TO COPE WITH THE VERY DIFFICULT ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN REGISTRATION AND SUBSEQUENTLY LOCATING AND TRANSPORTING LARGE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES SCATTERED BETWEEN WIDELY- SPREAD CAMPS AND IN TOWNS.

/3. THE

CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED

3. THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE TOLD US THIS MORNING THAT YESTERDAYS' TOTAL OF ABOUT 1600 REFUGEES GOING BACK COULD AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN TWO OR THREE TIMES AS LARGE, BUT THAT THE JORDANIANS HAD BEEN UNABLE TO ROUND THEM UP IN TIME AND TRANSPORT THEM TO THE JORDAN. IN ANY CASE, TROYAN BELIEVES THAT DOUBLE REGISTRATION HAS TAKEN PLACE IN MANY CASES AND HIS OWN ESTIMATE OF THE TRUE FIGURE IS NEARER 90,000 THAN 175,000 PUBLISHED BY THE JORDANIANS. MANY OF THE CAMPS ARE NOW LESS THAN HALF OR A QUARTER FULL AND THERE IS SOME MYSTERY ABOUT THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE VAST MAJORITY.

4. ALL THIS INCLINES ME TO AGREE WITH MR. HADOW'S RECOMMENDATION (PARA 4 OF HIS TEL UNDER REFERENCE) THAT WE SHOULD NOT GIVE IMMEDIATE PUBLICITY TO OUR PRESENT (UNDERLINE) DE'MARCHES (CEASE UNDERLINING) BUT HOLD OUR FIRE UNTIL JUST BEFORE 31 AUGUST.

FO PASS UKMIS NEWYORK 137 WASHINGTON 194

/Repeated by Foreign Office to U.K.Mission New York No. 4392./

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— 1827/99/67

CYPHER CAT A 25 AUG 1967 CONFIDENTIAL

PRORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM NO 1854 25 AUGUST 67

R. 11.02 a.m. 25 August

/Routine/

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO.1854 OF 25 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK No. 4388, UKMIS GENEVA WASHINGTON TRIPOLI BENGHAZI KUWAIT BAHRAIN (AGENCY) KHARTOUM JEDDA RABAT TUNIS JERUSALEM AMMAN CAIRO (BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION) AND ALGIERS.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO.965. 1194

I ACCEPT THE RECOMMENDATION IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 4 THAT WE SHOULD POSTPONE PUBLICITY FOR YOUR REPRESENTATIONS TO THE ISRAELIS.

2. IF THERE HAS BEEN NO MOVE BY THE ISRAELIS BEFORE THEN YOU SHOULD MAKE ANOTHER APPROACH TO MR. EBAN, OR FAILING HIM TO THE PRIME MINISTER, OR TO WHICHEVER MINISTER IS IN CHARGE OF THE M.F.A. ON 29 AUGUST. NEWS DEPARTMENT WOULD ANNOUNCE THIS AT THEIR 12 O'CLOCK PRESS CONFERENCE ON 31 AUGUST IF THERE HAD STILL BEEN NO FAVOURABLE ISRAELI REACTION. THIS TIME-TABLE WOULD ALLOW THE ISRAELIS 24 HOURS IN WHICH TO REACT WITHOUT BEING UNDER PUBLIC PRESSURE FROM H.M.G. IF YOU JUDGED IT USEFUL YOU COULD INFORM THEM OF OUR INTENTION ABOUT PUBLICITY WHEN MAKING YOUR SECOND DEMARCHE.

3. H.M. AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, SHOULD INFORM THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS.

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1827/98/67

EN CLAIR

PRIORITY TEL AVIV

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TEL NO. 971

24 AUGUST 1967

/PRIORITY/

25 AUG 1967

R. 7.10 P.M. 24 AUGUST

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESS TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 971 OF 24/8/67 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, UKMIS NEW YORK, NO 205 UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON, TRIPOLI, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, BENGHAZI, KHARTOUM, JEDDA, RABAT, TUNIS, JERUSALEM, BIS CAIRO, AND BIS ALGIERS.

MY TELNO 965. 194

RETURN OF REFUGEES.

REFUGEES ARE STILL RETURNING AT A RATE OF ONLY A LITTLE MORE THAN HALF THE NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS APPROVED. YESTERDAYS TOTAL WAS 1,750 OUT OF AN APPROVED QUOTA OF 3,000 ISRAEL PRESS TENDED INITIALLY TO PUT THIS DOWN TO JORDANIAN INEFFICIENCY BUT ARE NOW TAKING THE LINE THAT JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES ARE DELIBERATELY HOLDING REFUGEES BACK IN ORDER TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO EXTEND 31 AUGUST DEADLINE.

2. ISRAEL MINISTER OF INFORMATION STATED YESTERDAY THAT THE DEADLINE WAS FINAL BUT THAT ISRAEL WOULD CONSIDER INDIVIDUAL REQUESTS AFTER 31 AUGUST FROM FAMILIES ON THE WEST BANK FOR THE RETURN OF THAIR RELATIVES FROM JORDAN.

HADOW+++

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CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1036

23 AUGUST 1967

R. 8.39 a.m. 24 August

24 AUG 1967

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FO TELNO 1036 OF 23AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION No. 135 TO TEL AVIV UK MIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON. YOUR TEL NO 1836 TO TEL AVIV PARA 3. -190

I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF I COULD BE INFORMED BY FLASH TELEGRAM OF ANY STATEMENT ISSUED BY NEWS DEPT SO THAT WE CAN SECURE IMMEDIATE PUBLICITY FOR IT HERE. I BELIEVE THIS AND IN PARTICULAR MENTION OF OUR CONCERN ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IN COUNTERING THE GROWING IMPRESSION THAT THE WEST IS BEING UNHELPFUL AND UNMINDFUL OF JORDAN'S PROBLEMS.

2. SO FAR AS WE CAN TELL HERE PROVOCATIVE PROPAGANDA ON RETURN OF REFUGEES HAS VIRTUALLY CEASED. I THEREFORE HOPE THAT THIS ASPECT WILL BE OVER PLAYED IN THE PROPOSED STATEMENT.

/Repeated by Foreign Office to UKMIS New York as 4366/

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INDEXED

T827/96/67

F.O. Tel. No. 1289 Saving to New York Mission

CONFIDENTIAL

24 AUG 1967

Cypher/Cat.A

PRIORITY TRIPOLI TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram No. 819 21 August, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 819 of 21 August, Repeated for information to Benghazi, Amman, Tel Aviv and Saving to Tunis, Cairo, Beirut, Rabat, Algiers, Jedda, Khartoum, Bahrain, Kuwait and UKMission New York.

Arab-Israel Crisis.

While I admit to having no information on whys and wherefores of Israel's resistance to an extension of 31 August deadline for return of West Bank refugees beyond BBC and British Press reports, I wonder if we could not further improve our image among our Arab friends at little price by a suitable public statement urging Israel to reconsider her position on this matter and allow refugees a longer interval to return over the Jordan. I am sure this would help Libyan Government in its efforts to restore normal relations with United Kingdom.

Foreign Office pass Benghazi No. 291, Amman No. 21, Tel Aviv No. 11, and Saving to Tunis No. 12, Cairo No. 3, Beirut No. 6, Rabat No. 9, Algiers No. 7, Jedda No. 5, Khartoum No. 3, Bahrain No. 5, Kuwait No. 7 and UKMission New York No.3.

Mr. Sarell

Sent 1250Z 21 August
Recd 1715Z 21 August

[Repeated as requested]

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1827/95/67

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT/A

INMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO. 2023

24 AUG 1967

23 AUGUST 1967

D. 5.42 P.M. 23 AUGUST

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 2023 OF 23 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, UKMIS GENEVA AND JERUSALEM.

190

RETURN OF REFUGEES.

YOUR TELNO. 1836 TO TEL AVIV.

RALPH BUNCHE TOLD ME TODAY THAT THE SECRETARY GEBERAL IS MAKING REPRESENTATIONS TO THE ISRAELIS ASKING FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE TIME LIMIT FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO THE WEST BANK AFTER THE 31ST AUGUST.

2, BUNCHE SAID THAT IF THIS REQUEST IS REFUSED OR IGNORED HE IMAGINED THAT THERE MIGHT BE A CALL FOR A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT I HAVE NO OTHER INDICATION THAT THERE IS ANY INTENTION TO CALL THE COUNCIL.

3. THE JORDANIAN MISSION CLAIM THAT THE MINIMUM EXTENSION WHICH THEUR GOVERNMENT CONTEMPLATE IS A FURTHER MONTH.

F.O. PASS AMMAN 250, TEL AVIV 380, BEIRUT 147, UKMIS GENEVA 68 AND JERUSALEM 31.

LORD CARADON GPS 100A SENT AT 2142Z HJ

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107.

INDEXED

/1827/94/67

CYPHER/CAT ''A'' CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY REL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 965 23 AUGUST 1967 24 AUG 1967

CONFIDENTIAL R. 9.10 a.m. 24 August.

No. 203

ADDSD TO FO TEL 965 OF 23/8 RFI UKMIS NYORK/GENEVA WTON

TRIPOLI BENGHAZI KUWAIT BAHRAIN KHARTOUM JEDDA RABAT

TUNIS JERUSALEM AMMAN AND B INTERESTS SECTIONS CAIRO

ALGIERS.

/190

YR TEL 1836. RETURN OF REFUGEES.

I HAD THIS MORNING, BEFORE RECEIPT OF YR TEL UNDER

REF SPOKEN TO LOURIE ON A PERSONAL BASIS AND URGED A MORE

NB FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE MATTER. I DREW ON AMMAN TELS

1023 AND 1025. 10/12/73 I ALSO SAID THAT REPORTS FROM OTHER

ARAB POSTS INDICATED KEEN INTEREST IN THE ARAB WORLD.

ISRAEL INTRANSIGENCE

WOULD BE EXPLOITED TO THE FULL BY ALL THE ARAB STATES AND

WOULD, QUITE JUSTIFIABLY, HAVE AN EFFECT ON WORLD PUBLIC

OPINION, NOT LEAST IN THE U K. HE SHOULD

BEAR IN MIND THAT IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE

THERE WOULD BE DEBATES IN THE SECURITY

COUNCIL AND IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHEN

IT RECONVENED AND ISRAEL COULD JUST NOT AFFORD TO BE

IN THE DOCK OVER REFUGEES AS WELL AS OVER THE

MANY OTHER ASPECTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION.

2. YR TEL ARRIVED IN THE MIDDLE OF THIS CONVERSATION AND

I READ TO LOURIE PARA 2. I ASKED TO BE GIVEN AN INTERVIEW

CONFIDENTIAL /WITH...

/98. 99.

INDEXED

WITH MR EBAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. LOURIE SAID THAT EBAN WOULD BE TAKING A WEEKS HOLIDAY FROM FRIDAY= HE WAS EXHAUSTED AND HIS LAST WEEKS HOLIDAY HAD BEEN A FIASCO SINCE HE HAD BEEN CAUGHT UP IN NUMEROUS SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS AND RADIO INTERVIEWS. HE WOULD DO THE BEST HE COULD BUT HE COULD NOT PROMISE ANYTHING DEFINITE.

3. I HAD PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM WITH MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE, WHO HAS ADVISED HIS GOVT NOT TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS UNTIL NEARER THE DATE OF AUGUST 31, WHEN IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO POINT MORE EXACTLY AT THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM OF THE REFUGEES WHO WISHED TO RETURN BUT HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO DO SO BECAUSE OF THE DEADLINE. HE HAD ALSO HAD INDICATIONS FROM HIGHLY PLACED ISRAE OFFICIALS THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THE GOVT WOULD GIVE WAY IN THE END, BUT ONLY AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR. GEN RABIN IN CONVERSATION HAD LET SLIP A REMARK TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ARMY EXPECTED TO BE HAVING TO COPE WITH RETURNING REFUGEES +UNTIL OCTOBER+.

4. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF CONSIDERATION COULD BE GIVEN TO NOT (REPEAT NOT) GIVING IMMEDIATE PUBLICITY TO OUR PRESENT DEMARCHES. AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE THIS MIGHT MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE ISRAEL GOVT (WHO HAVE GENUINE INTERNAL DISAGREEMENT ON THE PROBLEM AND A HOSTILE PUBLIC OPINION) TO BEHAVE REASONABLY IN A WEEKS TIME (IF THEY INTEND TO DO SO). I WOULD SUGGEST INSTEAD THAT I BE AUTHORISED TO MAKE ANOTHER, FINAL DEFINITIVE APPROACH ON 29 OR 30 AUGUST, IF POSSIBLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE, AND THAT AT

/THAT STAGE..

THAT STAGE PUBLICITY SHOULD BE GIVEN. IT WILL SURELY BE MORE EFFECTIVE IN THE ARAB WORLD IF OUR APPROACHES ARE SEEN TO HAVE MET WITH SOME SUCCESS, WHICH THEY ARE MORE LIKELY TO DO AT A LATER STAGE. EVEN IF THEY DO NOT, WE SHALL HAVE LOST NOTHING IN WAITING A FEW DAYS IN ORDER TO TELL THE ARABS THAT WE HAVE TRIED OUR BEST AND WE COULD THEN MENTION THAT WE STARTED MAKING REPRESENTATIONS AS EARLY AS 23 AUGUST.

HADOW

/Repeated by Foreign Office to UKMIS New York as 4368/

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1825/67

21 AUG 1967
23 AUG 1967

With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY
TEL-AVIV

United Kingdom Mission,
New York.

17 August, 1967

Mr Byatt 21/8
Mr Hoselitz
Col. Sweeney 22/8
Mr Muffin
for info. 21/8

1827/93/67

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY,

TEL AVIV.

1825/67

17 August, 1967.

Return of West Bank Refugees from Jordan

I raised this subject with David Rivlin, the Acting Head of the Commonwealth Division of the Israel Foreign Ministry, with whom I had lunch in Jerusalem yesterday.

2. I said that I was confused over the rights and wrongs of the wrangle between Israel and Jordan over the practical arrangements for the return of the refugees which had held things up for so long. Most outside observers who had looked at the problem (in this connection I mentioned Messrs. Orme and Hooley - see Crawford's letter 1639/67 of 31 July to you) had gained the impression that it was the Israelis who had dragged their feet.

10712/80A

3. Rivlin denied this. He said that, whatever the future of the occupied territories might be, it was of little consequence to Israel whether there were 700,000 Arabs on the West Bank or 900,000. Israel's offer to allow those who had fled to Jordan to return was entirely genuine but the Jordanians had refused to accept this in the same spirit. They had consistently, and without regard for humanitarian considerations, tried to exploit the refugee problem for political ends. At first they had opposed the return of the refugees whose plight attracted considerable world sympathy and support for Jordan and was a useful propaganda weapon against Israel. The Jordanian Government could not of course say publicly that they did not want the refugees to return but they had done all they could by, for example, rejecting Israel's procedural proposals without being prepared to put up proposals of their own, to place obstacles in the way of a solution. But about ten days ago the Jordanians suddenly changed their attitude and became cooperative. Rivlin thought that this change was mainly due to two factors. Firstly, the penny had finally dropped in Amman that the continued presence of two hundred thousand or so West Bank refugees would place an intolerable economic, social and security burden on Jordan.

/Secondly,

J.C. Moberly, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

INDEXED

CONFIDENTIAL

Secondly, their earlier fears that a Palestinian movement would develop on the West Bank, opposed to a return to Hashemite rule and willing to accept Israeli tutelage, had proved unfounded. The West Bankers had begun to agitate against the Israel occupation authorities and had demonstrated their continued loyalty to Jordan by taking orders from Amman. The Jordanians now realised that the return of the refugees would reinforce anti-Israel pressures on the West Bank. It was clear from a recent statement by the Jordanian Finance Minister (our telegram No. 929) that the refugees were under orders to make life difficult for the Israelis.

NR

4. Rivlin added that the Jordanians had almost wrecked the refugee scheme by their policy of incitement to rebellion. The decision of the Cabinet on 13 August to allow the refugees to return (our telegram No. 946 not to all) was an extremely close run thing and Eban had had a hard fight to get his way.

NR

5. I asked Rivlin how many West Bankers he thought would take advantage of the opportunity to return. Rivlin replied that he doubted whether more than about 50,000 would come back unless the Jordanians used compulsion. I said that even on this figure it would be difficult to get them all in before the 31st August deadline. Surely it was a mistake to be too rigid about timing. It would do Israel a great deal of harm if at the end of the day thousands of would-be returnees were left stranded on the East Bank of the Jordan. Rivlin said that he thought it was feasible to handle all those who wished to return within the time limit, but he had no doubt that if necessary the deadline could be extended. This however partly depended on the Jordanians. If they continued their policy of incitement, public pressure in Israel was likely to be opposed to any further concessions.

M

6. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries in Amman and Washington, to the United Kingdom Mission in New York and to H.M. Consul-General, Jerusalem.

(N. Aspin)

1827/92/67

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT.A.

23 AUG 1967

PRIORITY AMMAN

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1033

/Priority/

23 AUGUST 1967

R. 1.59 p.m. 23 August

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1033 OF 23 AUGUST.
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK No. 134, WASHINGTON AND BEIRUT.

10712/73

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1025 (NOT TO ALL): RETURN OF REFUGEES.

JORDANIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON BEHALF OF PRIME MINISTER THIS MORNING ASKED ME FOR THE SUPPORT OF H.M. GOVERNMENT FOR THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO ALLOW THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO THE WEST BANK TO CONTINUE AFTER 31 AUGUST.

2. THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT HAVE INSTRUCTED THEIR DELEGATION AT THE U.N. TO TAKE UP THE MATTER WITH THE SECRETARY - GENERAL AND HAVE ALSO APPEALED TO GUSSING, BELIEVED NOW TO BE IN BEIRUT, FOR HELP. THEY HOPED THAT FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS WOULD SUPPORT THIS ACTION BY POINTING OUT TO THE ISRAELIS THAT THE U.N. RESOLUTION SET NO TIME LIMIT FOR THE OPERATION AND BY EMPHASISING ITS HUMANITARIAN ASPECT.

190

3. SINCE DRAFTING THE ABOVE I HAVE SEEN YOUR TELNO 1836 TO TEL AVIV AND HAVE INFORMED FOREIGN MINISTER OF ITS CONTENTS.

/Repeated by Foreign Office to U.K.Mission New York No.4360/

F O PASS UKMIS NEW YORK 134 WASHINGTON 192

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CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED

1827/91/67

23 AUG 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY WASHINGTON

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2731

23RD AUGUST 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL /Priority/

R. 1.45 p.m. 23 August

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 2731 OF 23RD AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY TO AMMAN TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK No.417. UKMIS GENEVA AND SAVING TO C.G. JERUSALEM.

YOUR TEL. 1836 TO TEL AVIV: RETURN OF REFUGEES.

THE STATE DEPT. ARE URGENTLY CONSIDERING MAKING SIMILAR REPRESENTATIONS TO THE ISRAELIS AND ALSO THE POSSIBILITY OF APPROACHING THE SWISS AND SOME OF THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES TO SEE IF THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO WEIGH IN TOO.

F O PASS AMMAN 105, TEL AVIV 1171 UKMIS GENEVA 200 AND SAVING TO JERUSALEM 11.

SIR P DEAN

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101, 102

INDEXED

1827/90/67

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM NO 1836 22 AUGUST 1967

R. 8.28 a.m. 23 August

CONFIDENTIAL.

23 AUG 1967

ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 1836 OF 22 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK No. 4350 UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON, TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, KHARTOUM, JEDDA, RABAT, TUNIS, JERUSALEM, AMMAN, BRITISH INTERESTS SECTIONS: CAIRO, ALGIERS.

YOUR TELEGRAM 959: -186 RETURN OF REFUGEES.

PLEASE REPRESENT UNGENTLY TO MR. EBAN THAT IT WOULD BE UNREASONABLE OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO INSIST ON THE 31 AUGUST DEADLINE ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF AMMAN TELEGRAM -181 1012. IN SO DOING, YOU MAY INFORM HIM OF H.M. AMBASSADOR'S RECENT REPRESENTATIONS IN AMMAN (MY TELEGRAM NO 1808 10639/109 TO TEL AVIV AND AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 1025. 10712/73)

2. IT CANNOT BE IN ISRAEL'S OWN INTERESTS TO OBLIGE THE NEW REFUGEES TO REMAIN AS A CENTRE OF DISAFFECTION ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE JORDAN. THE CONSEQUENT AGGRAVATION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM CAN ONLY MAKE EVEN MORE REMOTE ANY EVENTUAL ARAB/ISRAEL SETTLEMENT. AN UNYIELDING ATTITUDE ON THIS PROBLEM IN WHICH THERE ARE SUCH STRONG HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS CAN ONLY DAMAGE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD, AND CERTAINLY OF U.K. PUBLIC OPINION.

3. PLEASE REPORT BY TELEGRAM WHEN YOU HAVE TAKEN ACTION AS WE INTEND NEWS DEPARTMENT TO MAKE PUBLIC THE FACT THAT WE HAVE MADE REPRESENTATIONS, BALANCING THIS WITH A SIMILAR REFERENCE TO OUR REPRESENTATIONS TO THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT TO AVOID PROVOCATIVE PROPAGANDA ABOUT THIS QUESTION.

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INDEXED

-/91.92

Copy of Gussing's report
to be forwarded when it
is published.

Noted 24/8.

1827/89/67

22 August, 1967

I am sorry that I did not reply to your letter of the 11th of August before I left London to come back to New York - though I did ask the Foreign Office to look at this suggestion which you have put to me about giving additional support and publicity to the work of U.N.R.W.A.

They told me in London just before I left what is being done in England to further UNRWA's interests. You no doubt know of this already but I was told that the United Nations Information Centres Press Officer runs an information service for UNRWA as well as for other United Nations agencies. I was also told that there is an UNRWA Liaison Group of the Standing Conference of British Organisations for Aid to Refugees (SCBOAR) which distributes information about UNRWA's

/ services

Miss Grania Birkett,
Brook House,
Ardingly,
Sussex.

INDEXED

services and needs to the major charitable organisations which are members of the Standing Conference and to schools, Universities and other groups. I gather that this Liaison Group is active as a fund raiser and that in last year's campaign for refugees they collected £35,000 specifically for UNRWA's use; and this year they are actively engaged in renewed appeals to meet the increased need for emergency relief.

Consequently those whom I consulted in London were doubtful whether there was a need for the establishment of a separate office which would inevitably require more money to be directed to administration.

It was, by the way, suggested that you might like to mention your idea of sending Arab children to Pestalozzi Villages to the UNRWA Liaison Group?

I am afraid that I myself know too little about this to reach a conclusion, but I must say that I always feel some doubt and reluctance about proposals to set up new organisations. Better, I am

/ sure,

sure, to make use of existing bodies wherever possible.

You may have seen the Secretary-General's report of the 18th of August, I enclose a copy. I am afraid that Gussing's main report is not expected for another fortnight or so, but I shall send it to you when it is published.

Naturally we watch very closely here to see what is happening about the return of the refugees. But I hardly expect the Security Council to meet before the middle of September. When it does meet the question of the refugees will be high on our priorities, depending, of course, a good deal on what recommendations Gussing makes.

I am afraid that these comments may not be very helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to write to me if you think there is anything more that I can do or say from here.

With warmest good wishes,

(Caradon)

W 1827/89/67

BROOK HOUSE,
ARDINGLY,
SUSSEX.
TELEPHONE ARDINGLY 247.

11/8/67

Dear Lord Canadon,

I was so pleased to get your most encouraging letter; thank you very much indeed for taking the trouble to write at such length, while on holiday.

It was much appreciated and I was especially glad to hear that plans are being made for a real constructive effort to help the situation in the M. East.

I await further details with great interest.

II

I am now working with the new Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding which it is hoped will work with UNRWA as far as possible.

I took the liberty of showing your letter to Miss Rice-Jones as I knew she was already "in the picture" as it were.

With many thanks
again for your letter,
and its good news.

Yours sincerely,
Grania Butlett.

(GRANIA!)

W 1827/89/67

Lord Caradon

You will recall the enquiry by Miss Birkett, who thinks that an UNRWA Office should be established in London. Eastern Department have produced what seems to be a convincing case against setting up a new organisation. I do not know whether you intend to speak to Miss Birkett or would prefer to write to her: I submit a draft letter in case you wish to write.

Flag A

Anne Warburton

(A. M. Warburton)
15 August, 1967

INDEXED

Registry No.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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Secret.
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Restricted.
Unclassified. RBB

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Ed. (3746)

DRAFT (Miss Birkett)

To:— L

Type 1 +

From
Lord Caradon

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

Your letter of 2 August suggested that an UNRWA Liaison Office might be set up in London to serve as a general information centre and to organise certain projects.

I have had a word about this with my colleagues in London. Quite a lot is in fact already done on the domestic scene to further UNRWA's interests. The United Nations Information Centre's Press Officer runs an information service for UNRWA as well as for other U.N. Agencies. There is also an UNRWA Liaison Group of the Standing Conference of British Organisations for Aid to Refugees (SCBOAR) which disseminates information about UNRWA's services and needs to the major charitable organisations which are members of the Standing Conference, and to schools, universities, churches and womens' groups, etc. In addition, this Liaison Group is fully active as a fund raiser. In last year's campaign for refugees they collected £35,000 specifically for UNRWA's use, and this year they are actively engaged in renewed appeals to meet the increased need for emergency relief.

~~Admittedly,~~ I agree that recent events have shown more than ever how necessary it is for refugee organisations

/to enjoy

RBB 14/5

to enjoy as wide a support and publicity as possible. I do value your idea, but ~~I suspect~~ it does seem that ~~many of~~ in the main the services which you envisage ~~your~~ an UNRWA Office providing are already covered, ~~and~~ I rather doubt whether ~~there is a justifiable~~ the former is ~~the establishment of~~ need for a separate office ~~to be established,~~ which would, ~~after all, only add to refugee costs.~~ inevitably, require more money to be directed to administration. If you have not done so already, it seems to me Perhaps you might like to mention your idea of sending Arab Children ~~in~~ to Pestalozzi Villages to the UNRWA Liaison Group?

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Dd.033009 Gp.863

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

to enjoy as wide support and publicity as possible. I do value your idea, but it does seem that in the main the services which you envisage an UNRWA Office providing are already covered. I rather doubt whether the present need is for the establishment of a separate office which would, inevitably, require more money to be directed to administration. If you have not done so already, it occurs to me, you might like to mention your idea of sending Arab children to Pestalozzi Villages to the UNRWA Liaison Group?

W 1827/89/67

TREMATON CASTLE
SALTASH
CORNWALL
SALTASH 3278

4th August

Dear Ann, (Wardlaw)

We might have a word about this when I am in London. I have sent an interim reply

Yours ever

Hugh Leadon

W 1827/89/67

Replied 4/8

13, KENSINGTON GATE,
W. 8.
01-584 9063

2nd August 1967

Dear Lord Caradon,

You may recall our brief meeting at Dame Kathleen's party for U.N.S.A. last Friday.

I am sorry to bother you while on holiday, but I wanted to ask what you thought about the

setting up of an UNRWA liaison office in London - to serve as a general information centre, and to organise projects such as arab refugee boys at the Pestalozzi Childrens Village.

There are many other ways in which such an

II

•

this could help the refugee problem, and also purchase the work of UNRWA, which at the moment is virtually an un-heard of organisation in this country.

I have been helping the committee set up after the recent crisis to promote interest in UNRWA, but feel that much more could

be achieved with a permanent U.N.R.W.A. office.

I have consulted all the U.N. groups in London, and they all support the idea, as do U.N.R.W.A. of course, but the problem there is of course complete lack of funds -

I would be very grateful if you could

III

spare a moment to give me your thoughts on the matter - and - hopefully - your support and encouragement.

Yours sincerely,

Grania Birkett.

Reference W.1822/89/67

UN Political Dept. (Mr. Bone)

Please refer to your minute of 9 August about Miss Birkett's suggestion in her letter of 2 August to Lord Caradon that a UNRWA liaison office should be set up in London.

2. The services which Miss Birkett envisages this office providing are already in existence.

3. United Nations Information Centre's press officer runs a normal Information Service for UNRWA as well as for other UN Agencies.

4. The UNRWA Liaison Group of the Standing Conference of British Organisations for Aid to Refugees (SCBOAR) (Chairman of which is Dame May Curwen) also disseminates information about UNRWA's services and needs to the major charitable organisations which are members of the Standing Conference, and to schools, universities, churches, women's groups, etc. They also provide speakers when requested.

5. I understand from the UNRWA Liaison Group that there is not a significant number of Palestinian refugees in this country who are in need of help. They would, however, be prepared to put any such refugees in touch with the British charitable organisation best suited to help them. I understand that the UK Representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has to deal with much larger numbers of refugees who come within the High Commissioner's mandate and who live in this country: they too provide help by putting refugees in touch with the British charitable organisation best able to help them. I would doubt whether the number of Palestinian refugees resident in Britain would justify the establishment of a separate office to meet their needs.

6. Miss Birkett does not specifically mention fund raising as an appropriate activity for the proposed UNRWA liaison office. But the UNRWA Liaison Group of the SCBOAR are active in this field. In last autumn's campaign for refugees, they collected £35,000 specifically for the use of UNRWA. On 15 June, before other appeals had been launched, the Chairman wrote a letter to the Times, appealing for funds for UNRWA, response to which still continues and has so far produced £12,000. As the need for emergency relief became evident, the UNRWA Liaison Group extended its scope to include collaboration with societies such as the Anglo-Arab Association and the Middle East Association, which are not represented on the SCBOAR. They have also worked

/closely

Ed (2829)

closely with another subsidiary of the SCBOAR, the Disasters Emergency Committee, who launched a much broader appeal. I expect to be able to provide on 14 August figures of the amounts raised by this and other appeals with which the UNRWA Liaison Group has associated itself.

7. The UNRWA Liaison Group has tirelessly pressed HMG to restore cuts made in the 1966 UK contribution to UNRWA's regular budget. They have sent a number of very high-powered deputations to make representations to the Minister of State (Mr. Thomson).

8. Both the UN Information Centre and the UNRWA Liaison Group are limited in what they can do by the small size of their staffs. But it would be hard to justify expenditure of UNRWA funds to establish a UNRWA Liaison Office in London when these two organisations already do so much of the work which it would have to do. Moreover, UNRWA has severely cut down on its administrative costs in the Middle East in order to channel more of its funds into its operational work.

(T. J. Rutter)
11 August, 1967

Reference.....

Mr. Rutter (Eastern)

I would be grateful for your views on this before the end of the week. Lord Curzon may wish to discuss with Miss Wordsworth on Monday morning next August 14.

R B Brown 9/8
(for PU)

Miss Wordsworth

You may wish to submit the attached draft to Lord Curzon.

R B Brown 14/8

R. 15/8

Kelly MAY 3862

1827/88/67

22 AUG 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT'A'

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1030

21 AUGUST 1967

/Routine/

R. 8.13 a.m. 22 August

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 1030 OF 21 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV WASHINGTON NEW YORK. No. 133.

RETURN OF REFUGEES TO THE WEST BANK.

85.

CONSIDERABLE DISMAY HAS BEEN CAUSED AMONG RESPONSIBLE JORDANIANS BY THE ANNOUNCEMENT CARRIED BY THE BBC AND OTHER BROADCASTING STATIONS THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET HAVE CONFIRMED THAT 31 AUGUST IS THE LAST DAY FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES.

2...THIS DISMAY IS HEIGHTENED BY THE FOLLOWING ISRAELI ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS:

(A) SHORTNESS OF NOTICE (USUALLY SIX HOURS) GIVEN TO THE JORDANIANS TO BRING REFUGEES FORWARD FROM THE CAMPS TO THE BRIDGES.

(B) THE RELATIVELY FEW (300) COMPLETED FORMS WHICH THE ISRAELIS RETURN TO THE JORDANIANS EACH DAY FOR THOSE AUTHORISED TO CROSS.

3...AT THIS RATE ONLY ABOUT 35,000 OUT OF THE APPROXIMATE 175,000 WHO HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR WISH TO RETURN CAN HOPE TO GET BACK TO THE WEST BANK BY 31 AUGUST. BUT PERHAPS THIS IS THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT INTENTION.

FO PASS WASHINGTON 191 AND NEW YORK 133.

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CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED

1827/87/67

22 AUG 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT'A'

1861

PRIORITY TEL AVIV

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 960

/Routine/

21 AUGUST 1967

R. 8.27 a.m. 22 August

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 960 OF 21 AUGUST

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN UKMIS NEW YORK No. 201, UKDEL GENEVA WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO JERUSALEM.

NYR

M.I.F.T. : RETURN OF REFUGEES.

ESHKOL'S RIGID ATTITUDE OVER DEADLINE REPORTED IN PARA 2 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRESENT POPULAR ISRAEL QUOTE HARD LINE UNQUOTE. I WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, RULE OUT POSSIBILITY THAT NEARER THE TIME, AND IF THERE ARE STILL GREAT NUMBERS OF REFUGEES TO COME, THE ISRAELIS MAY RELENT. BUT THEY WILL TRY AND EXTRACT FROM JORDAN SOME UNDERTAKING THAT THE RETURNEES WILL NOT BE INVITED TO STIR UP TROUBLE ONCE THEY GET HOME.

FO PASS UKMIS NEW YORK 201 WASHINGTON 212.

/Repeated by Foreign Office to U.K.Mission New York No.4329./

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INDEXED

1827/86/67

22 AUG 1967

ENCLAIR

FROM TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 959 21 AUGUST 67

/ROUTINE/ R. 3.56 P.M. 21 AUGUST

ADDSD FO TELNO 959 OF 21/8 RFI TO AMMAN, UKMIS NEW YORK, NO.200 UKDEL GENEVA, WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO JERUSALEM. MY TELNO 952. -182

RETURN OF REFUGEES. ACCORDING TO REPORTS IN THE ISRAEL PRESS TODAY 1,876 REFUGEES CROSSED TO THE WEST BANK ON THE SECOND DAY (20 AUG) OF THE OPERATION. THIS IS SOME 700 FEWER THAN ISRAELIS HAD EXPECTED.

2. PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD THE CABINET YESTERDAY THAT NO OFFICIAL REQUESTS HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM ANY QUARTER FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE DEADLINE FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND THAT THE GOVT STILL STOOD BY THE ANNOUNCED DATE OF 31 AUG.

3. SEE MIFT.

HADOW SENT 1955/21Z AM

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-187

INDEXED

1827/85/67

CYPHER/CAT A 21 AUG 1967 CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 841 21 AUGUST 1967

/Priority/ R. 10.32 a.m. 21 August

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 841 OF 21 AUGUST

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO EXTERNAL OTTAWA
WASHINGTON AND UK MISSION
NEW YORK/No. 69./TEL AVIV AND OTHER ARAB POSTS AS NECESSARY.

ARAB-ISRAEL.

BBC REPORTS THAT ISRAEL GOVERNMENT HAVE DECIDED AGAINST EXTENDING DEADLINE OF AUGUST 31 FOR RETURN OF REFUGEES TO WEST BANK.

2. INTERNAL DIFFERENCES IN ISRAEL AND PALESTINIAN ACTIVITIES IN OCCUPIED AREAS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED BUT TO OUTSIDE OBSERVERS IT LOOKS AS THOUGH ISRAEL NEVER MEANT TO ADMIT MORE THAN LIMITED NUMBERS AND IS PLAYING POLITICS WITH THE REFUGEES.

3. THE PALESTINE REFUGEES ARE A QUESTION ON WHICH WE HAVE A RIGHT TO SPEAK, AND ON THE EVE OF AN ARAB MEETING IN KHARTOUM AT WHICH WE HOPE THE QUOTE MODERATES UNQUOTE WILL BE ARGUING OVER WHO ARE THE FRIENDS OF THE ARABS AND WHO THE AGGRESSORS, THERE SEEMS TO BE A STRONG CASE FOR SPEAKING QUICKLY.

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS WASHINGTON 98 AND UKMISSION NEW YORK 69.

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U.K.Mission New York No.4319./

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MR. TESH

CONFIDENTIAL

-188-

INDEXED

CONFIDENTIAL

Entered with brief on file 1425/67

1827/84A/67

Refugees and Nuclear Desalination

I circulate for information the very comprehensive brief prepared for the US/UK talks in Washington on the de Rothschild/Ionides scheme for the building of a desalination plant, combined with nuclear reactors, to produce 300 million gallons of fresh water per day in the Israel/Jordan/Gaza Strip area, as a contribution to the permanent solution of the Arab refugee problem.

2. This proposal has basically two aspects (a) economic and (b) political. Economically, Israel as a developing industrial country, uses an enormous amount of fresh water per day, and her needs will increase enormously until say 1975. By that date there will be no other natural sources of fresh water to exploit. Israel will therefore probably have to acquire nuclear desalination plants anyhow. Jordan's economic development on the other hand is piecemeal and far inferior to anything on Israel lines; furthermore the Jordanians have sources of fresh water which they could exploit far more cheaply in normal (i.e. non nuclear) ways. She would thus probably not want much of the expensive water produced under the de Rothschild scheme.

3. As regards the political problem, the scheme basically is one for financing the resettlement by the Israel authorities of Arab refugees in Arab territory under Israel military occupation. The Arabs are likely to be highly antagonistic to it, for obvious reasons, and the risks for H.M.G. of getting involved in actively promoting the scheme are again obvious. On the other hand, as Mr. Wilson says in his letter to Mr. de Rothschild, if an "overall international scheme for the economic development of the whole area" could be worked out, we should wish to take part and of course to provide desalination equipment, in the manufacturing of which we are well ahead of most other countries.

(S. L. Egerton)
11 August, 1967

Colonel Sweeney

Miss Harden

INDEXED

1827/84/67

CYPHER/CAT A CONFIDENTIAL 27 AUG 1967

PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 2001 19 AUGUST 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 2001OF 19 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN BEIRUT TEL AVIV UKMIS GENEVA WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO CAIRO AND JERUSALEM.

M I P T: 183

REFUGEES.

THERE HAD BEEN SOME SPECULATION AS TO WHETHER A REPORT FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON REFUGEES WOULD LEAD TO AN EARLY MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THAT SUBJECT.

2...ARAB DELEGATIONS MAY FEEL OBLIGED TO REACT TO THE PASSAGE ABOUT THE TRANSFER OF REFUGEES FROM GAZA (PARA 5 OF MYTEL UNDER REFERENCE): THEY MIGHT WRITE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL BUT I THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT THEY WILL SEEK A MEETING IN ADVANCE OF GUSSING'S FINAL REPORT (UNLESS, OF COURSE, ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES BREAK DOWN).

LORD CARADON

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CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED

1827/83/67

EN CLAIR

PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 2000 19 AUGUST 1967

21 AUG 1967

UNCLASSIFIED D. 5.15 p.m. 19 August.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 2000 OF 19 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN BEIRUT TEL AVIV UKMIS GENEVA WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO CAIRO AND JERUSALEM.

TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO 952 TO FOREIGN OFFICE: /of 17 August/

1/82

REFUGEES.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS CIRCULATED A REPORT (COPIES BY BAG) TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION NO 237(1967) OF 14 JUNE AND THE ASSEMBLY'S RESOLUTION NO 2252 (ES-V) OF 4 JULY. IT IS COMPILED FROM INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM MICHELMORE, COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF UNRWA, AND FROM INTERIM REPORTS BY GUSSING, THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE BASED IN JERUSALEM. IT STATES THAT GUSSING'S FINAL REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED TOWARDS MID-SEPTEMBER.

2...U THANT'S REPORT DESCRIBES THE DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF REFUGEES: THEIR NEEDS, ESPECIALLY OVER THE LONGER TERM IF POLITICAL SOLUTIONS ARE NOT ACHIEVED SOON: EMERGENCY MEASURES TAKEN: CONTINUING SERVICES PROVIDED AND PLANNED BY UNRWA: REHABILITATION PROSPECTS: AND GUSSING'S SCHEDULE OF WORK.

3...POINTS HIGHLIGHTED BY THE REPORT INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING. THE NUMBER OF UNRWA - REGISTERED (''OLD'') REFUGEES DISPLACED BY THE WAR IS PUT AT 113,000. OF THESE, ABOUT 93,000 MOVED FROM THE WEST BANK OF JORDAN TO THE EAST. ABOUT 17,000 MOVED FROM THE SOUTH-WEST CORNER OF SYRIA TO DERAA AND DAMASCUS: AND ABOUT 3,000 FORMERLY IN THE GAZA STRIP TOOK REFUGE IN THE U A R. PERSONS NOT PREVIOSLY REGISTERED WITH UNRWA MOVED IN EVEN LARGER NUMBERS, PERHAPS 210,000 IN ALL. OF THESE ''NEW REFUGEES'' 85,000 MOVED FROM THE WEST TO THE EAST BANK: ABOUT 90,000 FROM SOUTHERN SYRIA TO DERAA AND DAMASCUS: AND ABOUT 35,000 FROM SINAI WESTWARDS ACROSS THE SUEZ CANAL.

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4...BY THE BEGINNING OF AUGUST THE ''IMMEDIATE MINIMAL NEEDS'' OF OLD AND NEW REFUGEES DISPLACED DURING AND AFTER THE WAR WERE BEING MET, BUT ARRANGEMENTS WERE STILL ''PRECARIOUS''. IT IS POINTED OUT THAT IF THE RETURN OF DISPLACED PERSONS IN EAST JORDAN AND SYRIA IS DELAYED, MORE PERMANENT DWELLINGS THAN THE PRESENT TENTAGE WILL SOON BE NEEDED AT A COST OF OVER 1 MILLION DOLLARS. ''THE ADDITIONAL SERVICES BEING PROVIDED BY UNRWA HAVE INCREASED ITS EXPENDITURES AT THE RATE OF SEVERAL MILLION DOLLARS A YEAR'', AT A TIME WHEN IT WAS ALREADY FACING A DEFICIT OF 4 MILLION DOLLARS FOR 1967. IF UNRWA WAS EXPECTED TO FACE NECESSARY EXPENDITURES ON CONTINUING SERVICES FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD, THE COST MIGHT BE AN ADDITIONAL 10 MILLION DOLLARS PER YEAR.

5...IT IS SAID THAT AS OF 16 AUGUST SOME 32,000 FAMILIES TOTALLING ABOUT 160,000 PERSONS HAD SUBMITTED APPLICATIONS TO RETURN TO THE WEST BANK, AND THAT ''FACILITIES FOR RECEIVING APPLICATIONS WERE BEING KEPT OPEN''. AS REGARDS REFUGEES STILL IN GAZA, ''THERE ARE REPORTS OF SOME ORGANISED VISITS IN SIX FIFTY-SEATER BUSES OF REFUGEES FROM GAZA TO THE WEST BANK, FOR WHICH THE ISRAEL AUTHORITIES ACCEPTED APPLICATIONS. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT SOME OF THE REFUGEES ON THESE VISITS DO NOT RETURN FROM THE WEST BANK TO GAZA, AND THAT SOME IN FACT EVEN REACH THE EAST BANK.''

6...THE REPORT CONCLUDES BY STATING THAT THERE IS AN OBVIOUS NEED FOR A RESTATEMENT OF THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF THE LONGER-TERM TASKS OF REHABILITATION AND AN EXAMINATION OF HOW, AND BY WHOM, THEY CAN BE UNDERTAKEN.

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LORD CARADON

1827/82/67

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TEL[redacted] NUMBER 952

17 AUGUST 1967

R. 10.05 a.m. 19 August.

21 AUG 1967

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDSD TO F O TELNO 952 OF 17 AUGUST REPTD FOR INFMN TO AMMAN, UKMIS NEW YORK No. 198 UKDEL GENEVA, WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO JERUSALEM.

AMMAN TELNO 1012:- RETURN OF REFUGEES.

THERE IS A WIDE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN FIGURES QUOTED IN FIRST PARAGRAPH OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND THOSE WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN BY ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTRY. LATTER HAVE TOLD US THAT UP TO YESTERDAY 7,000 COMPLETED APPLICATION FORMS HAD BEEN RECEIVED. ISRAEL AUTHORITIES HAVE SO FAR APPROVED 3,000 OF THESE APPLICATIONS COVERING APPROXIMATELY 20,000 SOULS.

2. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT APPLICATION FORMS ARE FILLED IN BY HEADS OF FAMILIES. WE ASSUME THAT FIGURE OF 100,000 FORMS GIVEN BY RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE REFERS NOT TO NUMBER OF COMPLETED FORMS BUT TO TOTAL NUMBER OF INDIVDUALS LISTED AS REFLECTED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF TEL UNDER REFERENCE. EVEN THIS IS A GOOD DEAL HIGHER THAN ESTIMATE MADE BY ISRAELIS WHO ASSUME THAT, UNLESS JORDANIANS EMPLOY COMPULSION, NO MORE THAN 50/60,000 FORMER WEST BANKERS WILL WISH TO RETURN.

3. HEAD OF COMMONWEALTH DIVISION OF ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS TOLD MY COUNSELLOR IN CONFIDENCE THAT HE HAS NO DOUBT THAT DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION OF RETURN OF REFUGEES COULD BE EXTENDED BEYOND 31 AUGUST IF THIS PROVES NECESSARY, PROVIDED THAT JORDANIANS STOP INCITING AGITATION ON WEST BANK. IF THEY CONTINUE TO PORTRAY THE REFUGEES AS A POTENTIAL QUOTE FIFTH COLUMN UNQUOTE, PUBLIC OPINION IN ISRAEL WILL FORCE THE GOVERNMENT TO CLOSE THE DOOR TO RE-ENTRY, POSSIBLY EVEN BEFORE 31 AUGUST.

/Repeated by Foreign Office to UKMIS New York as 4287/

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1827/81/67

CYPHER/CAT'A'

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1012

16 AUGUST 1967

16 AUG 1967

R. 12.55 p.m. 16 August, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1012 OF 16 AUGUST.
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, No.130 UKMIS GENEVA AND WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO JERUSALEM.

TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO 934: 175

RETURN OF REFUGEES.

THE LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS TELLS ME HE DESPATCHED 20 THOUSAND COMPLETED APPLICATION FORMS TO THE ISRAELIS ON AUGUST 14 AND PLANNED TO TAKE A FURTHER 60 THOUSAND ON AUGUST 15. HE EXPECTED TO SEND AT LEAST ANOTHER 20 THOUSAND WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

2. HE THEREFORE FORESAW THE NEED TO ARRANGE FOR THE RETURN OF MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND REFUGEES AND TO MAKE THIS POSSIBLE HAD ASKED THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES TO AGREE TO PERMIT RIVER CROSSINGS AT THREE POINTS. WHEN THEY HAD REFUSED THIS HE HAD ASKED THAT LAST DAY FOR RETURN BE EXTENDED BEYOND AUGUST 31. WHEN THE ISRAELIS HAD REFUSED THIS TOO TROYON SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE QUITE IMPOSSIBLE TO GET ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND REFUGEES ACROSS THE ALLENBY (FOOT) BRIDGE DURING THE TEN DAYS OR SO WHICH WOULD BE AVAILABLE BETWEEN PROCESSING OF DOCUMENTS AND

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THE END OF THE MONTH. HIS INTERLOCUTOR HAD CONSENTED ONLY THAT THE WORD QUOTE IMPOSSIBLE UNQUOTE DID NOT EXIST IN THE HEBREW LANGUAGE.

3. I CAN UNDERSTAND THAT RECENT STATEMENTS OF JORDANIAN OFFICIALS AND OTHERS AND AMMAN RADIO COMMENTARIES MAY HAVE IRRITATED THE ISRAELIS INTO ADOPTING A TOUGH LINE AND WE ARE TAKING EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO PERSUADE THE JORDANIANS OF THEIR UNWISDOM. YOU MAY WISH TO INSTRUCT ME TO SPEAK MORE OFFICIALLY. MY U.S. COLLEAGUE HAS SPOKEN TO THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER ON INSTRUCTIONS AND FOUND THAT HE ENTIRELY AGREED THAT IT WAS UNWISE TO TAUNT THE ISRAELIS AT THIS STAGE. BUT THE PRIME MINISTER CONFESSED HIS INABILITY TO CONVINCE OR CONTROL CERTAIN OF HIS COLLEAGUES.

4. DESPITE OUR BELIEF THAT THE JORDANIANS ARE BEHAVING UNWISELY THE STRONG IMPRESSION IN THE NON-ARAB COMMUNITY HERE IS THAT THE ISRAELIS INTEND FOR THEIR OWN REASONS TO BE AS OBSTRUCTIVE AS THEY CAN AND THAT ONLY CONSTANT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE WILL PERSUADE THEM TO ADOPT A HUMANITARIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS RETURNING REFUGEES.

/Repeated by Foreign Office to UKMIS New York as 425/

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CONFIDENTIAL

U.S./U.K. TALKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST

REFUGEES

Mr. Eugene Rostow began by expressing American anxiety to make progress on the question of refugees. He mentioned that the Israeli Government had set up a Committee to encourage irrigation and the establishment of handicraft industries on the West Bank, with a view to getting the refugees out of the camps and engaged on productive work. The United States had been working out some plans for the formation of an international group, in which both public and private interests would participate in development plans to improve the condition of the refugees. The sort of project he had in mind might be backed both by the international Jewish Community and by other governments. He would hope that it could be set in motion as soon as political agreement between the Israelis and Jordanians had been reached and that it might be possible to show some tangible progress in dissolving the refugee problem even during the period of Israeli occupation. The Americans would be letting us have a paper on this matter. They aimed through development and resettlement - including at least a token resettlement of some Arab refugees in Israel - to make progress towards resolving the refugee problem.

where in Israel?

2. So far American efforts had been directed principally at getting the Israelis and Jordanians to agree to cooperate with each other through the Red Cross in order to allow refugees to return to the West Bank.

3. Sir Richard Beaumont said that the British Government felt inhibited by their other interests in the Arab world from participating in any scheme which amounted to recognition of Israeli occupation rights on the West Bank. He enquired about the United States attitude towards UNRWA and mentioned nuclear desalination projects.

4. Mr. Rostow said that the United States shared British sensitivity over the political implications of development plans on the West Bank and took the same view as ourselves of the risks involved. He mentioned that Mr. Horowitz, the Governor of the Bank of Israel, had stressed to him that all Israeli plans for development on the West Bank were tentative and that there was nothing in them which would preclude the eventual handing back of the West Bank to Jordan. Mr. Rostow also alluded to a meeting of Jewish businessmen in Jerusalem on 9 August at which development plans had been discussed; they had specifically excluded the West Bank from Israeli development schemes. Mr. Rostow said that the Americans were considering encouraging the Israelis to make a public statement about their ultimate intention to hand back the West Bank.

5. On nuclear desalination Mr. Rostow agreed with Sir Richard Beaumont that the present schemes - such as that put forward by Mr. Edmund de Rothschild - were too ambitious and that they involved the production of more electric power than Jordan could conceivably use. However, he alluded to "the incurable yearning for dramatic action" on this issue and

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said that the Americans were still anxious to find some joint Jordanian/Israeli development scheme as a means of cementing any political agreement between them and thought that such plans were worth continuing study. If a nuclear desalination plant could relieve Israel of the necessity of drawing water from the Jordan, this might be very helpful politically. The Israelis were also using very large quantities of electric power at the moment.

7. Sir Richard Beaumont mentioned that water produced by present-day nuclear desalination plants would be too expensive for the types of cultivation possible in the area; electricity might have to be sold at high cost to the Israelis and water at a correspondingly cheap rate to Jordan. But boring wells were the more economical way of increasing Jordanian water supplies. Mr. Rostow said that American estimates were in line with this; the main attraction of such a nuclear desalination plant was political.

8. Mr. Goldberg (who had not been present during some of the earlier discussions on refugees) said that refugees would also be a problem at the next General Assembly. He mentioned that the United States Mission in New York had put the following thoughts to the State Department:

(i) The U.S. Mission wondered if any attempt by the Israelis to tackle the refugee problem might not provoke an automatically hostile reaction from the Arabs. This was not to say that an Israeli initiative in itself might not be a good thing; indeed we had been urging the Israelis for years to make some constructive move about refugees. But it was important for the United States not to be "tagged" with any Israeli scheme;

(ii) The Arabs were more likely to go alone with a scheme under United Nations auspices. Mr. Goldberg said that he personally felt a lot more could be done through UNRWA which had the organisation and the funds to tackle the problem.

9. Mr. Goldberg also wondered if Congressional attitudes - he had in mind the Israeli lobby in Congress which had campaigned regularly over the years to reduce the United States contribution to UNRWA on the grounds that refugees were being used by the Arabs as a political weapons - might not change now that the Israelis themselves had the refugee problem on their hands. Stressing that this was just personal surmise, Mr. Goldberg wondered if the Israeli lobby might not now approach Congress for additional help for refugees. Mr. Battle intervened to stress the need for capital expenditure to provide a self-sustaining programme for meeting the refugee problem. He thought we were likely to hear much more in future of permanent solutions based

/ on

on the injection of large amounts of capital, as an alternative to being faced with recurring expenditure on refugees for years to come. Mr. Sisco thought there might be less resistance from Congress to continued American contributions to UNRWA if it were possible to show some Israeli movement on a de facto basis to reduce the refugee problem. He agreed that in principle it was better not to create a new organisation, but to continue to work through UNRWA.

10. Sir Richard Beaumont mentioned the possible role which might be played by Prince Sadruddin Khan and the United Nations Office for Refugees and pointed out some of the advantages of using his office. Mr. Goldberg found this idea attractive and mentioned that Prince Sadruddin had been a class-mate of Senator Edward Kennedy, who was now the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Refugees.

11. Mr. Sisco agreed on the need for a new symbol in tackling the refugee problem and thought that Prince Sadruddin might well have a role to play at some stage. [but not yet?]

12. Mr. Rodger Davies wondered if everything was being done that could be done to encourage emigration of Arab refugees. Would it be possible to ask some of the Commonwealth countries to adopt a more liberal policy towards Arab immigrants? Sir Richard Beaumont thought Australian policy was already quite generous in this respect.

13. Mr. Battle said that the Americans had no evidence that the Arabs, either at Khartoum or elsewhere, had given any serious thought to the problem of refugees since fighting came to an end.

1827/80/67

14 AUG 1967
15 AUG 1967

With the compliments of

THE BRITISH EMBASSY

A.B.Urwick

Extract from Congressional Record-House of Thursday, August 10 1967 REFUGEES

Copied to: Eastern Dept. F.O.
Chanceries, Amman and Tel Aviv.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

14 August 1967

The Chancery,
U.K.Mis.to the U.N.
New York, N.Y.

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POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. FARBSTEIN] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, when Israel occupied substantial segments of territory previously held by Jordan, Egypt, and Syria during the war last June, many of us who were familiar with conditions in the Middle East felt a deep foreboding about the problem of the Arab refugees.

Ever since the 1948 war, the refugee problem had been one of the principal contributing factors to instability in the Middle East. During these 19 long years, the Arab States did nothing to resolve the problem and Israel, perhaps, did less than it might have done. But while Israel accepted hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees from Arab lands, it, at least, made overtures to solve simultaneously the problem of the displaced Arabs. The Arab states, however, responded to none of these overtures and refused to hear of a settlement. In seeking to perpetuate the suffering of the refugees for their own political purposes, I believe the Arab States have borne the burden of responsibility for this misfortune. But we have all paid the price.

Of the 1,300,000 refugees that were under UNWRA care, some 700,000 have now come under Israel jurisdiction. More refugees have since joined them, perhaps hundreds of thousands, victims of the war last June. The number is uncertain, for there has been a consistent pattern of dissembling to inflate the refugee rolls. But Israel, a country of only 2½ million itself, obviously cannot absorb them, whether there are a million or 2 million. Not only are its resources inadequate, but it would be politically absurd for Israel to try to give homes to millions of people who have vowed their eternal enmity to Israel's existence.

In a framework of peace and security Israel may be satisfied to negotiate the return of all or part of the land on which the refugees are currently settled; but since the Arab governments refuse to negotiate a peace, Israel has no choice but to maintain its jurisdiction. Arab leaders recognize that the presence of the refugees suits their purposes by making life difficult for Israel. As for the refugees themselves, the Arab States seem to consider them political pawns to be manipulated as policy demands. They have not treated the refugees as human beings, so it has been impossible to appeal to a humanitarian impulse within the Arab world.

Within the past few days, Mr. Speaker, it has become increasingly clear that the Arab chiefs who look upon the refugees as a source of turmoil have assessed the situation with some accuracy. Arab propagandists are again at work with their messages of hate and destruction. The shock of the first days of war has worn off and the troublemakers again find receptive ears. We have only to take note of the general strike of Arab merchants in Jerusalem last week. By the agreement of all observers, Israel has treated the Jerusalem Arabs well. The strike indicates the kind of behavior one could expect en masse if Israel tried to absorb some millions of Arabs. That behavior might range from civil disobedience, such as we saw in Jerusalem, or guerrilla warfare, such as was conducted for years from the Gaza Strip. The Arab refugees are restless. They are being stirred up. They may soon be contributing actively, as they have in the past, to instability in the Middle East.

Four years ago, I visited Israel and I made an extensive study of the refugees living under United Nations jurisdiction on the Israel frontiers. I warned then that "unless the United States takes the initiative, another decade will find that the Palestine Arab refugees have become even more institutionalized and more difficult to integrate." I made 10 recommendations for the purpose of restoring fluidity to the situation. They were not followed—with a result that we all know—another round of destructive war. I visited Israel again last month and found the situation much worse than before. Millions of dollars had been spent, most of them by the United States, to sustain the refugees. But the years brought no improvement. Conditions have obviously become more threatening and all our money and efforts have been wasted. I repeat now that the United States must act if war is not again to be the fruit of our efforts.

Mr. Speaker, it is against our national interest to allow the current refugee situation to continue, deteriorating as it does week by week. If the volatile situation in the Middle East explodes once more, the price may be much heavier for all of us. I believe we cannot afford, no matter what the cost, to permit the current refugee problem to rigidify, as it did after the 1948 war. Solutions obviously become more difficult, Mr. Speaker, in ratio to their rigidity.

Unfortunately, my recommendations of 4 years ago will no longer do. Had they been followed then, I believe the refugee problem would have been reduced to manageable limits. But that is spilled milk and we must look elsewhere for an answer.

That is why, Mr. Speaker, I believe that a dramatic gesture of constructive good will on our part is both mandatory and urgent. That is why I feel the time has come to divest ourselves of some preconceptions. It is the moment for courage and audacity.

I would like, Mr. Speaker, for the President of the United States to announce at once his willingness to accept into this country 25,000 refugees of the Arab-Israeli wars.

I have no animosity for the Arab people, nor do my fellow Americans. On the contrary, I believe they can make productive citizens of this country. My study into the refugees 4 years ago indicated that, with relatively little training, many of them could be made into highly skilled workers. I believe that many Arabs would gladly accept the offer to settle in the United States and that the United States would absorb them with almost no difficulty.

It is delusive to expect miracles, Mr. Speaker, but I would hope that such a gesture on our part would produce a chain reaction that might lead to the end of one of the most troublesome aspects of the Middle Eastern morass.

I would look to the other countries of the West to make similar gestures. Most of the Western European countries are still short of labor. Australia and New Zealand welcome immigrants. Canada, Brazil, and Argentina have already offered to accept some Arab refugees. The West has room for more Arab peoples.

The nations of the Communist bloc would, I hope, behave with equivalent magnanimity. Certainly they could do no less than the nations of the West to assist their recent allies.

The various international philanthropic organizations, including the agencies of the United Nations, would, I am sure, cooperate in a major resettlement program.

If I am right in foreseeing events, then surely all the Arab States would be put to tremendous pressure to take in their own brethren, to the limit of their capacity. Certainly, we would help them make the transition, because we would rather spend our money on resettlement than on reconstruction made necessary by another war. How long could the Arab leaders resist welcoming the refugees, if they were being welcomed by peoples throughout the world?

I have no doubt that Israel would also make its contribution, if such a chain of events were underway. Israel is ready to take a proportionate part of the responsibility for the integration of the refugees into society, though obviously it cannot take the full responsibility. Israel has clearly indicated that it would help.

Once the momentum of resettlement begins, we may be able to resolve this problem. The time has come, at least, to make a beginning. We will solve nothing by paralysis. The initiative in this field must lead to negotiations in a variety of other fields where differences remain acute. We must restore fluidity to a situation which is rapidly worsening. Peace in the Middle East requires no less of us, and the cause is worth our effort.

Mr. Speaker, in my report to the Congress in 1963, I stated:

> Although I do not regard the solution of the Arab refugee problem as the key issue between Israel and the Arab states, I am convinced that the refugee problem is one of the problems that must be solved if there is to be peace and stability in the Near East.

Today, however, I am of the opinion that unless and until the Arab refugee problem is solved, there can be no peace.

It is tragic, Mr. Speaker, that 4 years have passed since I made that report on the Near East and we have gone through another destructive war, but we are still left with the same dilemmas. The refugee problem is, as I said then, only one of the many differences that exist between Israel and the Arab States. But we Americans learned to our dismay when we went to the brink of war last June that the problems of the Middle East are the world's problems. A new war may be a world war. We cannot afford to sit back waiting for the initiative to come from another quarter. We must not wait for the milk of human kindness to flow from sources which, in our time, have only been dry. We must show by our own good will what the possibilities are for peace. I believe we can set an example for the community of nations. We have the resources and the capacity for moral leadership. I call upon the President to respond positively to my proposal to restore the movement toward permanent peace.

Mr. TENZER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Yes, I will be glad to yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. TENZER. Mr. Speaker, I want to congratulate the gentleman from New York, a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, for his compassion and understanding of the problem. Without the settlement of the Arab refugee problem in the Middle East, permanent peace cannot be established in that area of the world. And while I do not speak and cannot speak for what the State of Israel might do, I believe it is commendable that the suggestion is made that the United States take the lead in suggesting and promoting a worldwide program for the resettlement of the Arab refugees.

Of course, the gentleman understands that 25,000 of the 1.3 million refugees is a very small proportion.

I would like to say to the gentleman that on June 13, 1967, I made a statement on the floor of the House rather proposing an extensive program for resettlement of the Arab refugees on the land available in the various territories around the State of Israel, and that it would cost far less to reclaim that arid desert land than it would to conduct an arms race in that area.

Again, Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the gentleman for all of his suggestions. They deserve the greatest consideration of our Government.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman for his remarks. I want to say his view and his idea is an excellent one. I might say that of course this is part of this plan. But I feel that if the entire world felt a sense of awareness of this problem, if the entire world did something to break the logjam that has existed for 19 years, that today these Arab refugees who are presently under the control and direction of Israel will be permitted to emigrate from these areas where they are presently located, where previous to June 5 the Arab nations would not permit them to emigrate,

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1821/149/67

Chancery,
UK Mission UN,
New York

10 AUG 1967

11 AUG 1967

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

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THE CHANCERY

3rd August, 1967

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BRITISH EMBASSY,
BEIRUT.

C9/4/1281 —

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

REPORT ON CONTRIBUTIONS

For the six months ended 30 June 1967

GENERAL NOTES

1. This report covers only contributions to UNRWA and does not include any made direct to the refugees. A contribution to UNRWA is one that is under its direct control, and usable in its programme. All other contributions, even if handled by UNRWA, are considered as being made direct to the refugees.

2. The pledges reported in Statement I are those which relate wholly or partly to contributions for 1967 and subsequent years and, also, pledges wholly related to previous years that have not yet been received in full.

3. Contributions in currencies of countries where exchange restrictions are in force have been shown in U.S. dollars at official rates of exchange prevailing at the time of receipt. Other cash contributions are stated at approximate free market rates.

4. Contributions in kind are shown at the donors' valuations, if known and reasonable; otherwise at valuations set by the Agency, with consideration given to prevailing market valuations.

Accounts Division

14 July 1967

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM GOVERNMENTS

Status of Current Pledges
as at 30 June 1967
(in U.S. dollars)

Name of contributor	Description or purpose	Amount pledged	Applicable to operations in 1966 and before	1967	1968 and after	Unpaid balances
		$	$	$	$	$
Abu Dhabi	Bahrein dinars	20,927	-	20,927	-	-
Australia	Australian dollars (1966/67 pledge)	201,600	100,800	100,800	-	-
Austria	U.S. dollars	10,000	-	10,000	-	-
Belgium	Belgian francs	30,000 4/	-	30,000	-	30,000
Canada	Canadian dollars	462,963	-	462,963	-	462,963
Canada	Flour (FOB Canada)	925,926	-	925,926	-	925,926
Canada	Flour and skim milk (C&F Beirut)	1,059,901 5/	-	1,059,901	-	1,059,901
Ceylon	Supplies	1,000	-	1,000	-	1,000
China	U.S. dollars	20,000	-	20,000	-	20,000
Cyprus	Pounds sterling	560	-	560	-	-
Denmark	Danish crowns (regular pledge 1966/67)	79,629	39,814	39,815	-	-
Denmark	U.S. dollars (for vocational education 1966/67)	200,000	66,667	133,333	-	-
Denmark	U.S. dollars (for vocational education 1967/68)	200,000	-	66,667	133,333	-
Federal Republic of Germany	U.S. dollars (regular pledge)	750,000	-	750,000	-	375,000
Federal Republic of Germany	Jordan dinars	2,800 5/	-	2,800	-	-
Finland	U.S. dollars	50,000 4/5/	-	50,000	-	50,000
Finland	U.S. dollars	15,000	-	15,000	-	-
France	French francs (regular pledge)	122,449	-	122,449	-	-
France	Rents (regular pledge)	61,570	-	61,570	-	30,785
France	Lebanese pounds (for university scholarships)	1,412	-	1,412	-	-
France	Services of staff (for teaching French)	11,987	3,996	7,991	-	2,111
France	French francs (for teaching French and vocational education):					
	1964/65 school year	57,653	45,417	-	12,236	-
	1965/66 school year	57,653	26,902	-	30,751	-
	1966/67 school year	57,653	15,350	25,575	16,728	-
	1967/68 school year	57,653	-	19,053	38,600	-

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM GOVERNMENTS
(Continued)

Name of contributor	Description or purpose	Amount pledged	Applicable to operations in 1966 and before	1967	1968 and after	Unpaid balances
		$	$	$	$	$
Gaza Authorities	Rents and vaccines	154,785	-	154,785	-	76,160
Gaza Authorities	Egyptian pounds (for university scholarships)	2,000	1,000	1,000	-	-
Ghana	U.S. dollars	9,000	6,000	3,000	-	9,000
Greece	U.S. dollars	15,000	-	15,000	-	-
Holy See	U.S. dollars	2,500	-	2,500	-	-
Holy See	U.S. dollars	10,000 5/	-	10,000	-	10,000
India	Supplies	26,666	13,333	13,333	-	18,704
Iran	Iranian rials	6,000	-	6,000	-	6,000
Ireland	U.S. dollars	25,000	- 1/	25,000 2/4/	-	-
Italy	U.S. dollars	320,000	160,000 1/	160,000	-	320,000
Jamaica	Pounds sterling	560	-	560	-	560
Japan	U.S. dollars	40,000	-	40,000	-	-
Jordan	Rents, water, port services and vaccines	170,366	-	170,366	-	97,553 6/
Kuwait	U.S. dollars	220,000	-	220,000	-	220,000
Lebanon	Rents, laboratory services, water and vaccines	45,418	-	45,418	-	21,924
Libya	U.S. dollars	100,000	-	100,000	-	-
Luxembourg	U.S. dollars	3,000 4/	-	3,000	-	3,000
Malaysia	U.S. dollars (regular pledge)	1,500	-	1,500	-	1,500
Malaysia	U.S. dollars	10,000 5/	-	10,000	-	10,000
Monaco	French francs	204	-	204	-	-
Morocco	U.S. dollars	25,000	-	25,000	-	25,000
Netherlands	Netherlands guilders (regular pledge)	110,193	-	110,193	-	-
Netherlands	U.S. dollars (for vocational education)	7,681	-	7,681	-	2,388
New Zealand	Pounds sterling and New Zealand pounds	84,000	-	84,000	-	28,000
Niger	Niger francs	510	-	510	-	510

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM GOVERNMENTS
(Continued)

Name of contributor	Description or purpose	Amount pledged	Applicable to operations in 1966 and before	1967	1968 and after	Unpaid balances
		$	$	$	$	$
Norway	Norwegian crowns (regular pledge)	84,000	-	84,000	-	-
Norway	Norwegian crowns	209,996 4/ 5/	-	209,996	-	209,996
Pakistan	Pounds sterling	20,964	-	20,964	-	-
Philippines	U.S. dollars	1,250	-	1,250	-	-
Qatar	U.S. dollars	10,000	-	10,000	-	-
Saudi Arabia	U.S. dollars	297,778 5/	-	297,778	-	-
Singapore	U.S. dollars	1,000 5/	-	1,000	-	1,000
Sudan	Sudanese pounds	5,740 5/	5,740	-	-	5,740
Spain	Flour	78,000 5/	-	78,000	-	78,000
Spain	Potatoes	44,500 5/	-	44,500	-	44,500
Sweden	Swedish crowns (regular pledge)	145,773	-	145,773	-	-
Sweden	U.S. dollars (for education and training)	2,000,000	1,945,000	55,000	-	-
Sweden	U.S. dollars (for well for Siblin VTC and T &TTI)	11,662 5/	11,662	-	-	11,662
Sweden	Swedish crowns	2,000,000 5/	-	1,945,000	55,000	2,000,000
Switzerland	Swiss francs (regular pledge)	104,167	-	104,167	-	-
Switzerland	Swiss francs (for family kits)	34,722 5/	-	34,722	-	34,722
Syrian Arab Republic	Road transport, rents and vaccines	89,904	-	89,904	-	63,140
Trinidad and Tobago	U.S. dollars	1,000	-	1,000	-	-
Tunisia	U.S. dollars	4,000	-	4,000	-	-
Turkey	U.S. dollars	18,000	8,000	10,000	-	8,000
United Arab Republic	Road transport and port services	255,960	-	255,960	-	138,017 6/
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Pounds sterling	4,500,000	-	4,500,000	-	2,250,000
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Pounds sterling	500,000 5	-	500,000	-	500,000
United States of America	Foodstuffs of earlier pledges under delivery	-	-	-	-	67,860
United States of America	U.S. dollars and local currencies (1966/67)	13,300,000 3/	6,650,000	6,650,000	-	3,150,000
United States of America	Foodstuffs (1966/67)	8,900,000 3/	4,450,000	4,450,000	-	388,822
United States of America	U.S. dollars	2,000,000 5/	-	2,000,000	-	2,000,000
Yugoslavia	Supplies	20,000	-	20,000	-	20,000
				26,649,806	286,648	14,779,444

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM GOVERNMENTS
(Continued)

1/ Pledge made in 1966 in respect of period 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1966

2/ Pledge made in 1967 in respect of period 1 July 1966 to 30 June 1967

3/ Payable on a matching basis not to exceed 70% of contributions paid by all governments applicable to the fiscal period of the United States to which this pledge applies.

4/ Subject to parliamentary approval.

5/ Special pledges for emergency needs.

6/ Includes services for June as information on them is not yet available.

CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED FROM NON-GOVERNMENT SOURCES
during the six months ended 30 June 1967
(in U.S. dollars)

Name of contributor	Description	Vocational education scholarships $	Other education contributions $	Other contributions $	Special contributions for emergency needs $
Australia					
U.N. Association of Australia - Victorian Division	Cash	502	-	-	-
Austria					
Caritas	Cash	3,873	-	-	-
Canada					
Canadian Embassy	Supplies	-	-	75	-
Canadian Red Cross Youth	Cash	460	-	-	-
Henderson, Mrs. Dorothy	Cash	460	-	-	-
Peel County Secondary School	Cash	926	-	-	-
Federal Republic of Germany					
Berliner Bank	Cash	500	-	-	-
Bosch, Robert, GmbH	Cash	500	-	-	-
Frankfurter Bank	Cash	500	-	-	-
MISEREOR	Cash	-	-	-	12,500
The Near East Representatives of German Banks - Beirut	Cash	1,000	-	-	-
Sundry donors	Cash	37	-	-	-
Sundry donors	Supplies	-	-	5	-
Finland					
Finnish Association of Folk High Schools and Folk Academies	Cash	1,500	-	-	-
Finnish Refugee Council	Cash	-	-	8,900	-
Hufoudstadsbladet, Helsinki	Cash	1,000	-	-	-
Paraisten Kalkkivuor, OY	Cash	500	-	-	-
Stockmann Department Store, Helsinki	Cash	1,000	-	-	-
Svenska Osterbottons Folkshogskola Folkakademi, Yttermark	Cash	500	-	-	-
[illegible]ahtaanpuiston Yhteiskoulon Teinikunta	Cash	500	-	-	-
Union of Finnish Girl Guides	Cash	500	-	-	-

CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED FROM NON-GOVERNMENT SOURCES
(Continued)

Name of contributor	Description	Vocational education scholarships	Other education contributions	Other contributions	Special contributions for emergency needs
		$	$	$	$
France					
Alamichel, Claude	Cash	-	-	-	210
Communaute de L'arche	Cash	-	-	-	612
Lycee Jeanne d'Arc - Nancy	Cash	163	-	-	-
Meyer, Georges	Cash	-	-	-	102
Secours Catholique de France	Cash	-	-	-	898
Gaza					
Abu Abdallah Family	Services	-	-	52	-
Abu Khusa Family	Services	-	-	17	-
Abu Middain Family	Services	-	-	959	-
Abu Ommar Family and Khalil Khalil	Services	-	-	19	-
Abu Salim Family	Services	-	-	244	-
Abu Salah Naser	Services	-	-	14	-
Abu Sha'b Family	Services	-	-	220	-
Abu Ayyad Family	Services	-	-	18	-
Abu Ayyad and Awada Families	Services	-	-	36	-
Abu Uriban Family	Services	-	-	47	-
Abu Uriban and Abu Middain Families	Services	-	-	24	-
Awada Family	Services	-	-	782	-
Awada and Abu Middain Families	Services	-	-	162	-
Daghma Family	Services	-	-	55	-
El Mussaddar Family	Services	-	-	140	-
Gaza Municipality	Services	-	-	28	-
Mussaddar and Qur'an Families	Services	-	-	187	-
Saleh Ali Barbakh	Services	-	-	23	-
Tarazi Family	Services	-	-	58	-
Waqf Department	Services	-	-	3,294	-
Jordan					
Municipal Council - Qalqilia	Services	-	-	307	-
Save the Children Fund	Supplies	-	-	266	-
Anonymous	Services	-	-	1,042	-

CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED FROM NON-GOVERNMENT SOURCES
(Continued)

Name of contributor	Description	Vocational education scholarships	Other education contributions	Other contributions	Special contributions for emergency needs
		$	$	$	$
Lebanon					
Greek Orthodox Community	Services	-	-	315	-
Mneimneh and Bohsaly	Services	-	-	708	-
Heirs of Saaddine Shatila	Services	-	-	632	-
Syrian Lebanese Mission	Services	-	-	948	-
Sundry donors	Supplies	-	-	11	-
Anonymous	Services	-	-	1,658	-
New Zealand					
New Zealand Council Organizations for Relief Services Overseas (CORSO)	Cash	14,000	-	8,834	-
Norway					
Kroksnes, Arthur	Cash	-	-	141	-
Norwegian Refugee Council	Cash	8,000	-	29,771	-
Save the Children Fund (Redd Berna)	Cash	490	-	-	-
Portugal					
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation	Cash	5,000	-	-	-
Sweden					
Ericsson Messrs. L.M.	Supplies	-	583	-	-
Swedish Save the Children Federation	Cash	8,000	-	15,301	-
Switzerland					
Anderson, Malto	Cash	500	-	-	-
Feller, E.	Cash	-	-	-	231
Krbec, Miss Eva Marie	Cash	-	-	-	231
Moracchi, V.	Cash	-	-	-	1,359
[illegible]s. Weeks and Miss Krbec	Cash	93	-	-	-
[illegible]undry donors	Cash	-	-	8	24

CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED FROM NON-GOVERNMENT SOURCES
(Continued)

Name of contributor	Description	Vocational education scholarships	Other education contributions	Other contributions	Special contributions for emergency needs
		$	$	$	$
Syrian Arab Republic					
Syrian Local Authorities	Services	-	-	1,023	-
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland					
Cambridge University - UNA Refugee Department	Cash	-	-	280	210
Christian Aid	Cash	-	-	-	14,000
European Campaign for World Refugees	Cash	28,000	-	-	-
Freedom from Hunger (Tenby) Committee	Cash	504	-	-	-
May, E.G.	Cash	-	-	63	-
Mulford, Mr. and Mrs. W.	Cash	168	-	-	-
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM)	Cash	10,500	-	5,040	42,000
Petts Wood Methodist Church	Cash	504	-	-	-
Rogers, Miss M.	Cash	504	-	-	-
St. Helen's School	Cash	504	-	-	-
Standing Conference of British Organization for Aid to Refugees	Cash	-	-	-	14,000
United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Cash	-	-	-	2,800
United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Freedom from Hunger Campaign Fund)	Cash	1,484	-	-	-
Veitch, G.	Supplies	-	-	300	-
Wings of Friendship	Supplies	-	-	101	-
Sundry donors	Cash	-	-	28	-
United States of America					
American Middle East Rehabilitation Inc. (AMER)	Supplies	5,558	-	-	-
American Mission - Beirut	Services	-	-	503	-
American Women's Club of Lebanon	Cash	475	-	-	-
Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO)	Cash	15,000	40,000	5,000	-
Baird Foundation	Cash	-	-	108	-
Buehrig, Dr. Edward E.	Cash	100	-	-	-
Dahran Women's Group (ARAMCO)	Cash	-	-	380	-

CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED FROM NON-GOVERNMENT SOURCES
(Continued)

Name of contributor	Description	Vocational education scholarships	Other education contributions	Other contributions	Special contributions for emergency needs
		$	$	$	$
United States of America (Continued)					
Ford Motor Co.	Cash	25,000	-	-	-
Ford Motor Co.	Supplies	-	1,826	-	-
Garth, William Le Roy Estate	Cash	-	-	2,958	-
Hibner, Mrs. Don T. Jr.	Cash	-	-	50	-
Hoppe, Denis and Family	Cash	-	-	-	100
Lombardi, Miss Helen Brown	Cash	-	-	100	-
Mukwonago Union High School	Cash	108	-	-	-
NAJDA - American Women for the Middle East	Cash	500	-	-	-
Near East Christian Committee	Cash	-	-	154	-
Sady, Emil J.	Cash	-	-	50	-
Selby, Peter Spengler	Cash	102	-	-	-
United States Committee for Refugees	Cash	60	-	-	-
U.S. Omen	Cash	500	-	-	-
Sundry donors	Cash	35	-	182	-
International Organizations					
International Federation of Business and Professional Women					
Australia	Cash	1,020	-	-	-
Switzerland	Cash	500	-	-	-
United Kingdom	Cash	2,016	-	-	-
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	Services of Staff	-	169,973	-	-
United Nations Emergency Force (Canadian Army Contingent)	Cash	-	-	2,916	-
United Nations Emergency Force (Danor Battalion)	Cash	-	-	239	-
United Nations Emergency Force (XXV Swedish Battalion)	Cash	-	-	1,163	-
Women's Auxiliary of UNRWA	Cash	-	-	3,364	-
World Health Organization (WHO)	Services of staff or reimbursement of UNRWA staff costs in lieu	-	-	29,828	-
World Health Organization (WHO)	Supplies	-	-	696	-

CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED FROM NON-GOVERNMENT SOURCES
(Continued)

Name of contributor	Description	Vocational education scholarships	Other education contributions	Other contributions	Special contributions for emergency needs
		$	$	$	$
International Organizations (Continued)					
Zonta Helsinki	Cash	-	-	-	1,535
Zonta International	Cash	5,385	-	-	-
Sundry donors	Gift coupons	275	-	-	-
		149,306	212,382	129,827	90,812

Summary:

Vocational education scholarships contributions	$149,306
Other education contributions	212,382
Other contributions	129,827
Special contributions for emergency needs	90,812
	582,327

No. 2/67

U. N. R. W. A.

REGISTRATION STATISTICAL BULLETIN

FOR THE

SECOND QUARTER 1967

Table of Contents

Table		Page
	ABBREVIATIONS IN USE	2
	REGISTERED POPULATION	
1.	Total registered population by Country, Area and Category of registration	3
2.	Distribution of registered population by age group and category of registration	4
3.	Special Classes - Jordan and Gaza	4
	CAMP POPULATION	
4.0	Summary	5
4.1	Gaza	5
4.2	Lebanon	6
4.3	Syria	7
4.4	Jordan	8
5.	BASIC RATION UNITS DISTRIBUTED APRIL-JUNE 1967	9
	REGISTERED POPULATION MOVEMENTS	
6.1	Consolidation for April - June 1967 - Increases	10
6.2	" " " " " - Decreases	11
7.1	Recapitulation of movements 1950 - 1967 (Total registered population)	12
7.2	" " " " " (RR, B, and CRS)	13
8.	Age & Sex Statistics by year of birth and category of registration - Lebanon	14 - 15

Records & Statistics Division
UNRWA, H.Q. - Beirut

NOTE 1

Apparently very incomplete figures have been received on the registered population movements during the month of June 1967 for the following Fields:

Jordan
Gaza
Syria

The relevant columns of the tables 6.1, 6.2, 7.1 and 7.2 are therefore deleted. The June 1967 movement figures of all Fields are however included in the other tables as their incompleteness will not affect seriously the total picture therein.

ABBREVIATIONS IN USE

R	Families with some or all members eligible for Basic Rations and any other assistance. (Families in this category may include RR, RS, B, CRS and RWR).
S	Families in this category are eligible for General Education, Medical Services and some other UNRWA assistance but specifically not for Basic Rations.
N	Families with all members eligible only for restricted UNRWA assistance.
RR	Persons registered for Basic Rations.
RS	Persons registered for Basic Rations but whose entitlement has been temporarily suspended (eg. by reason of their employment by the Agency, and or placed in institutions).
RWR	Members of an "R" family registered on the same Index Cards but not eligible for Basic Rations.
CRS	Children above 1 year of age registered for Services only.
B	Babies 0 - 1 year of age.
Per.	Number of persons.
Fam.	Number of families.

Table 1

TOTAL REGISTERED POPULATION PER COUNTRY, AREA AND CATEGORY OF REGISTRATION

AS AT 30.6.67

Location		"R"							"S"		"N"		TOTAL	
		RR	RS	Babies	CRS	RWR	Total	Families	Per.	Fam.	Per.	Fam.	Persons	Families
Jordan	Amman	118734	309	2588	68629	1397	191657	31034	615	97	11351	2954	203623	34085
	Irbed	34956	114	1035	20046	382	56533	9972	177	33	4127	990	60837	10995
	Jericho	59871	553	2046	28581	982	92033	17132	417	79	4783	1476	97233	18687
	Jerusalem	61421a	514	1255	28388	1661	93239	16380	551	107	12072	3581	105862	20068
	Hebron	58389a	191	1918	27684	963	89145	14660	589	107	6230	1881	95964	16648
	Nablus	91756a	854	2172	48896	2168	145846	24046	1290	219	12657	3569	159793	27834
	Total	425127	2535	11014	222224	7553	668453	113224	3639	642	51220	14451	723312	128317
Gaza	Jabalia	37960	924	1092	6373	1068	47417	8222	173	29	1339	399	48929	8650
	Rimal	32376	1089	1208	4774	1585	41032	6838	263	52	4135	1190	45430	8080
	Zaitun	25123	474	912	3337	1784	31630	5329	185	40	5582	1677	37397	7046
	Nuseirat	31169	1127	679	4797	1518	39290	6690	164	41	2485	817	41939	7548
	Deir el Balah	22059	684	789	3084	974	27590	4722	117	26	1839	614	29546	5362
	Khan Yunis	39939	851	1652	5949	1935	50326	7950	130	29	2963	900	53419	8879
	Rafah	45529	1013	1834	7475	1904	57755	9325	373	68	2244	659	60372	10052
	Total	234155	6162	8166	35789	10768	295040	49076	1405	285	20587	6256	317032	55617
Lebanon	Central Area	48994	362	1303	2211	5083	57953	11382	12428	2615	13192	5759	83573	19756
	South Area	56215	315	1765	3098	3621	65014	12779	5309	1109	7210	3386	77533	17274
	Total	105209	677	3068	5309	8704	122967	24161	17737	3724	20402	9145	161106	37030
Syria	Damascus	64546	830	2369	15803	1581	85129	17211	1920	326	10613	5323	97662	22860
	South	15725	213	559	3773	227	20497	4003	174	27	1476	998	22147	5028
	Homs, Hama	6548	143	283	1482	242	8698	1678	236	37	1189	534	10123	2249
	North	9808	91	386	2424	271	12980	2486	220	45	1504	715	14704	3246
	Total	96627	1277	3597	23482	2321	127304	25378	2550	435	14782	7570	144636	33383
Grand	Total	861118	10651	25845	286804	29346	1213764	211839	25331	5086	106991	37422	1346086	254347

(a) Frontier Villagers entitled to half rations are accounted for in number of Persons.

Table 2

DISTRIBUTION OF REGISTERED POPULATION BY AGE GROUP, COUNTRY AND CATEGORY OF REGISTRATION AS AT 30.6.67

Location	Category of Registr.	Below 1		1 and Over		Total	
		Persons	%	Persons	%	Persons	%
Jordan	R	11014	1.6	657439	98.4	668453	100
	S	54	1.5	3585	98.5	3639	100
	N	354	0.7	50866	99.3	51220	100
Total		11422	1.6	711890	98.4	723312	100
Gaza	R	8166	2.8	286874	97.3	295040	100
	S	31	2.2	1374	97.8	1405	100
	N	206	1.0	20381	99.0	20587	100
Total		8403	2.7	308629	97.3	317032	100
Lebanon	R	3068	2.7	119899	97.3	122967	100
	S	280	1.6	17457	98.4	17737	100
	N	210	1.0	20192	99.0	20402	100
Total		3558	2.2	157548	97.8	161106	100
Syria	R	3597	2.8	123707	97.2	127304	100
	S	37	1.5	2513	98.5	2550	100
	N	60	0.4	14722	99.6	14782	100
Total		3694	2.6	140942	97.4	144636	100
Grand Total	R	25845	2.1	1187919	97.9	1213764	100
	S	402	1.6	24929	98.4	25331	100
	N	830	0.8	106161	99.2	106991	100
Agency Total		27077	2.0	1319009	98.2	1346086	100

Table 3

SPECIAL CLASSES - JORDAN & GAZA (a)

AS AT 30.6.67

Location & Class	"R"							"S"		"N"		TOTAL	
	RR	RS	B	CRS	RWR	Total	Fam.	Per.	Fam.	Per.	Fam.	Per.	Fam.
Jordan Frontier Villagets entitled to half rations:													
Jerusalem Area	4782	20	92	2788	54	7736	1420	6	2	324	149	8066	1571
Hebron "	3589	7	99	2669	52	6416	998	40	9	182	106	6638	1113
Nablus "	6957	37	67	3927	119	11107	1757	58	12	598	188	11763	1957
Total	15328	64	258	9384	225	25259	4175	104	23	1104	443	26467	4641
Jerusalem Poor	2072	-	29	760	45	2906	471	10	3	448	108	3364	582
Gaza													
Gaza Poor	956	7	38	133	46	1180	225	13	2	119	33	1312	260

(a) The special classes shown in Table 3 are incorporated in all other general statistics.

Table 4.0

CAMP POPULATION - SUMMARY

AS AT 30.6.67

Location	OFFICIAL CAMP POPULATION												Unofficial Camp Population	Total
	Families				Persons									
	R	S	N	Total	RR	RS	Bab.	CRS	RWR	S	N	Total	Persons	Persons
Jordan	39177	239	2411	41827	136027	1739	5088	79886	2724	1279	6201	232944	7334	240278
Gaza	31846	178	1976	34000	152866	5259	5395	24677	6401	813	6640	202051	3895	205946
Lebanon	12874	772	684	14330	59102	464	1996	3363	3526	4027	2920	75398	7614	83012
Syria	4248	83	543	4874	16176	311	749	4038	419	435	1057	23185	991	24176
Total	88145	1272	5614	95031	364171	7773	13228	111964	13070	6554	16818	533578	19834	553412

Table 4.1

CAMP POPULATION - G A Z A

AS AT 30.6.67

Location	OFFICIAL CAMP POPULATION												Unofficial Camp Population	Total
	Families				Persons									
	R	S	N	Total	RR	RS	Bab.	CRS	RWR	S	N	Total	Persons	Persons
Jabalia	6867	23	292	7182	32089	826	924	5355	1046	112	990	41342	75	41417
Gaza Beach	5034	34	373	5441	24207	991	962	3768	987	153	1382	32450	1018	33468
Nuseirat	3011	21	188	3220	14669	502	336	2261	695	86	605	19154	839	19993
Bureij	2397	11	178	2586	10871	530	241	1687	546	45	560	14480	464	14944
Deir el Balah	1209	5	70	1284	5695	360	238	891	252	25	212	7673	110	7783
Maghazi	1532	10	107	1649	7170	282	210	1008	334	39	324	9367	618	9985
Khan Yunis	4537	18	356	4911	22585	761	926	3430	1106	62	1132	30002	-	30002
Rafah	7259	56	412	7727	35580	1007	1558	6277	1435	291	1435	47583	771	48354
Total	31846	178	1976	34000	152866	5259	5395	24677	6401	813	6640	202051	3895	205946

Table 4.3

CAMP POPULATION - SYRIA

AS AT 30.6.67

Location	OFFICIAL CAMP POPULATION												Unofficial Camp Population	Total
	Families				Persons									
	R	S	N	Total	RR	RS	Bab.	CRS	RWR	S	N	Total	Persons	Persons
Damascus														
Khan Esheh	1047	19	69	1135	3717	90	177	976	62	111	99	5232	192	5424
Khan Danoun	432	3	6	441	1426	20	89	429	28	18	7	2017	19	2036
Damascus Total	1479	22	75	1576	5143	110	266	1405	90	129	106	7249	211	7460
South														
Dera'a	318	6	67	391	1210	19	52	317	49	40	113	1800	417	2217
South Total	318	6	67	391	1210	19	52	317	49	40	113	1800	417	2217
Homs, Hama														
Homs City	827	26	152	1005	3211	103	147	717	158	158	310	4804	100	4904
Hama	437	3	58	498	1751	19	90	420	29	18	102	2429	80	2509
Homs, Hama Total	1264	29	210	1503	4962	122	237	1137	187	176	412	7233	180	7413
North														
Neirab	1187	26	191	1404	4861	60	194	1179	93	90	426	6903	183	7086
North Total	1187	26	191	1404	4861	60	194	1179	93	90	426	6903	183	7086
Grand Total	4248	83	543	4874	16176	311	749	4038	419	435	1057	23185	991	24176

Table 4.4

CAMP POPULATION - JORDAN

AS AT 30.6.67

Location	OFFICIAL CAMP POPULATION												Unoff. * Camp Popul.	Total
	Families				Persons									
	R	S	N	Total	RR	RS	Bab.	CRS	RWR	S	N	Tot.	Pers.	Persons
Amman														
Jabal Husein	3333	6	77	3416	12085	51	342	8034	134	36	175	20857	349	21206
Amman New Camp	4010	6	124	4140	13416	43	457	10491	168	27	215	24817	1200	26017
Zerka	1605	2	105	1712	5959	39	155	3933	130	12	332	10560	557	11117
Amman Total	8948	14	306	9268	31460	133	954	22458	432	75	722	56234	2106	58340
Irbed														
Irbed Camp	2154	7	42	2203	7289	34	227	4656	108	26	153	12493	327	12820
Irbed Total	2154	7	42	2203	7289	34	227	4656	108	26	153	12493	327	12820
Jericho														
Aqbat Jabr	5132	23	263	5418	17151	250	755	8670	219	126	837	28008	772	28780
Ein Sultan	3418	19	146	3583	11165	115	638	6463	215	78	368	19042	425	19467
Nuweimeh	1007	16	56	1079	3206	48	173	1587	76	80	203	5373	25	5398
Karameh	3558	20	134	3712	13119	115	173	6051	167	100	396	20121	1033	21154
Jericho Total	13115	78	599	13792	44641	528	1739	22771	677	384	1804	72544	2255	74799
Jerusalem														
Shufat	497	2	21	520	1776	65	77	1274	48	14	64	3318	50	3368
Amari	657	6	78	741	2127	67	71	1332	74	38	221	3930	-	3930
Kalandia	901	2	139	1042	2777	65	142	1793	117	12	215	5121	350	5471
Deir Ammar	318	5	48	371	1121	50	38	534	40	22	113	1918	130	2048
Jalazone	892	4	128	1024	2760	66	105	1604	90	24	274	4923	90	5013
Jerusalem Tot.	3265	19	414	3698	10561	313	433	6537	369	110	887	19210	620	19830
Hebron														
Fawwar	875	7	57	939	2931	33	160	1621	110	24	142	5021	35	5056
Arroub	1287	11	101	1399	5153	31	249	2436	124	57	237	8287	66	8353
Dehesheh	1186	9	133	1328	4533	29	208	2444	130	52	249	7645	591	8236
Ayda	309	3	20	332	1031	7	72	721	28	21	48	1928	49	1977
Beit Jibrin	200	2	22	224	768	12	47	385	23	16	41	1292	46	1338
Hebron Total	3857	32	333	4222	14416	112	736	7607	415	170	717	24173	787	24960
Nablus														
Far'a	1118	4	139	1261	3915	109	185	2353	103	27	259	6951	109	7060
Camp No. 1	535	8	40	583	1777	46	83	992	59	32	125	3114	11	3125
Askar	1023	18	71	1112	3539	84	90	2066	95	125	210	6209	-	6209
Balata	1773	21	118	1912	6072	178	224	3577	138	133	230	10552	224	10776
Tulkarm	1423	14	124	1561	5431	59	147	2739	156	70	293	8895	268	9163
Nur Shams	713	11	103	827	2422	56	122	1428	89	54	438	4609	137	4746
Jenin	1253	13	122	1388	4504	87	148	2702	83	73	363	7960	490	8450
Nablus Total	7838	89	717	8644	27660	619	999	15857	723	514	1918	48290	1239	49529
Grand Total	39177	239	2411	41827	136027	1739	5088	79886	2724	1279	6201	232944	7334	240278

* Figures as at 31.3.67

Table 5

BASIC RATION UNITS DISTRIBUTED

APRIL - JUNE 1967

Location and Month	Rations Distributed to Ration Beneficiaries	Special Issue (a)	Total Rations Distributed
Jordan			
April	416796½	344	417140½
May	NOT YET	AVAILABLE	
June	NOT YET	AVAILABLE	
Gaza			
April	234165	377½	234542½
May	233999½	403½	234403
June	221688½	1374½	223063
Lebanon			
April	104973	6	104979
May	104926	14	104940
June	104933	13	104946
Syria			
April	96334	-	96334
May	96475	-	96475
June	96202	181	96383
Agency Total			
April	852268½	727½	852996
May	NOT YET	AVAILABLE	
June	NOT YET	AVAILABLE	

(a) The special rations issued to outstanding cases and arrivals from Gaza.

QUARTERLY CONSOLIDATION OF TOTAL REGISTERED POPULATION MOVEMENTS DURING APRIL-JUNE 67

INCREASES IN POPULATION AND/OR ENTITLEMENT

Nature of Changes	Jordan		Gaza		Lebanon		Syria		Total	
	RR	P	RR	P	RR	P	RR	P	RR	P
INCREASES IN POPULATION										
Births (Below 1 year					-	1322				
Births (1 year & over					-	391				
New Registration					-	-				
Deletion by error					10	19				
Total					10	1732				
INCREASES IN ENTITLEMENT										
Loss of Income					226	288				
" " " with UNRWA					94	97				
" " " Z & W Empl.					7	7				
" " " Abroad					218	242				
Temporary issue of rations (Trainees)					9	10				
Returned from Absence					194	211				
Issue of Rations to children					668	668				
Rans. released (Institutions)					1	1				
Miscellaneous					53	136				
Total					1470	1660				
DISTRICTS TRANSFER FROM										
Jordan					1	2				
Gaza					-	11				
Lebanon					-	-				
Syria					-	4				
Total					1	17				
AREAS TRANSFER TO										
Lebanon (Central Area					1006	1174				
Lebanon (South Area					54	68				
Centres Transfer IN					281	3205				
Separations IN					303	441				
Total					1644	4888				
Grand Total					3125	8297				

See NOTE on Page 1 .

Table 6.2

QUARTERLY CONSOLIDATION OF TOTAL REGISTERED POPULATION MOVEMENTS DURING APRIL-JUNE 67

DECREASES IN POPULATION AND/OR ENTITLEMENT

Nature of Change	Jordan		Gaza		Lebanon		Syria		Total	
	RR	P	RR	P	RR	P	RR	P	RR	P
DECREASES IN POPULATION										
(Below 1 year					-	25				
Deaths(1 year & over					167	222				
False & Duplicate Regist.					12	622				
Non Refugees					6	6				
Total					185	875				
DECREASES IN ENTITLEMENT										
Increase in Income					377	466				
Employment with UNRWA					60	171				
" Z & W Employee					2	2				
" Abroad					359	487				
Temp. removing of Rans. (Trainees)					2	3				
Perm. " " " (Graduates)					8	8				
Absence					259	305				
Withdrawal of Rans. from CRS					-	-				
Rans. Suspended (Institutions)					36	36				
Miscellaneous					116	151				
Total					1219	1629				
DISTRICTS TRANSFER TO										
Jordan					-	27				
Gaza					-	-				
Lebanon					-	-				
Syria					-	5				
Total					-	32				
AREAS TRANSFER FROM										
(Central Area					209	243				
Lebanon (South Area					851	999				
Centres Transfers OUT					281	3205				
Separations OUT					303	441				
Total					1644	4888				
Grand Total					3048	7424				

See NOTE on Page 1.

Table 7.1

RECAPITULATION OF MOVEMENTS JULY 50 - JUNE 67 (a)

TOTAL REGISTERED POPULATON

Nature of Changes	Jordan		Gaza		Lebanon		Syria		Israel	Total	
	July 66 June 67	July 50 June 67	July 66 June 67	July 50 June 67	July 66 June 67	July 50 June 67	July 66 June 67	July 50 June 67	July 50 June 52	July 66 June 67	July 50 June 67
Increases											
Births		301291		156594	5999	80701		74331	839		613756
New Registration		38359		4277	56	2827		1957	168		47588
Districts Transfer IN		8357		944	33	2151		4182	-		16134
Areas " IN		215877		119049	3448	29278		34803	818		399825
Separation IN		75937		46650	1940	30973		27825	-		181385
Miscellaneous		-		3453	-	-		1706	-		5159
Adjustments		720		1814	-	1278		992	65		4869
Total Increases		641041		332781	11476	147208		145796	1890		1268716
Decreases											
Deaths		51535		37066	957	17070		17241	217		123129
False & Dupl. Registr.		50940		3971	7818	13900		830	-		69641
Districts Transfer OUT		2668		5138	111	4195		2453	240		14694
Area " OUT		215878		119051	3448	29240		34814	818		399801
Separations OUT		76122		46650	1940	30973		27823	-		181568
Miscellaneous		26226		-	-	16573		-	46366		89165
Adjustments		560		2100	-	1751		193	49		4653
Total Decreases		423929		213976	14274	113702		83354	47960		882651
Net Increase + or Decrease -		+ 217112		+ 118805	- 2798	+33506		+ 62442	-45800		+ 386065
Population at 30 June 1967	723312		317032		161106		144636			1,346.086	

(a) See Note on Page 1

Table 7.2

REGAPITULATION OF MOVEMENTS JULY 1950 - JUNE 1967[a]

REFUGEES REGISTERED FOR RATIONS, THEIR BABIES & CHILDREN REGISTERED FOR SERVICES

Nature of Changes	Jordan		Gaza		Lebanon		Syria		Israel	Total	
	July 66 June 67	July 50 June 67	July 66 June 67	July 50 June 67	July 66 June 67	July 50 June 67	July 66 June 67	July 50 June 67	July 50 June 52	July 66 June 67	July 50 June 67
Increases											
Births		297699		153558	4963	75786		73539	839		601421
New Registration		37272		4224	11	2584		1886	168		46134
Loss of Income		19423		7691	2378	37089		5407	-		69610
Issue Rations (Trainees)		7943		2730	273	4448		3947	-		19068
Returned from Absence		1624		10769	458	3753		1512	-		17658
Miscellaneous Additions		18308		5110	444	5983		2891	-		32292
Districts Transfer IN		8445		887	1	2028		4002	-		15362
Areas Transfer IN		213273		117295	3182	27861		33755	818		393002
Separations IN		69023		44286	1431	23722		24600	-		161631
Adjustments		3026		1512	104	1615		1675	65		7893
Total Increases		676036		348062	13245	184869		153214	1890		1364071
Decreases											
Deaths		49842		35717	810	15873		16859	217		118508
False & Duplicate Regis.		49764		2488	71	4825		695	-		57772
Increases in Income		33976		23680	4387	69670		13125	5436		145887
Trainees & Graduates		35174		7536	633	10031		8657	-		61398
Absence		10555		26162	1292	11120		4860	-		52697
Miscellaneous Deletions		56188		4329	1347	29646		5706	40930		136799
Districts Transfer OUT		2554		4715	11	3914		2290	240		13713
Areas Transfer OUT		213274		117297	3182	27805		33766	818		392960
Separations OUT		69208		44286	1431	23722		24590	-		161814
Adjustments		3336		1969	79	2277		1146	49		8777
Total Decreases		523871		268179	13243	198883		111702	47690		1150325
Net Increase + or Decrease		+ 152165		+ 79883	+ 2	- 4014		+ 41512	- 45800		+ 213746
Population at 30 June 67	658365		278110		113586		123706			1,173.767	

(a) See Note on Page 1

Table 8

AGE AND SEX STATISTICS BY YEAR OF BIRTH AND

CATEGORY OF REGISTRATION - LEBANON

AS AT 30.6.67

Year of Birth	Age	Number of Persons								Grand Total
		Males				Females				
		R	S	N	Total	R	S	N	Total	
1967	0-1	577	36	12	625	549	28	11	588	1213
66	1	2103	126	89	2318	1845	122	88	2055	4373
65	2	2471	195	108	2774	2180	174	88	2442	5216
64	3	2674	211	125	3010	2305	203	127	2635	5645
63	4	2790	230	151	3171	2536	256	141	2933	6104
62	5	2473	227	147	2847	2304	223	132	2659	5506
61	6	2209	224	132	2565	2009	192	119	2320	4885
60	7	2316	230	151	2697	2229	214	119	2562	5259
59	8	1903	197	102	2202	1811	190	94	2095	4297
58	9	2142	228	129	2499	1911	208	100	2219	4718
57	10	1802	190	131	2123	1628	171	90	1889	4012
56	11	1730	191	103	2024	1541	181	99	1821	3845
55	12	1766	229	103	2098	1605	157	88	1850	3948
54	13	1548	199	97	1844	1345	192	91	1628	3472
53	14	1515	202	106	1823	1410	190	97	1697	3520
52	15	1479	207	113	1799	1320	179	102	1601	3400
51	16	1449	198	118	1765	1331	210	137	1678	3443
50	17	1186	221	126	1533	1056	174	151	1381	2914
49	18	1063	194	136	1393	921	167	167	1255	2648
48	19	1119	226	204	1549	1000	180	241	1421	2970
47	20	1302	260	291	1853	1167	222	304	1693	3546
46	21	1295	234	271	1800	1021	236	345	1602	3402
45	22	1283	255	343	1881	1108	215	446	1769	3650
44	23	1129	247	326	1702	992	176	409	1577	3279
43	24	1082	264	308	1654	943	177	450	1570	3224
42	25	935	217	285	1437	707	144	367	1218	2655
41	26	929	263	283	1515	738	124	394	1256	2771
40	27	834	215	322	1371	685	123	330	1138	2509
39	28	872	231	338	1441	723	108	371	1202	2643
38	29	892	230	335	1457	666	94	409	1169	2626
37	30	744	196	246	1186	575	81	357	1013	2199
36	31	773	196	308	1277	641	104	378	1123	2400
35	32	681	171	231	1083	616	98	348	1062	2145
34	33	478	134	187	799	483	64	307	854	1653
33	34	638	137	198	973	564	79	259	902	1875
32	35	451	105	172	728	430	77	227	734	1462
31	36	670	115	191	976	651	85	200	936	1912
30	37	621	132	166	919	583	89	203	875	1794
29	38	486	102	164	752	468	82	145	695	1447
28	39	427	75	127	629	419	78	142	639	1268
27	40	379	84	108	571	382	85	99	566	1137
26	41	661	71	117	849	788	97	101	986	1835
25	42	577	96	119	792	682	103	133	918	1710
24	43	450	96	99	645	448	80	114	642	1287
23	44	399	71	85	555	361	81	111	553	1108
1922	45	284	70	74	428	276	59	59	394	822

Year of Birth	Age	Number of Persons								Grand Total
		Males				Females				
		R	S	N	Total	R	S	S	Total	
1921	46	616	72	62	750	687	81	60	828	1578
20	47	503	94	63	660	517	97	70	684	1344
19	48	238	57	47	342	240	67	63	370	712
18	49	265	61	39	365	220	45	65	330	695
17	50	188	42	34	264	137	44	51	232	496
16	51	442	46	38	526	570	53	45	668	1194
15	52	391	62	70	523	509	94	86	689	1212
14	53	267	64	62	393	225	72	73	370	763
13	54	218	60	50	328	208	69	71	348	676
12	55	210	56	47	313	194	62	66	322	635
11	56	585	67	45	697	715	76	77	868	1565
10	57	433	92	79	604	527	91	88	706	1310
09	58	177	66	61	304	171	58	72	301	605
08	59	185	57	53	295	116	35	47	198	493
07	60	118	35	46	199	110	40	37	187	386
06	61	470	61	53	584	422	51	54	527	1111
05	62	353	54	58	465	328	55	69	452	917
04	63	176	43	54	273	176	33	53	262	535
03	64	149	37	40	226	118	27	46	191	417
02	65	126	42	30	198	92	25	35	152	350
01	66	385	35	41	461	385	44	36	465	926
1900	67	422	50	93	565	495	52	42	589	1154
1899	68	93	31	34	158	108	16	34	158	316
98	69	83	29	25	137	92	15	25	132	269
97	70	80	16	17	113	48	14	20	82	195
1896-1860	71 & over	1378	163	201	1742	1426	129	208	1763	3505
Total		64178	9720	9519	83417	58789	8017	10883	77689	161106

CONFIDENTIAL

(1822/67)

2 AUG 1967

8 AUG 1967

Mr Greenhill 3/8.
Sir L. Glass 4/8
Col Sweeney 4/8
Mr Darwin
Miss Hardy 7/8
Mr Mann

U.K. Representative
to the United Nations
New York.

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S

EMBASSY

(J.P. Tripp)

The onset of the bitter Jordanian winter weather seems bound to make the plight of the refugees, or therefore their trouble-making ability for King Hussein's regime, much more serious. Even if a great deal of new international money is forthcoming, cold & hunger will increase.

M E Norton 3/8

AMMAN.
31.7.67

1827/78/67

CONFIDENTIAL

Summary of Amman Despatch No.15 of the 31st of July, 1967: The Refugee Problem in Jordan

1. Immediately after the outbreak of war on the 5th of June about 125,000 people fled from the West Bank to the East Bank of Jordan. This created a refugee problem of appalling size for the Jordan Government which they were at first unable to handle (paras. 1 - 5).

2. By the 20th of July the numbers who had crossed to East Jordan reached 215,000 and strenuous efforts were made by various international and voluntary organisations, notably UNRWA, but also the British Save the Children Fund, to assist the Jordanian Government in the work of looking after the refugees (paras. 6 - 12).

3. Conditions in the camps are now slowly improving but there will be difficulties when winter comes. The majority of refugees would like to go home, but Israeli administrative difficulties look as if they will delay this for some considerable time. (paras.12-14).

4. Her Majesty's Government has since the war given considerable help to Jordan for the refugees but if the return to their homes is delayed much longer it may create further economic and political problems for Jordan. The only acceptable solution is to return the refugees to the West Bank as soon as possible (paras. 15 - 16).

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BRITISH EMBASSY,

No.15 AMMAN.

(1822/67) 31 July, 1967.

Sir, The Refugee Problem in Jordan

On the 5th of June when fighting broke out between Israel and the Arabs a host of Palestinian refugees fled from the West Bank to the East Bank of Jordan. In the ten days to the 15th of June it is estimated that about 125,000 people, mainly from Jerusalem, Ramallah and Jericho, crossed the river. Few of these people were able to take anything with them and the majority were destitute on arrival.

2. By the 7th of June all the bridges over the river Jordan had been destroyed. However, the Allenby and Damia bridges remained passable for people on foot and it was here that most of the refugees came across. The Jordan Government were appalled by the size of the problem confronting them and frequent broadcasts were made telling the Palestinians to stay in their homes or camps and not to cross over to East Jordan. At one stage the Director of Public Security was ordered to stop the crossings, by force if necessary. He replied that this was an impossible order and refused to obey. The flow of people across the bridges continued.

/3.

The Right Honourable
George Brown, M.P.,
Etc., Etc., Etc.,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Meanwhile, on the East Bank Jordanians searched for news of their families and friends from the West Bank. No normal means of communication with the other side existed and alarming rumours of heavy military and civilian casualties at Jenin, Jerusalem, Jericho and Ramallah increased anxiety and heightened the feeling of tension. Enterprising boys, using fords or swimming the river, carried messages to and from the West Bank for a fee. Foreign Missions with Consulates in Jerusalem were inundated with requests for help in tracing West Bank families.

4. Most of the refugees who came across found their way to the Amman/Zerqa area and were temporarily accommodated by the Jordanian authorities in schools and hostels. Others descended like locusts on their relatives and friends. Some 8/9,000 unfortunates were put into a transit camp at Wadi Dhuleil on the edge of the Syrian desert: a "camp" which had no tents, no sanitation and an inadequate water supply.

5. Relief supplies were sent to Jordan from many countries, including Britain. Her Majesty's Government's immediate help was of £20,000 worth of blankets and tents which were delivered by air from Cyprus by aircraft provided by the International Red Cross. At the outset of the crisis, in the aftermath of the fighting, the Jordan Government, apparently stunned and disorientated like the people, were incapable of organising the reception and distribution of relief supplies. Two committees were formed and disbanded

/without

without achieving anything, before eventually a Ministerial Committee for Refugees was set up, comprising the Ministers of Finance, National Economy, Education, Social Welfare, Health and Reconstruction and Development, the Director of Public Security and the President of the Jordan Red Crescent Society. This Committee almost immediately decided to give UNRWA a free hand in setting up new camps each to hold 10,000 people at Suf, South Shuneh, Ghor el Wahadneh, Maadi, Karameh (extension) and Marqa, where the Evangelische Hilfwerke of West Germany announced its intention of opening a camp for 5,000 people. In addition, other camps under government control were planned for Karak, Tafila, Ma'an and a properly organised transit camp at Wadi Dhuleil.

6. During the first stage, before UNRWA took a hand, non-Government bodies shouldered most of the burden of providing relief. The Jordan Red Crescent Society was quickly swamped with requests for news about relatives on the West Bank and individual requests for assistance and for a time was unable to do anything constructive for refugees. Its Iranian counterpart, The Red Lion and Sun Society, set up a camp for 5,000 people at Jiza, some 20 kilometres south of Amman where it provided tents, sanitation, medical facilities and food stores before allowing any refugees in. This organisation seems to have been particularly efficient in the period of organisational muddle.

/The

The British Save the Children Fund teams moved at once to Wadi Dhuleil where they worked unremittingly to alleviate the hardships of over 2,000 children living under appalling conditions. Some local organisations, such as the Y.W.C.A., also worked hard to provide hot food and clothing for refugees living in schools in Amman. On the whole, the problem was too much for the Jordanians to tackle effectively on their own with only voluntary helpers.

7. From the 15th to the 20th of June the number of refugees crossing the Jordan fell to a trickle and there were unfounded rumours circulating that many people were going back to the West Bank. Then on the 20th of June a new wave of refugees started to come over from such areas as Hebron, Bethlehem, Nablus, Jenin and Qalkiliya. They were transported with some of their possessions to the Allenby and Damia bridges in Israeli trucks and buses, apparently they were being given every facility to leave the West Bank. They have been given none to return home.

8. It is estimated that in the period from the 5th of June to the 20th of July the number of refugees who crossed to East Jordan was 215,000, of whom about 100,000 were "old" refugees from UNRWA camps on the West Bank. The remainder were "new" refugees, created by the recent fighting. Eye-witnesses report that West Bankers are even now still crossing the Jordan at a rate of over 500 a day, indicating

/that

that the final figure of those who have fled from the West Bank may well be in excess of a quarter of a million.

9. For the present, therefore, the Jordanian authorities have to think in terms of up to a quarter of a million refugees, the majority of whom will need some temporary assistance, even though many (perhaps 190,000) will continue to live with friends and relatives rather than in camps.

10. On the 1st of July the Jordan Government started to move the refugees out of schools and hostels in Amman where they had been temporarily housed and into the new camps listed at Appendix A. These camps have a total population at present of about 60,000, but are planned to accommodate 75,000 or about one-third of the present additional refugees.

11. Life in these camps seems to be slowly improving from the disgraceful conditions of the first few weeks. UNRWA with its wide experience and facilities has shouldered the main burden of work and will continue to do so. A great deal still remains to be done and there is considerable need for additional assistance in the form of supplementary feeding, particularly for children, more tents, family kitchens and, later, schools and recreational facilities.

12. After a recent visit to Suf (one of the better run UNRWA camps) an eye witness reported as follows, "There are about 12,500 people in this camp, which is

/grossly

grossly overcrowded. At present the food is cooked in Jerash town (about 5 kilometres away) and brought out to the camp, but it is hoped to switch to dry rations in all the UNRWA camps as soon as possible and people will then prepare their own food. They have already constructed their own bakeries, built mud walls round the tents, and used camel thorn for privacy and shelter. The latrines are totally inadequate for so many people. A complete street of shops has sprung up - tailors, barbers, a shoemaker, general stores, hardware, butcher etc. run by the refugees themselves and some merchants from Jerash. A regular bus service runs to and from the camp. Goats, sheep and chickens have been brought in and are settling round the tents. A medical centre is run by two doctors and four nurses but they are very overworked, mainly by cases of children suffering from malnutrition. It is hoped to send in a Save the Children Fund team shortly."

13. The majority of refugees would now, it is believed, like to go back "home" to the West Bank, but so far the Israelis have only permitted 50 families to return. Israeli "administrative difficulties" look like delaying the return of any significant number of refugees at least for some considerable time. The International Red Cross has been trying for the last four weeks to find an acceptable formula for the return of refugees to the West Bank and it has been suggested that the Jordanians, by refusing to allow the Red Cross to

/distribute

distribute questionnaire forms are responsible for the postponement of the return of refugees to their homes. But the Jordanian view is that the United Nations recommended the "unconditional return" of West Bankers. They say, with some justice, that the Israelis are laying down conditions in defiance of the U.N. Resolution and that these are unacceptable.

14. Very little planning has been done to tackle the long term problems of the refugees, since most Jordanians hope that the West Bank will be returned to Jordan before the winter. If (as now seems possible) most of the new camps have to be kept open when winter comes, because of no significant return of the refugees to the West Bank, much more help will be needed. Some form of heating and drainage will be required in the camps outside the "ghor" and at Jiza new tents will be needed, as those provided by the Iranian Red Lion and Sun Society are not suitable for use in winter.

15. Since the end of the five-day war Her Majesty's Government have given considerable help to Jordan. In addition to their immediate gift of £20,000 worth of supplies and the subsequent grant of £500,000 for relief and rehabilitation works we have restored our cut of $500,000 to UNRWA and collected a considerable sum of money from appeals launched by friends of Jordan in the United Kingdom. The money so raised is being distributed through the British Relief Fund for Jordan

/which

which was set up to co-ordinate the distribution of British aid to the maximum advantage.

16. The only acceptable solution of the new refugees problem would be to return as many as possible of those who have come over to the East Bank as a result of the recent fighting to their homes on the West Bank. The Government (and East Jordanians as a whole) are anxious that this should happen for economic and political reasons. The new refugees are, in their opinion, a burden on the economy, potential unemployed trouble-makers and an unacceptable security risk. If the return of the refugees to their homes is delayed very much longer the strain on the already weakened Jordan economy will intolerably increase as well as the likelihood of political unrest.

17. I am sending a copy of this despatch, with enclosure, to H.M. Representatives at Beirut, Tel Aviv, Washington, Jedda, Bahrein Kuwait, Tehran, U.K. Mission, New York and U.K. Mission, Geneva, and to Her Majesty's Consul-General in Jerusalem.

I have the honour to be
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(J.P. Tripp)

APPENDIX A

New Refugee Camps East Jordan

	Location	Capacity	Responsible body
1.	Wadi Dhuleil	10,000	Jordan Government
2.	Suf	10,000	UNRWA
3.	Marqa	5,000	Evangelische Hilfswerke and UNRWA
4.	Jiza	5,000	Red Lion & Sun Society
5.	Karak	5,000	Jordan Government
6.	Ghor el Wahadneh	10,000	UNRWA
7.	Maadi	10,000	UNRWA
8.	Karameh (extension)	10,000	UNRWA
9.	Shuneh (South)	10,000	UNRWA

Other possible Camps

10.	Tafila	?	Jordan Government
11.	Ma'an	?	Jordan Government

— 1827/77/67

No. 125
(1827/77/67)

(-/74)

The Acting Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to his Note No. PO 230 PAL (4-1) of 10 July, transmitting a copy of the General Assembly's Resolution No. 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July, has the honour to state as follows.

As regards facilitating the transport of supplies to all areas in which assistance is being rendered (Operative Paragraph 8 of Resolution No. 2252), Her Majesty's Government arranged with the International Red Cross for the latter to transport by air from Cyprus to Amman blankets and medical supplies made available from United Kingdom Government stocks.

Operative Paragraph 9 of the Resolution appealed to all Governments to make special contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. As the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom informed the Secretary-General in his letter No. 1072/1192 of 19 June, 1967, Her Majesty's Government have made an emergency contribution of $500,000 to the Agency in addition to the $4.5 million already pledged for 1966/67.

Her Majesty's Government have also given £500,000 to the Government of Jordan for urgent rehabilitation and reconstruction work in Jordan. This grant, and the gift of emergency supplies from stocks in Cyprus referred to above, constitute direct contributions to assistance for the area which Her Majesty's Government hope will lessen the burden on the funds of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

The Acting Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the assurance of his highest consideration.

United Kingdom Mission
to the United Nations,
New York.

7 August, 1967.

INDEXED

1827/76/67

CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY AMMAN

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 960

DATE 4 AUGUST

7 AUG 1967

CONFIDENTIAL.

R. 9.54 a.m. 5 August

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 960. OF 4 AUGUST.

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK No. 120 AND UKMIS GENEVA.

(1/75)

RETURN OF REFUGEES TO THE WEST BANK.

TROYON THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE I.C.R.C. IN JORDAN TOLD MR. MAUDLING YESTERDAY THAT HE HOPED VERY SOON TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE ISRAELIS AND THE JORDANIANS ON A DOCUMENT FOR USE IN RETURNING REFUGEES TO THE WEST BANK. THE DOCUMENT WOULD HAVE AT THE TOP THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS EMBLEM AND ON EACH SIDE OF IT REFERENCES RESPECTIVELY TO THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE KINGDOM OF JTRDAN. TROYON ADDED THAT THE JTRDANIANS HAD ALREADY AGREED TO THE USE OF THIS FORM AND HE EXPECTED TO HEAR WITHIN THE NEXT 48 HOURS THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD SIMILARLY AGREED. IN FACT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY HERE HAS HEARD THAT ISRAELI AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE HAS ALREADY BEEN GIVEN.

2. TROYON STRESSED THAT, EVEN AFTER AGREEMENT ON THE USE OF THIS DOCUMENT, IT WOULD TAKE THE I.R.R.C. TEAM HERE SEVERAL WEEKS TO HAVE THE FORMS PREPARED (THEY ARE TO BE PRINTED IN ISRAEL) AND DISTRIBUTED TO THE REFUGEES IN JORDAN. THEREAFTER

CONFIDENTIAL

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INDEXED

THE COMPLETED FORMS WOULD HAVE TO BE RETURNED TO THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES WHO, IF THEY APPROVED A REFUGEE'S APPLICATION TO RETURN, WOULD DETACH A COUNTERFOIL FROM THE FORM. THIS WOULD BE RETURNED TO THE I.R.R.C. TEAM IN JORDAN WHO WOULD HAND IT TO THE REFUGEE CONCERNED TO ACT AS HIS PERMIT FOR CROSSING OVER TO THE WEST BANK.

3. TROYON SAID THAT HIS TEAM HOPED TO USE FOUR BRIDGES ACROSS THE JORDAN FOR THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES AND PLANNED TO SEND 500 PERSONS A DAY OVER EACH. HE HOPED U.N.R.W.A. WOULD ESTABLISH FORWARD TRANSIT CAMPS FROM WHICH PEOPLE WOULD CROSS THE RIVER TO THE WEST BANK AND THAT THE JORDANIAN ARMY WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR TRANSPORTING REFUGEES UP TO THE RIVER. IN ANSWER TO MR. MAUDLING'S QUESTION AS TO HOW MANY REFUGEES HE THOUGHT WOULD WISH TO RETURN, TROYON SAID THAT HE WOULD BE SURPRISED IF MORE THAN 20,000 REPEAT 20,000 WERE IN FACT TO CHOOSE TO DO SO. THUS THE OPERATION WHEN IT STARTED WOULD IN THEORY NOT TAKE MORE THAN TEN DAYS. HE ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS FIGURE WAAS ONLY HIS OWN PERSONAL HUNCH AND HE MIGHT BE UNDULY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE NUMBER WISHING TO RETURN.

4. IN ANSWER TO A FURTHER QUESTION, HE SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE REPRESENTATIVES OF THEL I.C.R.C. IN THE WEST BANK DURING THE OPERATION TO CHECK THAT REFUGEES WERE RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL HOMES OR CAMPS. HE COMMENTED AT VARIOUS PLACES THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE EXTENSIVE REBUILDING TO ACCOMMODATE THOSE WHO HAD FLED FROM THEIR HOMES.

/Repeated by Foreign Office to UKMIS New York as 4036/

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ADAMS

- 1827/75/67

10 AUG 1967

EN CLAIR

ROTINE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 934 10 AUGUST 1967 R. 2.28 p.m.

ADDSD TO FO TEL NO 934 OF 10/8 RFI AMMAN BEIRUT CAIRO UKMIS No. 196
NEWYORK/UKDEL GENEVA WTON AND SAVING TO JERUSALEM.

MY TEL 863 OF 25 JULY.

RETURN OF REFUGEES.

THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY, WED 9 AUGUST, THAT THE RETURN OF WEST BANK REFUGEES FROM JORDAN IS EXPECTED TO BEGIN NEXT WEEK FOLLOWING THE AGREEMENT ON THE FORMALITIES REACHED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN ON SUNDAY 6 AUGUST.

2. THE AGREED APPLICATION FORMS BEAR THE HEADINGS STATE OF ISRAEL ON THE RIGHT HAND SIDE, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RED CROSS IN THE MIDDLE, AND HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN ON THE LEFT. EACH OF THESE HEADINGS APPEARS IN HEBREW, ARABIC AND ENGLISH.

. A BATCH OF 10,000 APPLICATION FORMS WAS HANDED OVER TO THE RED CROSS ON 7 AUGUST AND REMAINDER OF THE FORMS WILL BE DELIVERED THIS WEEK. THE ISRAEL AUTHORITIES EXPECT TO RECEIVED THE FIRST COMPLETED FORMS BY THE WEEKEND. THEY SAY THAT THEY HAVE MADE ALL THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS TO EXPEDITE THE PROCESSING OF THESE FORMS AND TO GIVE EARLY REPLIES TO THE APPLICANTS THROUGH THE RED CROSS. THEY HAVE RESERVED THE RIGHT TO REFUSE CERTAIN APPLICATIONS ON THE

/GROUNDS

INDEXED

GROUNDS THAT THEY WOULD CONSTITUTE SECURITY OR CRIMINAL RISKS.

4. THE GOVT PRESS OFFICE HAVE ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR HAS DECIDED THAT PERMANENT RESIDENTS OF THE WEST BANK WHO LEFT THE COUNTRY PRIOR TO 5 JUNE AND ARE STILL ABROAD MAY APPLY TO REJOIN THEIR FAMILIES. THE MINISTER HAS RULED THAT RESIDENTS OF THE WEST BANK POSSESSING VALID PASSPORTS MAY LEAVE THE COUNTRY PERMANENTLY AFTER RECEIVING APPROVAL. IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES PERMANENT RESIDENTS MAY LEAVE THE COUNTRY OF LIMITED PERIODS.

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Enter & submit with pp.

4 AUG 1967

EJ2/8

FOREIGN OFFICE,

S. W. 1.

1 August, 1967

Dear Egerton,

Aid for the Middle East

Please refer to your Note No. 111 (1827/54/67) of 12 July to the Secretary-General.

2. Please now reply substantively to the Secretary-General on the following lines. As regards facilitating the transport of supplies to all areas in which assistance is being rendered (operative para 8 of Resolution 2252), HMG arranged with the International Red Cross for the latter to transport by air to Amman blankets and medical supplies made available from British Government stocks in Cyprus. As regards contributions to UNRWA (operative para 9) you should, of course, mention HMG's emergency contribution of $500,000, which was additional to the $4.5 million already pledged. You should add that by agreeing to provide a grant of £500,000 for urgent rehabilitation and reconstruction in Jordan, and by making available from stocks in Cyprus the emergency supplies already referred to, HMG has made direct contributions to assistance for the area, which should help to facilitate the work of the Agency.

Yours sincerely,

(I. S. Winchester)

S. L. Egerton, Esq.,
New York.

DPI N.Y.

4/8

INDEXED

1827/73/67

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

2 AUG 1967

TELEGRAM NO. 2518

2 AUGUST 1967

CONFIDENTIAL /PRIORITY/

R. 2.16 p.m.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2518 OF 2 AUGUST

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN TEL AVIV AND UKMIS NEW YORK. No. 381

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1689 TO TEL AVIV: REFUGEES.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY ARE THINKING OF MAKING A FURTHER DEMARCH TO THE ISRAELIS ABOUT REFUGEES SHORTLY. THEY ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED OVER THE NEED TO FIND SOME SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM BEFORE WINTER COMES, AS THEY UNDERSTAND THAT THE TEMPORARY CAMPS IN WHICH THE NEW REFUGEES ON THE EAST BANK ARE NOW LODGED ARE ENTIRELY UNSUITABLE FOR WINTER CONDITIONS. IF NO PROGRESS IS MADE ON THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO THE WEST BANK, IT WILL MEAN HEAVY EXPENDITURE BY U.N.R.W.A. TO PROVIDE WINTER ACCOMMODATION AND WORK ON THIS WILL HAVE TO BEGIN SHORTLY.

2. THE AMERICANS PROPOSE, HOWEVER, WAITING A LITTLE LONGER TO SEE IF THE RED CROSS HAVE ANY SUCCESS IN NEGOTIATING BETWEEN AMMAN AND TEL AVIV BEFORE APPROACHING THE ISRAELIS AGAIN.

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CONFIDENTIAL

INDEXED

-1827/72/67

16

-2 AUG 1967

CYPHER CAT A

SECRET

ROUTINE FOREIGN OFFICE

TO TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM NO 1689

1 AUGUST 67

R. 9.52 a.m. 2 August.

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 1689 OF 1 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK. No. 3996

JORDAN/ISRAEL

1062/50

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 2497.

1062/49

YOU SHOULD NOW SPEAK TO THE ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TELEGRAM NO 8380 TO WASHINGTON.

YOU SHOULD ALSO STRESS TO THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT MY CONTINUING CONCERN AND THAT OF PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC OPINION HERE ABOUT THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. IN DOING THIS, YOU SHOULD POINT TO THE BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON WORLD OPINION OF THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ALLOW THE NEW REFUGEES TO RETURN. WITHOUT GOING INTO THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF THE DISPUTE ABOUT THE FORMS TO BE USED FOR THE DOCUMENTATION OF THE REFUGEES, WE BELIEVE THAT HUMANE CONSIDERATIONS DICTATE THAT THESE ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES SHOULD BE CUT AWAY, SO THAT THE BULK OF THESE PEOPLE MAY RETURN TO THEIR HOMES ON THE WEST BANK - WHETHER IN UNRWA CAMPS OR ELSEWHERE - BEFORE THE ONSET OF COOLER WEATHER MAKES THEIR PLIGHT EVEN WORSE. ISRAEL CAN ONLY GAIN POLITICALLY FROM BEHAVING IN A WAY WHICH WILL DEMONSTRATE HER

SECRET /GOODWILL TO.....

-173.

INDEXED

GOODWILL TO WORLD OPINION AND TAKE THE STEAM OUT OF ARAB ACCUSATIONS ABOUT ISRAELI INDIFFERENCE TO THE REFUGEES.

2. H.M. AMBASSADOR, AMMAN, SHOULD, ON HIS RETURN, SEEK AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO KING HUSSEIN ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. IF KING HUSSEIN RAISES THE TOPIC OF HIS PROPOSED VISIT TO MOSCOW 1062/52. AGAIN, AND SEEMS TO EXPECT A COMMENT, MR ADAMS SHOULD SAY THAT WE SEE NO OBJECTION TO SUCH A VISIT AND WOULD AGREE THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME ADVANTAGE FOR HIM IN MAKING IT (PARAGRAPH 5 OF AMMAN TELEGRAM 933). 1062/48 THE KING WILL OF COURSE BE WELL AWARE THAT, ALTHOUGH RECENT EVENTS HAVE CREATED EMBARRASSMENTS FOR THE RUSSIANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THEY HAVE NOT CHANGED THEIR BASIC POLICY OF SUPPORTING THE REVOLUTIONARY ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND TRYING TO UNDERMINE THE MODERATE ONES WHICH HAVE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE WEST.

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26 JUL 1967

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under comps.

Press Release PAL/1054
20 July 1967
Sent 25-7-67

UNRWA ARRANGES FOR BELGIAN AIRLIFT OF TENTS
FOR ARAB REFUGEES IN SYRIA

(The following was received from the New York office of UNRWA.)

An airlift of 1,400 family-size tents, donated by voluntary agencies in the United Kingdom and urgently required for newly-displaced Arab refugees, is being carried out by Belgian military aircraft at the request of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

The first consignment of tents from London is scheduled to arrive in Beirut on 21 July in two "flying boxcar" aircraft placed at the disposal of UNRWA for emergency relief work by the Government of Belgium. Further flights will be made by the Belgian aircraft until all the tents have reached the Middle East.

The tents are urgently required by UNRWA in Syria to shelter Palestine refugee families displaced from the Qunaitra District by the recent war. There are 140,000 Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA in Syria, of whom some 16,000 are known to be newly-displaced from the Quanaitra District, and are now in the Damascus and Dera'a areas, where they are receiving emergency relief from UNRWA.

INDEXED

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1967

Vol. 3. (71-)

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1827

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United Nations Relief and Works Agency: contributions and issues concerning Palestine refugees. January 1-December 31, 1967. MS Refugee Records from the Foreign Office, 1947-1970 FO 961/26. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Refugees, Relief, and Resettlement, link.gale.com/apps/doc/IESZQJ203966197/RRRW?u=omni&sid=bookmark-RRRW&pg=1. Accessed 6 Jan. 2025.

Gale Document Number:GALE|IESZQJ203966197